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Recent Cases
CIVIL CONSPIRACY IN MISSOURI
Stephan v. World Wide Sports, Inc.'
In August of 1965, defendant Roger Scherck arranged for two boxers
to meet with the plaintiff in California. In California, the boxers signed
contracts for three and seven years, respectively, with the plaintiff who
agreed to manage them in return for a promised percentage of their
earnings. The contract provided that no other persons would share in the
ring earnings of the boxers. The plaintiff, however, had difficulty managing
the fighters and they returned to St. Louis in October of that year. In May
of 1966, the defendant World Wide Sports, Inc. contracted with one of the
boxers to be his exclusive manager for 10 years and subsequently set up
fights for both boxers. Defendant Scherck, who was apparently a director
of World Wide Sports, participated in these proceedings. The plaintiff sued
these defendants and John Healy, the vice-president of the defendant cor-
poration, seeking $100,000 actual damages and $150,000 punitive damages
for conspiracy to cause a breach of contract. After directing a verdict for the
defendants, the circuit court sustained plaintiffs motion for a new trial
finding that it had erred in granting defendant's motion for directed ver-
dict. Holding that the evidence was sufficient to make a submissible case
and that the plaintiff's contracts with the fighters were not nullities, the
Missouri Supreme Court affirmed as to defendants Scherck and World
Wide Sports, Inc. The suit was dismissed as to defendant Healy, however,
since there was insufficient evidence to show that he knew the terms of
the fighters' previous contract.2
As stated in Rosen v. Alside, Inc.,3 "a combination for the purpose of
causing a breach of contract has been held to be an unlawful conspiracy.
A person who by conspiring with another or by collusive agreement with
him assists him to violate his contract with a third person and to obtain the
benefit of that contract for himself commits an actionable wrong."4 Since no
damages would accrue unless a contract breach was induced, however, the
conspiracy rule followed in Stephan and Rosen seems to be merely an
extension of the action for "malicious procurement of the breach of a con-
tract" which is recognized independently as a tort in Missouri.5 The "inten-
1. 502 S.W.2d 264 (Mo. 1973).
2. Id. at 268. By deposition, the defendant Healy admitted that he knew
there was a contract between the fighters and the plaintiff. The court held that it
could not be inferred from this that the defendant Healy knew that the subsequent
contract with the fighters was an actual violation of the plaintiff's contract. See
text accompanying note 10 infra.
3. 248 S.W.2d 638 (Mo. 1952).
4. Id. at 643. That there is also a damage action for breach of contract
against the contract breacher is no defense in a tort action against the inducer of
the breach. Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 1227, 1257 (1952).
5. See Clark-Lami, Inc. v. Cord, 440 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. 1969).
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tional interference with the contractual relation" without just cause so as to
effect a breach of the contract is a "wrong for which the wrongdoer may
be held accountable" in damages.6 To recover, the plaintiff must show that
the inducement of the breach was done maliciously. This does not require
that actual malice or ill will be shown.7 An intentional act without justifica-
tion suffices; 8 the use of coercion is not essential to recovery.9 It seems,
however, that both the person who procured the breach and the person
charged as co-conspirator must have full and actual knowledge of the
previous contract with the plaintiff.'0 The plaintiff must also have a valid
contract to have a cause of action."
The malicious procurement of breach of contract and the conspiracy
theories complement each other in that once the inducement of the breach
is proven, if a conspiracy has also been shown, persons other than the party
actually inducing the breach may be held liable. However, if the plaintiff
fails to prove the conspiracy, he may yet recover against those defendants
shown to have been guilty of the underlying wrong'--the intentional inter-
ference with the contract. Conversely, if there was no breach induced,
recovery will be denied completely even though a conspiracy is shown.
A civil conspiracy may be based upon torts other than malicious
procurement of breach of contract.'3 Conspiracy alone, however, does not
create a substantive cause of action in itself;14 it merely allows the plaintiff
to extend the liability of the wrongdoer to others. Generally, a civil con-
spiracy is "an agreement or understanding between two or more persons to
6. Downey v. United Weather Proofing, 253 S.W.2d 976, 980 (Mo. 1953).
The court also stated that while an existing contract may be entitled to greater
protection, some protection is appropriate against unjustified interference with
reasonable commercial expectancies even where an existing contract is lacking.
See W. PnOSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 129, at 948 (4th ed. 1971). See also
RESTATEMENT OF ToRTS § 766 (1939).
7. Downey v. United Weather Proofing, 253 S.W.2d 976, 980 (Mo. 1953).
8. See Beggs v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 409 S.W.2d 719, 722 (Mo.
1966).
9. Downey v. United Weather Proofing, 253 S.W.2d 976, 981 (Mo. 1953).
10. Some courts hold that it is sufficient to show that the defendant had
knowledge of facts which, if followed by a reasonable inquiry, would have dis-
closed the existence of the plaintiff's contract. See, e.g., Continental Research, Inc.
v. Cruttenden, Podesta & Miller, 222 F. Supp. 190 (D. Minn. 1963). Most courts,
however, require actual knowledge by the defendant of the prior contract. Mis-
souri requires even more than this. Cases generally hold that the defendant is not
liable unless he has full knowledge of the situation or of the restrictive covenantif one has been breached. See Coonis v. Rogers, 429 S.W.2d 709, 713 (Mo. 1968);
Contour Chair Lounge Co. v. Aljean Furniture Mfg. Co., 403 S.W.2d 922, 930(St. L. Mo. App. 1966).
11. See Rosen v. Alside, Inc., 248 S.W.2d 638 (Mo. 1952); Annot., 26
A.L.R.2d 1227 (1952).
12. Rosen v. Alside, Inc., 248 S.W.2d 638, 643 (Mo. 1952).
13. See, e.g., Kansas City v. Rathford, 353 Mo. 1180, 186 S.W.2d 570 (1945)(conspiracy to defraud); Dano v. Sharpe, 236 Mo. App. 118, 152 S.W.2d 693
K.C. Ct. App. 1941) (conspiracy to fraudulently impair plaintiff's judgment lien)
dictum).
14. Royster v. Baker, 865 S.W.2d 496, 500 (Mo. 1963); Seegers v. Marx &
Haas Clothing Co., 334 Mo. 632, 639, 66 S.W.2d 526, 528 (1933).
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do an unlawful act or to use unlawful means to do an act which is lawful."' 5
The elements are: (1) combination, 16 (2) object,17 (3) means,', (4) overt
act,19 and (5) damage caused.20 Thus, an alleged "conspiracy does not give
rise to a civil action unless something is done pursuant to it which, absent
the conspiracy, would create a right of action against one of the defendants
if sued alone."2 ' Since the gist of the action is not the conspiracy but the
unlawful injury, the charge of conspiracy need not be proved to support the
action, but may be considered mere surplusage.22 It has been stated that
"the only purpose served" by establishment of conspiracy is to make the
defendants liable for each other's acts.23 Conspirators are liable as joint tort-
feasors.24 Because the act of each conspirator in carrying out the conspiracy
is the act of all, 25 the usefulness in charging conspiracy lies chiefly in allow-
ing the plaintiff to have a complete cause of action against a co-conspirator
even though he did not actually participate in the underlying unlawful act
As pointed out in Stephan, the plaintiff must prove his cause of action
by clear and convincing evidence.26 However, the conspiracy may be
proven by circumstantial evidence 27 and may be inferred from proof of
15. Rosen v. Alside, Inc., 248 S.W.2d 688, 643 (Mo. 1952). See also
Kansas City v. Rathford, 353 Mo. 1130, 1140, 186 S.W.2d 570, 574 (1945);
Shaltupsky v. Brown Shoe Co., 350 Mo. 831, 832, 168 S.W.2d 1083, 1084 (1943).
The allegation of an agreement or common design is essential to support a charge
of conspiracy. Gruenewaelder v. Wintermann, 360 S.W.2d 678, 688 (Mo. 1962).
16. There can be no independent tort of conspiracy except in the unusual
case where mere force of numbers acting in unison may constitute a wrong. See
Shaltupsky v. Brown Shoe Co., 350 Mo. 831, 168 S.W.2d 1083 (1943).
17. Acts agreed upon must be unlawful either in their nature and purpose or
in manner of their performance. See Baucke v. Adams & Hawkeye Cas. Co., 239
Mo. App. 84, 188 S.W.2d 355 (K.C. Ct. App. 1945).
18.Unlawfulness may be found in the means used or the end sought. See
Adams Dairy, Inc. v. Burke, 293 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
969 (1957).
19. No action will lie for an unexecuted conspiracy. See W.E. Stewart Land
Co. v. Perkins, 290 Mo. 194, 234 S.W. 653 (1921).
20. To sustain an action for conspiracy damage must have been done. See
Harelson v. Tyler, 281 Mo. 383, 219 S.W. 908 (1920).
21. Mills v. Murray, 472 S.W.2d 6, 13 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971). Most otherjurisdictions take a different view and hold that although an act by an individual
may not give rise to civil liability, the same act by a conspiracy may constitute an
actionable wrong. See 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy § 8 (1967).
22. Medich v. Stippec, 335 Mo. 796, 802, 73 S.W.2d 998, 1001 (1934).
23. Baucke v. Adams and Hawkeye Cas. Co., 239 Mo. App. 84, 104, 188
S.W.2d 355, 367 (K.C. Ct. App. 1945).
24. Royster v. Baker, 365 S.W.2d 496, 500 (Mo. 1963).
25. Jackson v. Scott County Milling Co., 118 S.W.2d 1054, 1056 (Spr. Mo.
App. 1938). A person joining an existing conspiracy is liable for all prior, as well
as subsequent, acts done by any of the conspirators in furtherance of the common
design. State ex rel. Kimbrell v. People's Ice, Storage & Fuel Co., 246 Mo. 168,
151 S.W. 101 (1912).
26. 502 S.W.2d at 266; Contour Chair Lounge Co. v. Aljean Furniture Mfg.
Co., 403 S.W.2d 922, 927 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966).
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concerted action.28 Furthermore, the plaintiff's evidence is viewed in the
most favorable light and he is given the benefit of every reasonable infer-
ence on appeal.29
The primary holding in Stephan, that a person who by conspiring with
another assists him to violate his contract and obtain the benefit of it "for
himself commits an actionable wrong,"30 has been extended in Missouri to
hold a contracting party liable for conspiring to breach his own contract 3 1
Some jurisdictions, though, refuse to permit this.3 2 Since the liability of civil
conspirators is joint and several,33 the other contracting party need not be
joined as a defendant-as in Stephan where the fighters who breached the
contract with the plaintiff were not joined. The conspiracy action may even
be maintained against only one defendant.3 4
One advantage of alleging conspiracy is that it permits recovery of
punitive damages against the breaching contracting party. While the general
rule is that damages for breach of contract are limited to pecuniary loss
sustained,3 5 since a civil conspiracy sounds in tort36 it may carry with it the
assessment of punitive damages if done with malice or wantonness.37 Inas-
much as an intentional interference with a contract is malicious at law3 -
and that the malice to be shown is the same as that required for showing
the tortious act of inducing the breach-it would seem that exemplary dam-
ages may always ensue. The judgment for actual damages resulting from the
conspiracy must be in one amount and against all the defendants, but "the
rule is otherwise as to punitive damages which may be properly determined
against" the joint tortfeasors in differing amounts.39 One factor to be con-
sidered is the degree of culpability of each, but it has also been stated that
28. Sackett v. Hall, 478 S.W.2d 381, 885 (Mo. 1972). The evidence must do
more than merely raise a suspicion. If the proof is equally consistent with honesty
as with fraudulent purpose, it will be referred to the better motive. National
Rejectors, Inc. v. Trieman, 409 S.W.2d 1, 50 (Mo. En Banc 1966). Evidence
of similar or collateral acts is admissible when conspiracy is charged to show
unlawful intent or purpose. Hawley v. Merritt, 452 S.W.2d 604, 611 (Spr. Mo.
App. 1970).
29. Addson v. Hannah, 475 S.W.2d 89, 42 (Mo. 1972); Buxton v. Horn,
452 S.W.2d 250, 251 (St. L. Mo. App. 1972).
80. 502 S.W.2d at 266.
31. Mills v. Murray, 472 S.W.2d 6, 13 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971).
32. In New York, a party cannot be held liable for conspiring to breach his
own agreement since to do so would be the equivalent of allowing recovery of
punitive damages in a contract action, which is not permitted under New York
law. Canister Co. v. National Can Corp., 96 F. Supp. 273 (D. Del. 1951);
Bereswill v. Yablon, 6 N.Y.2d 301, 189 N.Y.S.2d 661, 160 N.E.2d 531 (Ct. App.
1959).
33. Wooldridge v. Scott County Mill Co., 102 S.W.2d 958, 964 (Spr. Mo.
App. 1937).
34. Grubb v. Curry, 72 S.W.2d 863, 864 (St. L. Mo. App. 1934).
35. Byers Bros. Real Estate & Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 S.W.2d
102 (K.C. Mo. App. 1961).
36. Rosen v. Alside, Inc., 248 S.W.2d 638, 643 (Mo. 1952).
37. Mills v. Murray, 472 S.W.2d 6, 17 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971).
38. Id. at 18.
39. Id. at 14.
[Vol. 39
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the punitive damages must necessarily be viewed in the light of the actual
damage sustained.4
Finally, it was held in Stephan that there could be a conspiracy between
the defendant World Wide Sports, Inc. and its director, the defendant
Scherck, since Scherck's knowledge of the plaintiffs contract with the
fighters was imputed to the corporation. 4' The court relied on Contour Chair
Lounge Co. v. Alfean Furniture Manufacturing Co.42 where a conspiracy to
breach a covenant not to compete was found between a corporation and its
president, who formed the competing corporation immediately after leaving
the plaintiffs employment. As was stated in Mills v. Murray43 on facts
similar to those in Contour Chair, the "alter ego" theory will not be applied
to defeat the plaintiffs charge of conspiracy where the corporation's active
participation is essential to the conspiracy scheme and it has committed a
"direct tort" by ostensibly insulating its officers from liability.44 Nonetheless,
these Missouri cases seem to be directly in conflict with the general rule that
there can be no conspiracy between an individual and a corporation unless
the persons and entities are separate.45
In summary, it would seem that an action for civil conspiracy may be
established whenever a contract has been breached and a third party has
induced the breach. In Missouri, the contract breacher may be joined as a
defendant in the conspiracy action. As a result, the plaintiff may recover
punitive damages from the other party to the contract, which would not
otherwise be available in an action against him solely for breach of contract.
W. DUr_= MCCARTM
40. Adkdson v. Hannah, 475 S.W.2d 89, 44 (Mo. 1972); Beggs v. Universal
C.I.T. Credit Corp., 409 S.W.2d 719, 724 (Mo. 1966) (punitive damages must
bear some relation to the injury inflicted).
41. 502 S.W.2d at 268.
42. 403 S.W.2d 922 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966).
43. 472 S.W.2d 6 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971).
44. Id. at 18-14n.2. The court stated that under the alter ego rule the cor-
porate form will be disregarded where the corporation is so dominated by a
person that it is merely an instrument of that person. However, the court stated
that application of this rule would be neither equitable nor congenial to the
plaintiff's theory of recovery since the corporation and individual would be with-
out distinct individuality and without capacity for conspiring with each other.45. Many cases have held that there can be no conspiracy between a cor-
poration and its president, sole stockholder, or an individual affiliated with it in
an official capacity because an individual or corporation cannot conspire with
himself or itself. See Ariate Compania Nay., S.A. v. Commonwealth of Tankship
0., 310 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Harris Diamond Co. v. Army Times
Pub. Co., 280 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Bereswill v. Yablon, 6 N.Y.2d 301,
189 N.Y.S.2d 661, 160 N.E.2d 531 (Ct. App. 1959).
1974]
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CORPORATIONS-
LIABILITY OF SHAREHOLDER WHO SELLS
CONTROL TO LOOTERS
Swinney v. Keebler Co.1
In 1963 Keebler Company purchased Meadors, Inc., a candy manu-
facturer. At the time of the purchase, Meadors was in serious financial
trouble and its debentures had a book value of less than one-half of their
principal amount. Keebler operated Meadors profitably and by 1968,
Meadors had total assets of over $580,000, including cash of over $321,000.2
In 1968 Keebler decided to withdraw from the manufacture of candy, but
not from its sale and distribution. During final negotiations with Flora Mir
Candy Corporation for the sale of Meadors, Keebler learned that Atlantic
Services, Inc. might be interested in purchasing Meadors and arranged a
meeting with Atlantic on February 14, five days after Atlantic expressed
interest in purchasing Meadors. At the meeting between Keebler and Atlan-
tic, Keebler's representatives questioned the individuals representing Atlantic
about the corporation's financial structure and financial history. Keebler
was told that Atlantic was a prospering, small holding company which
wanted to diversify by expanding into the candy business, and was given
unaudited financial statements showing Atlantic's net worth of $997,000
as of December 31, 1967, and net income of $158,588 for the calendar year.3
At the negotiating session and at least one other time prior to closing
Atlantic inquired about the possibility of using Meadors' money to finance
the purchase, and Keebler's representative replied to the effect that Meadors'
money could not be used.4 At the February 14 meeting, Keebler and Atlantic
negotiated an agreement for the sale of Meadors' stock and the agreement
was executed that day or the next.3 On February 19, the date of closing,
Atlantic, apparently without Keebler's knowledge, made a one day borrow-
ing of $235,000 from a bank where Meadors had its account; the loan
proceeds were deposited in an account in Atlantic's name; a $230,000
banker's check in favor of Keebler was purchased; and, after the closing,
$310,000 was transferred from the Meadors' account to Atlantic's account
and the loan was repaid. The transfer of funds was shown on Meadors'
books as a loan to Atlantic, and on Atlantic's books as a loan from Meadors.
Atlantic retained ownership of Meadors for approximately four months and
then sold Meadors to Flora Mir Distributing. Flora Mir followed the pat-
tern of payment established by Atlantic, using Meadors' assets to finance
the sale. Soon Flora Mir and its parent company went into bankruptcy, as
did Meadors.6 The net effect of the two sales was that Meadors' cash,
1. 480 F.2d 578 (4th Cir. 1973).
2. Id. at 575.
8. Id.
4. Swinney v. Keebler Co., 829 F. Supp. 216, 220 (D.S.C. 1971).
5. 480 F.2d at 576.
6. Id. at 576-77.
[Vol. 39
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which made up more than half of its assets, had become an uncollectible
account receivable.7
Atlantic had 'looted" Meadors-it used the control it had purchased
to divert Meadors' assets to itself for the purpose of financing the very sale
by which it acquired Meadors. Plaintiffs, holders of Meadors" convertible
debentures, brought suit against Keebler to obtain payment of the deben-
tures or damage equal to the amounts unpaid.8 In light of all the circum-
stances the district court found that Keebler was in a position to forsee the
likelihood of fraud on Meadors, and consequently had an obligation "to
conduct such investigation of the purchaser as would convince a reasonable
man that the sale was legitimate, or to refrain from making the sale."9 The
district court held that, in failing to investigate, Keebler breached its fidu-
ciary duty to the Meadors' creditors and was therefore liable to plaintiffs.10
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the circum-
stances surrounding Keebler's sale of Meadors were not sufficient to suggest
to Keebler that Atlantic intended to loot Meadors."
Where there is a sale of controlling stock, the law must balance two
conflicting concepts. On the one hand, owners of shares of stock like other
property owners should be allowed to sell to anyone they choose at any
price.12 Thus it is the general rule that a noncontrolling shareholder may
dispose of his shares as he sees fit and is not a fiduciary merely by owning
stock.'3 On the other hand, because a controlling or dominant shareholder 4
is in a position to influence and control the affairs of the corporation, courts
have consistently held that he has a fiduciary duty, not only toward the
corporation but also to its creditors and minority stockholders, to exercise
his influence in a manner not detrimental to the corporation, its creditors,
7. 329 F. Supp. at 217.
8. Plaintiffs also named Meadors, Atlantic, Flora Mir Distributing, and
Flora Mir Candy Corporation as defendants. 480 F.2d at 574.
9. 480 F.2d at 574-75.
10. The district court also rendered judgment against Atlantic, Flora Mir
Distributing and Flora Mir Candy Corporation. However, since all defendants
except Keebler were the subject of bankruptcy proceedings, only Keebler appealed.
480 F.2d 573.
11. 480 F.2d at 580.
12. Annot., 38 A.L.R.3d 738, 741-42 (1971).
13. McDaniel v. Painter, 418 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1969); Seagrave Corp. v.
Mount, 212 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1954); Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 279
F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 911, rehearing denied, 404 U.S.
876 (1971); Benson v. Braun, 8 Misc. 2d 67, 155 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1956);
Levy v. American Beverage Corp., 265 App. Div. 208, 38 N.Y.S.2d 517 (App.
Div. 1942); Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941); 18 Am. Jun.
2d Corporations § 503 (1965); 6 Z. CAvrrcII, Busumss OnAo _AnroNs 751-53(1973); H. HENN, L~w oF ConronAnoNs § 241 (2d ed. 1970); 8'U. Cm. L.
REv. 335, 336 (1941).
14. Control may rest upon the ownership of all or a majority of the voting
stock or, as is the case in most public companies, substantially less than a majority.
The basis of control may be a block of stock constituting working control or it
may be derived from incumbency and be accompanied by only nominal stock
ownership. Schwartz, The Sale of Control and the 1984 Act: New Directions for
Federal Corporation Law, 15 N.Y.L. FoR. 674, 677 (1969).
1974]
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or minority stockholders.15 Courts have held that this fiduciary obligation
extends to the dominant shareholder's transfer of his control; 16 he must
exercise good faith and reasonable diligence' 7 to assure that the resulting
sale will be inherently fair to the corporation and those interested therein.18
A controlling shareholder has a fiduciary duty to protect his corporation
from looters."' A looter buys a controlling block of stock with the expecta-
tion that he or his nominees are to be elected directors or officers. Then the
looter utilizes his new place of power to steal from the corporation, many
times by selling assets-particularly liquid assets-and converting the pro-
ceeds to his personal use.20
Where a dominant shareholder sells his control to one who subsequently
loots the corporation, there are three possible tests to determine whether
the seller has breached his fiduciary duty to the corporation, its creditors,
and minority shareholders. Under the approach taken in Levy v. American
Beverage Corp.,2 a seller of control is liable only if he actually knows the
purchaser intends to loot the corporate treasury. A seller is not required to
act on the assumption that a prospective buyer will commit a fraudulent
or criminal act if given the opportunity to do so. "Quite the contrary may be
assumed, in the absence of actual notice."22
The most widely accepted approach requires a transferor of control
to make a reasonable 2 3 investigation of the buyer if the circumstances
surrounding the proposed transfer are such as to awaken suspicion and put
15. See note 12 supra.
16, Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22, 25 (E.D.
Pa. 1940).
17. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Brown v. Presbyterian Ministers
Fund, 484 F.2d 998 (3d Cir. 1978); Bayliss v. Rood, 424 F.2d 142 (4th Cir.
1970); Hyams v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 221 F. 529 (6th Cir. 1915);
Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592(1969); Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Note, 70 Comta.
L. lrv. 1079, 1084 (1970).
18. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939). Speaking for the Court, Justice
Douglas stated:
He who is in such a fiduciary position cannot serve himself first and
his cestuis second .... He cannot by the intervention of a corporate
entity violate the ancient precept against serving two masters .... He
cannot use his power for his personal advantage and to the detriment of
stockholders and creditors no matter how absolute in terms that
power may be and no matter how meticulous he is to satisfy technical
requirements.
Id. at 311.
See also Note, 70 CoLum. L. Rnv. 1069 (1970).
19. See, e.g., Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22(E.D. Pa. 1940).
20. Id. Many times looting cases involve the sale of an investment company.
Undoubtedly this is because the liquid assets of the investment company can be
disposed of easily. See, Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp.
22 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
21. 265 App. Div. 208, 38 N.Y.S.2d 517 (App. Div. 1942).
22. Id. at 219, 38 N.Y.S.2d at 527.,,
23. A reasonable investigation is one, which "discloses such facts as would
convince a reasonable person that no ,fraud is intended or likely to result."
Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22, 25 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
(Vol. 39
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a prudent man on his guard. In Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal
Corp.,24 controlling shareholders were held liable for their failure to make
a reasonable investigation prior to their sale to buyers who later looted the
corporation.2 5 The court found the following suspicious circumstances: an
agreement to have a large part of the corporation's assets converted into
cash and available as such at the time of the sale; the defendants were
warned by the corporation's counsel of the danger of dealing with little-
known parties; the same corporation had been looted by another group five
years before; the presence of a director whose questionable ethical standard
was well-known; and the inflated sale price.26
Whether the seller has reason to suspect that the buyer will defraud
the corporation is a factual question. Thus a controlling shareholder's duty
to investigate under the Insuranshares test depends upon the circumstances
present in the case. For example, a duty to investigate is more likely to be
imposed if the corporation's assets are liquid,27 since liquid assets are more
easily adapted to a looter's purposes. However, since a looter can use fixed
assets for his own purposes as well, this factor would not seem to be essential
to imposing liability on the seller if other facts are present which should
arouse the seller's suspicions.28 Another important factor is whether the
shares were sold at a price in excess of market value. 29 Even though a
controlling block of shares can usually be sold at a higher price per share
than other shares on the theory that the element of control makes the
block of shares more valuable, that the buyer is willing to pay an excessive
price for the shares may nevertheless be enough to require the seller to take
the steps needed to be reasonably certain that the buyer is paying only for
lawful advantages.30 Another factor is whether the buyer desires immediate
access to the corporation's assets upon purchase of the shares.31 Although
this alone would not seem to be enough to put the seller on notice of the
buyer's possible wrongful intentions, when coupled with the other factors,
it may arouse reasonable suspicions in the seller.32 Finally, a buyer's
insistence upon secrecy in the consummation of the transaction has been a
factor in determining whether the transferee had a duty to investigate.3 3 In
each case, the factors must be weighed and balanced in order to determine
if the transferor has a duty to investigate.
24. 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
25. Id. at 23.
26. Id. at 25-26. See also 8 U. Cm. L. RIv. 335n.1 (1941).
27. Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Leech, Transac-
tions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. Bxv. 725, 794 (1956). See also Insuran-
shares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
28. Leech, supra note 27.
29. Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 NY.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Leech, supra
note 27, at 795. Cf. 13 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF" COnPORATrIONS 98 (Penn.
ed. 1970); Note, 54 HARv. L. Riv. 648; 653 (1941).
30. Leech, supra note 27, at. 795.
81. Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Leech, supra
note 27 supra, at 795; Note, 54 HIv. L. Rv. 648, 653 (1941).
82. Leech, supra note 27, at 795; Note, 54 HAmv. .L. Bxv. 648, 658.(1941).
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In Keebler, the court recognized that controlling shareholders are
fiduciaries and adopted the Insuranshares requirement of a reasonable
investigation when there are suspicious circumstances. 34 The court expressly
rejected the Levy approach which conditions the transferor's liability on
his actual knowledge of the transferee's intent to loot the corporation. 5
According to the court, to require actual knowledge of the intended looting
places a premium on the "head in the sand" approach to corporate sales.36
On the facts of the case, however, the court held that the circumstances
surrounding the transfer of control of Meadors were not sufficient to neces-
sitate an investigation of Atlantic by Keebler 7
In view of the possible dangers to the corporation in every transfer of
control, a third approach to a controlling shareholder's fiduciary duty may
be desirable. The dominant shareholder could be required to make a
reasonable investigation of the purchaser before control is transferred-
34. 480 F.2d at 577. See also Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp.,
35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
35. Case cited notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text.
36. 480 F.2d at 577n.6.
37. The district court had found that circumstances surrounding the trans-
action known to Keebler at the time of the sale might have indicated that Atlantic
(the purchaser) intended to loot Meadors. Those circumstances were: (1) no
one from Atlantic had any experience in the candy business; (2) at the time of
the execution of the contract no one from Atlantic had inspected Meadors' opera-
tion; (3) at the time of closing, only Atlantic's accountant had examined Meadors
to any appreciable extent and he was interested primarily in the books and
inventory; (4) Meadors had no market of its own and the profit as shown could
not have been accepted at face value by an outsider; (5) prior to the closing, the
purchaser had conducted no negotiations with key employees then operating
Meadors relative to the continuation of the business; (6) the sale was consum-
mated with dispatch; and (7) the inquiries by the purchaser as to the avail-
ability of Meadors' funds for payment of the purchase price. According to the
district court these circumstances, considered together, were sufficient to impose
upon Keebler a duty to make a reasonable investigation of Atlantic and its
motives for the purchase. 329 F.Supp. at 220. Had Keebler conducted such an
investigation and reasonably concluded that there was no danger of looting, then
it would have been absolved of liability. 329 F. Supp. at 224. With respect to
the circumstances relied on by the district court the court of appeals found:
(1) that it is not unusual for any corporation to venture into a new business field
and therefore that Atlantic lacked experience in the candy business was not
sufficient to arouse Keebler's suspicion; (2) that Atlantic had inspected Meadors
and this was not indicative of an intention not to operate, much less to loot. The
court noted that Atlantic's accountant had made the inspection and, furthermore,
that Keebler warranted as true and correct its representations including the
Meadors balance sheet; (3) that while Meadors' past profit history may have been
questionable, Keebler's agreement to purchase candy provided Meadors with a
substantial initial market; (4) that Keebler had contracted to use its best efforts
to retain key employees of Meadors and Atlantic did retain them after it took
over. Thus there was no reason for Keebler to be suspicious because Atlantic did
not negotiate with Meadors' key employee, concerning the continuation of the
business; (5) that there being no reason to delay the transaction, the dispatch
with which it was consummated was not a suspicious circumstance; (6) that since
Keebler made it clear that Atlantic must consummate the purchase with its own
funds, that Atlantic had inquired about financing the sale with Meadors funds
was not a suspicious circumstance. 480 F.2d at 578-80.
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irrespective of the existence of "suspicious" circumstances. This rule would
avoid the present uncertainty and inconsistency as to whether a transferor
must investigate. Its application would not be impractical. For example, it
would have been no great burden for Keebler to make a reasonable investi-
gation of Atlantic, its history, and possible motives for the desired purchase.
Such an investigation may have revealed that Meadors' money was being
utilized for payment of the purchase price or that Atlantic Services, Inc. had
been involved in past looting incidents. 9 Considering Keebler's fiduciary
duty as controlling shareholder and the danger to the community of interests
in Meadors, this would not have placed an undue hardship on Keebler or
unnecessarily restricted the transferability of the Meadors stock.
Furthermore, it is at least arguable that the rationale of the looting
cases should be extended to impose liability for a sale to palpably incom-
petent buyers, if the buyers" lack of managerial talent was forseeable. 40
While it may be rather difficult to establish that the purchasers' lack of
managerial ability was forseeable, the damage to the corporation may bejust as great when control is transferred to incompetent managers as when
the purchaser loots the corporation. Thus, if the controlling shareholder is
negligent in transferring his control he should be liable to those who are
damaged as a result of this negligence. The controlling shareholder's fidu-
ciary obligation should require him to make reasonable efforts to prevent
harm to the corporation, whether the harm is caused by looters or the
mismanagement of the new owners of control.
The Keebler case is a good example of the situation encountered by a
controlling or dominant shareholder who attempts to transfer control of the
corporation. Under the majority rule, if he closes his eyes to possible wrong-
doing by the purchaser, the seller may be liable for his failure to investigate.
If he does investigate and discovers that the buyer may intend to loot the
corporation, the dominant or controlling shareholder is faced with two
rather unattractive alternatives. He may forego the sale of control or he
may sell and face liability to the corporation, its minority shareholders and
creditors. However, considering the extensive injury that can be caused by
irresponsible transfers of control, it is not unreasonable to impose a more
rigorous standard that mere good faith upon the seller of controlling shares
who is conveying control of the corporate assets.41
STEVEN C. PAmuSH
88. See note 28 supra.
89. 329 F. Supp. at 224.
40. Estate of Hooper v. Government of Virgin Islands, 427 F.2d 45, 47 (3d
Cir. 1970) (dictum); 18 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDiA oF CoIOR&OrONS 99 (Penn.
ed. 1970, Supp. 1973); Note, 70 CoLum. L. Rzv. 1079, 1086 (1970).
41. Note, 54 HARv. L. Rav. 648, 654 (1941).
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-MENTAL ILLNESS AND COMMITMENT
Ex parte Kent1
At trial in circuit court, defendant pleaded not guilty to a felony
charge of first degree robbery by means of a dangerous and deadly weapon.2
His appointed counsel moved for psychiatric evaluation of defendant pur-
suant to Missouri's statutes controlling criminal proceedings involving
mental illness, Chapter 552, RSMo 1969. Defendant was committed to the
Missouri State Mental Hospital at Fulton on May 27, 1971, for pre-trial
evaluation. The resulting psychiatric report indicated that defendant had a-
mental disease or defect which excluded his responsibility at the time of
the crime and made him incompetent to stand trial.3 Defense counsel asked
for leave to withdraw the not guilty plea so that defendant might enter a
"dual" plea of not guilty and not guilty .by reason of mental disease or
defect,4 and this was denied.5 The trial court said it would consider the
defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect if defendant
wished to interpose it; however, the defendant declined to do so.6 The
State then stipulated as to the accuracy of the psychiatric report, and
"accepted" a defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.7
The trial court sustained this defense, acquitted defendant on that ground,
and ordered him committed indefinitely8 for care and treatment in a state
mental hospital.9 Defendant challenged'0 his commitment by habeas corpus
in the Missouri Supreme Court. The supreme court invalidated the com-
mitting order and remanded to the trial court with directions" for further
1. 490 S.W.2d 649 (Mo. En Bane), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1077 (1973).
2. §§ 560.120,135, RSMo 1969.
3. § 552.020(3), RSMo 1969; 490 S.W.2d at 650.
4. 490 S.W.2d at 650.
5. Section 552.030(2), RSMo 1969, provides that within ten days after a
plea of not guilty, or at a later date if the court permits, the defendant may file
a written notice of his purpose to rely on the defense of mental disease or defect,
and such notice does not deprive the defendant of other defenses. Therefore the
statutory notice has the same effect as defendants offered plea, which apparently
was rejected by the trial court as redundant and improper. See § 546.020, RSMo
1969.
6. Defendant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States SupremeCourtp 12.T7. 1e Missouri Statute concerning criminal responsibility provides that:
"The state may accept a defense of mental disease or defect excluding respon-
sibility, whether raised by plea or writtennotice, if the defendant has no other
defenses and files a written notice to that effect." § 552.030(2), RSMo 1969.
8. The court ordered defendant "not to be released therefrom except on
order from this Court upon a detbrmination as provided by law." 490 S.W.2d at
650. See § 552.040(2), RSMo 1969.
9. In Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), the defendant alleged his
indefinite commitment-to a mental hospital amounted to a life sentence, and sub-jected him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and
fourteenth amendments. The court found it unnecessary to reach this claim in
deciding the case on other grounds. 406 U.S. at 739. -
10. Defendant claimed that he had been deprived of his liberty without due
process of law in violation of the Mo. CONST. art. I, § 10.
11. 490 S.W.2d at 651-52.
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proceedings, on the grounds that the defendant had been tried while incom-
petent and his defense of mental disease or defect had been "accepted"
despite his assertion of other defenses. The court refused, however, to dis-
charge the defendant.12
The problem of the mentally incompetent defendant creates special
problems for the criminal justice system. In a recent opinion 3 by the Kansas
City District of the Court of Appeals, Judge Somerville said,
By dictate of the American conscience, long steeped in the hollowed
traditions of basic fair play and justice, judicial and statutory safe-
guards have been created to balance the adversary proceeding
where it appears that an accused is suffering from a mental disease
or defect. Chapter 552 RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S. represents Missouri's
statutory response to this dictate of conscience.1 4
The Kent case illuminates some of the shadows in Missouri's criminal
mental responsibility statute, and, at the same time, quietly steps over
others. Adopted in 1963,15 the statute has been patched by amendment and
interpretation, yet it continues to be subjected to vigorous attacks such as
in Kent.
The area of criminal competency is "fraught with basic procedural
problems."' 6 When a defendant is committed because he lacks competency
to stand trial, how long can he be confined without a trial? To what extent
can he attack an obviously invalid criminal charge? Problems also arise
regarding the issue of criminal responsibility.1r Can a prosecutor "accept"
a not guilty plea by reason of mental disease or defect and remove an
accused from society without the necessity of a trial? Is automatic com-
mitment upon acquittal a trap for defendants resulting in indefinite confine-
ment and treatment in a mental hospital? Can an acquitted defendant be
committed without a hearing if he is sane at the time of commitment? Are
the different release and commitment standards for civil and criminal pro-
ceedings justified? These questions raise constitutional issues of due process
and equal protection, some of which the Kent court undertook to resolve.
12. Id. at 653. On remand Kent was found competent to proceed to trial.
He was tried on December 10, 1973 and acquitted by reason of mental disease
or defect. He was again commited to Fulton and remains there now with a new
appeal pending.
13. Ex parte Briggs v. State, 509 S.W.2d 154 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974).
14. Id. at 156.
15. Mo. Laws 1963, p. 674, § A, amended 1969, and 1971; see Hunvald,
Criminal Law in Missouri and the Need for Revision, 28 Mo. L. REV. 521 (1963);
Richardson, Reardon and Simeone, Analysis of Missouri's Mental Responsibility
Law, 19 J. Mo. BA 677 (1963); Comments on Missouris Mental Responsibility
Law, 19 J. Mo. Bkl 650 (1963).16. Ex parte Briggs v. State, 509 S.W.2d 154, 156 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974).
Nowhere, perhaps, is there encountered an area so fraught with basicprocedural problems as those arising where an accused lacks the requisite
mental capacity to knowingly and meaningfully understand the import
of the charges leveled against him and to viably consult with counsel and
assist in his own defense.
17. See generally § § 552.030-.040, RSMo 1969.
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CMn NAL COMPErENCY
The concept of criminal competency includes the ability of the accused
to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him, ability
to participate and assist in his own defense, and ability to understand the
nature and purpose of a sentence upon conviction.' If a trial court has
reasonable cause to believe1 that a defendant lacks mental fitness to
proceed, it must order a psychiatric examination of the defendant. Based on
the psychiatric report and other evidence, the court then makes a deter-
mination2 0 as to whether the defendant is mentally fit to proceed to trial.
The Missouri statute commands that if defendant is found not mentally fit to
proceed, the trial proceedings are suspended for "so long as the incapacity
endures."21 In Jackson v. Indiana,2 2 however, the United States Supreme
Court unanimously 3 held that an indefinite commitment of an accused,
solely on the basis of his lack of capacity to stand trial, violates due process
18. The Missouri statute provides:
"No person who as a result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to under-
stand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense shall be tried,
convicted or sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as the incapacity
endures." § 552.020(1), RSMo 1973 Supp. To pass this test, a defendant need
only have an awareness of the basic fundamentals of a trial, such as the functions
of the judge, jury, and counsel. See Rose, Criminal Responsibility and Competency
as Influenced by Organic Disease, 35 Mo. L. REv. 326, 327 (1970). Though the
Missouri statutes do not explicitly adopt the terms "criminal responsibility" and
"criminal competency," Rose makes the distinction clear. "Criminal responsibility"
is related to the defendant's mental state at the time of the criminal act and
"criminal competency" is related to his mental state from the time period begin-
ning after the commission of the criminal act and ending with sentencing. Id. at
327.
19. § 552.020(2), RSMo 1973 Supp. Due process requires a trial court sua
sponte to conduct a mental competency hearing if existing facts raise a "bona
fide doubt." Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 875, 385 (1966). Defendant should be
permitted to attend the hearing in person. Ex parte Briggs v. State, 509 S.W.2d
154, 159 (Mo. App. D.K.C. 1974); see note 42, infra.
20. Section 552.020(6), RSMo 1973 Supp. requires a hearing if the report
is contested, but provides the court may hold a hearing if it is not. The trial
court's discretion is limited, however, by the "bona fide doubt" rule of Pate v.
Robinson, 383 U.S. 875, 385 (1966). In Ex parte Briggs v. State, 509 S.W.2d 154,(Mo. App. D.K.C. 1974), an uncontested psychiatric report showed defendant
competent to stand trial, but that he had a mental disease or defect excluding
responsibility for the offense. The appellate court said these findings were at war
with each other and sufficient to raise suspicion and cast a "bona fide doubt" on
defendant's capacity to stand trial. The trial court's decision was reversed for
failure to conduct the requisite hearing on this issue. For cases where the facts
did not raise a "bona fide doubt" as to competency, see State v. Stein, 504 S.W.2d
1 (Mo. 1974); Jones v. State, 471 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. 1971); McCormick v. State,
463 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. 1971); Miller v. State, 498 S.W.2d 79 (Mo. App., D.K.C.
1973). In the Miller case, the court found counsel ineffective in his assistance for
failure to voice his doubts about his client's competency to the trial court.
21. § 552.020(1) RSMo 1978 Supp. Section 552.020(7) adds "or until the
charges or proceedings are disposed of according to law.
22. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
23. Powell and Rehnquist, JJ,, not participating.
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and equal protection.24 Jackson stated that such a defendant cannot be held
more than a reasonable time25 to ascertain whether there is a substantial
probability that he will attain capacity to stand trial in the foreseeable
future. If not, he must be civilly committed or released. 26 In Kent, the Mis-
souri Supreme Court applied the Jackson standards to the Missouri statute
and remanded the case to the trial court prescribing the proper procedure
for all courts to follow. If the trial court has determined that a defendant
is incompetent to proceed, it must make a second decision as to whether
there is substantial probability that he will recover in the forseeable future.
If not, then the charges must be dismissed and civil commitment proceed-
ings initiated, or the defendant must be released.27 If it appears that defen-
dant will be capable of standing trial in the foreseeable future, then the
trial court should enter necessary orders28 to assure that the defendant is
progressing toward the goal of criminal competency.
The Kent court also fashioned a method by which a defendant, com-
mitted for incompetency, may nevertheless test the prima facie criminal case
against him. The court recognized the problem of preventing an accused
from attacing an invalid criminal charge20 9 while he is being detained with
the criminally insane. Although the statute does not provide for a hearing
on a defense to the charges, 30 the Missouri Supreme Court said that Criminal
Rule 25.0631 allows defense counsel to assert "any legal objection to the
24. 406 U.S. at 730-81; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
25. Although the court declined to set time limits in the Jackson case, it said
that a continued commitment must be justified by progress toward defendant's
ability to stand trial. It also found that Jackson s three and one-half years of
pre-trial confinement was sufficient to establish the lack of a substantial prob-
ability that he would ever be able to participate fully in a trial. 406 U.S. at 738.
Kent had been confined for over a year when he filed his writ of habeas corpus.
26. 406 U.S. at 788.
27. 490 S.W.2d at 651-52. See § 552.020(8), RSMo 1973 Supp. (release or
civil commitment required if charges are dismissed); §§ 202.783-.875, RSMo
1969 (civil commitment); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. at 788; Ex parte Briggs v.
State, 509 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974).
28. 490 S.W.2d at 652. The court does not suggest what those orders might
be, but presumably periodic progress reports from the hospital to the trial court
would suffice.
29. See Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants,
108 U. PA. L. REv. 832 (1960). Professor Foote suggests three situations where
a defendant should be allowed to attack his criminal charges, even while he is
considered incompetent: 1) where the prosecution is barred by law as, for exam-
ple, when the statute of limitations has run; 2) where the prosecution's factual
case contains an intrinsic defect such as essential evidence based on an unlawful
seizure; or 3) where defendant has an affirmative defense that can be established
without his participation like alibi. Id. at 841.
30. Some other states provide for such a hearing. E.g., Chap. 123, § 17,
MAss. G. L. (1972 Supp.) allows a pre-trial hearing at which a defendant com-
mitted for incompetency may raise any defense, except insanity, and have it
considered by the trial court on the merits.
81. "Any defense or objection which is capable of determination without the
trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by motion." Mo. Ciam. R.
25.06(a). Subsection (b) of the rule expressly covers defenses and objections
based on defects in the institution of prosecution or in the indictment or informa-
tion, including failure to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense.
Subsection (d) excludes defenses which involve issues of fact to be tried by ajury. Compare note 30 supra.
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prosecution which is susceptible of fair determination prior to trial and
without the personal participation of the defendant.": 3 2 The court said that
while a defendant could not have a trial on the merits as long as he remains
incompetent, the trial judge should satisfy himself that there is substantial
evidence available to support a conviction, and if not, the charges should
be dismissed.33
CRUvMAL REsPONSIBILITY
If it is determined that a defendant is mentally fit to stand trial, the
criminal proceedings against him resume.34 An accused can now raise a
defense of mental disease or defect excluding criminal responsibility35 at
the time of the alleged criminal act, which is not precluded by a finding of
competency to stand trial.30 Reliance on this defense does not eliminate
other defenses37 and the State can only accept a mental disease or defect
32. 490 S.W.2d at 653, quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.06.
33. 490 S.W.2d at 653.
34. § 552.020(7), RSMo 1973 Supp. This may be after the threshold com-
petency hearing or after a period of confinement and recovery. Defendant's
presence in court is essential to enter a plea, stand trial, or receive a sentence or
commitment order. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI, XIV; Mo. CONST. art. I § § 10, 18(a);
§§ 546.030, .560, RSMo 1969; Mo. R. Cmm. P. 29.02, 37.86; Schwab v. Berg-
gren, 143 U.S. 442 (1892); State v. Cook, 432 S.W.2d 345 (Mo. 1968). Counsel
may have to file a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum to secure defendant's
presence if the court fails to order his release and appearance.
35. See § 552.030(2), RSMo 1969. Criminal responsibility concerns the
mens rea (criminal intent) of the defendant at the time of the commission of the
criminal act, and the basic notion that insanity precludes responsibility. See
generally H. FINGAIIET-E, TnE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY (1972).
Criminal responsibility has been tested by various insanity definitions in
English-American law. See United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir.
1966); Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Commonwealth
v. Chester, 337 Mass. 702, 150 N.E.2d 914 (1958) ("irrestible impulse" test);
and M' Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). Missouri employs essentially
the Freeman rule:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he did not know or
appreciate the nature, quality or wrongfulness of his conduct or was in-
capable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of law.§ 552.030(1), RSMo 1969. While Missouri courts have rejected defenses of
temporary insanity or sudden impulse, the statute seems to provide for one who
suffers from an exculpatory disease or defect at the time of the alleged crime, yet
later has the mental fitness to stand trial. Clappen, Mental Responsibility and the
Criminal Law in Missouri, 35 Mo. L. REv. 516 (1970). Psychiatric evidence is
admissible only after notice to rely on mental disease or defect has been given and
only to prove defendants state of mind. § 552.030(3), RSMo 1969. In practice,
however, notice and psychiatric evidence might be used strategically to influence
a jury into compromising on a lower crime or sentence.
86. § 552.020(9), RSMo 1973 Supp.; State v. Sturdivan, 497 S.W.2d 139
(Mo. 1973).
37. § 552.030(2), RSMo 1969. There are, then, a total of four pleas avail-
able to a criminal defendant in Missouri: (1) guil , (2) not gilty, (3) not
guilty by reason of mental disease or defect exclu ng responsibility, (4) not
guilty by reason of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility and no other
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defense when'the defendant 8 files a written notice that he has no other
defenses.3 'Failure of the trial court to follow this provision of the statute
was another ground on which the decision was invalidated. 40
AvTomAnc Co rrm'mr
By remand on the competency issue the court also managed to sidestep
for a short time Kent's challenge of the automatic commitment provision4 '
as violative of due process and equal protection.42 In civil commitments, a
hearing on present sanity is usually required at the time of commitment.43
But a criminal defendant is committed automatically in Missouri on acquit-
tal by mental disease or defect. This is a commitment based on a finding of
past insanity at the moment of the crime, usually months before the trial
and commitment, with no determination of present sanity. A similar pro-
vision in the District of Columbia was struck down by the federal district
court in Bolton v. Harrs.44 This court required that any commitment after
acquittal be obtained by civil rules and be predicated upon a new finding
of present insanity.
defenses. Other Missouri statutes have not been revised to recognize the mental
disease or defect pleas. E.g., § 546.020, RSMo 1969 (plea of not guilty, not for-
mally tendered).
38. Cases involving mental illness raise subtle problems of attorney-client
relations. Although a defendant is adjudged capable of participating in his defense,
he may still have difficulty understanding the complicated plea options, procedure,
and other legal matters which add to counsel's burden. Using his professional skill
and judgment, an attorney may decide certain actions amount to futile gestures,
or he may do for his client what he could not do for himself. Miller v. State, 498
S.W.2d 79 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973). On the other hand, counsel must inform
defendant of his constitutional rights, and when a defendant has been found
mentally fit to participate in his defense, it is the defendant, and not his counsel,
who must make the final choice of what plea to enter. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V, XIV;
ABA STANDASiDs, The Prosecutor Function and Defense Function, § 5.2(a) (i)
(1971).
39. See note 7 supra.
40. 490 S.W.2d at 651.
41. § 552.040(1), RSMo 1969; State v. Nickens, 403 S.W.2d 582, 586 (Mo.
1966); see generally Annot. 50 A.L.R.Sd 144 (1973); 145 A.L.R. 892 (1943).
42. For cases stating that commitment proceedings, whether civil or crim-
inal, are subject to both the equal protection and due process clauses of the
fourteenth amendment, see Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972) (post sen-
tence commitment); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) (sex offender act);
Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966) (post sentence); Lynch v. Overholser,
369 U.S. 705 (1962) (due process, defendant not allowed to plead guilty);
Bolten v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (commitment upon acquittal).
These issues were raised unsuccessfully in regard to automatic commitment in two
other Missouri cases. State v. Kite, 498 S.W.2d 756 (Mo. En Banc 1973); State
v. Lindner, 498 S.W.2d 754 (Mo. En Banc 1973) (Both dismissed for failure to
file timely motions for new trial).
43. §§ 202.783-.875, RSMo 1969. Sections 202.800-.803 provide for emer-
gency commitment without a hearing.
44. 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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The Missouri Supreme Court recently faced the issue squarely in State
v. Kee40 and upheld the automatic commitment provision. The Kee court
distinguished Bolton by construing the Missouri statute to allow a prisoner
to initiate re-examination proceedings the day he arrives at the state
mental hospital.40
EQUAL PNoTEcrIoN
Kent also attacked47 the Missouri mental responsibility statute as un-
constitutional because it sets more onerous standards for commitment and
release of persons acquitted on a defense of mental disease or defect than.
for persons civilly committed.48 This equal protection argument has prevailed
in some other jurisdictions49 but these cases were distinguished by the court
45. 510 S.W.2d 477 (Mo. En Bane 1974). The majority found precedent
for their decision in Chase v. Kearns, 278 A.2d 182 (Me. 1971) and State ex rel.
Schopf v. Schubert, 45 Wis. 2d 644, 178 N.W.2d 678 (1970). See also In re
Franklin, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553, 496 P.2d 465 (1972) and Mills v. State, 256 A.2d
752 (Del. 1969). Judge Seiler dissented on the grounds that such a procedure
places the burden on the defendant to prove he is sane.
46. § 552.040(4), RSMo 1969. Other applications can be filed at 180 day
intervals. Habeas Corpus is also available. Mo. CoNsT. art. I, § 12; Mo. R. Cxv. P.
91.
47. Defendant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court.
48. CIVIL COMMITMENT: §§ 202.785-.875, RSMo 1969. In civil invol-
untary commitments there must be a written application, doctor's certification,
hearing, and finding by the court of mental illness and need of custody, care, or
treatment in a mental facility and the lack of sufficient insight or capacity to make
responsible decisions with respect to hospitalization. Mental illness (including
alcoholism or other drug abuse) is a state of impaired mental function which
requires that a person so afflicted receive care and treatment for his own welfare,
or the welfare of others, regardless of whether such person has been adjudicated
legally incompetent.
Civil release is by the head of the hospital when he determines that the
conditions justifying involuntary hospitalization no longer exist, considering the
best interests of the patient, and the safety of the patient and others.
CRIMINAL COMMITMENT: Ch. 552, RSMo 1969. The person must have
been charged with a crime, initiate the defense of mental disease or defect, and
be acquitted on that defense. There is a right to trial by jury, a psychiatric exam-
ination, and a finding that he did not know or appreciate the nature, quality or
wrongfulness of his conduct or was incapable of conforming his conduct to the
requirements of the law.
Release is by the court on application every 180 days. The defendant will not
be released unless it is determined that he does not have, and in the reasonable
future is not likely to have, a mental disease or defect renderinghim dangerous
to the safety of himself or unable to conform his conduct to the requirements
of the law.
CRIMINAL SEXUAL PSYCOPATH: §§ 202.700-.770, RSMo 1969. This
is a civil commitment proceeding with the right to a jury. Commitment requires
findings that the subject is suffering from a mental disorder of at least one year
duration, is not insane or feebleminded, has criminal propensities to sex offenses,
and is considered dangerous. Release is by the court on application at any time,
and upon a finding that it would not be incompatible with the welfare of society.
49. Baxstrom v. Herold, 883 U.S. 107 (1966); United States ex rel. Schuster
v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir. 1969); Bolton v. Harris, 895 F.2d 642 (D.C.
Cir. 1969); Wilson v. State, 287 N.E.2d 875 (Ind. 1972).
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in Kee.5 0 The Missouri Supreme Court held that differences in the methods
of commitment are based on the prior criminal act of the defendant and
therefore are reasonable and not a violation of equal protection."1
CONCLUSION
The constitutionality of the Missouri criminal commitment statute has
been saved by construction on the part of the Missouri Supreme Court. In
Kent it held that a defendant can be committed for incompetency only if
there is substantial probability that he will be able to stand trial in the fore-
seeable future. His counsel may test the criminal charges and require the
trial judge to find a prima facie* case against him before trial. Further, the
state may not accept a defense of mental disease or defect unless the de-
fendant has filed written notice of no other defenses. In a follow-up case,
Kee, the court upheld the automatic commitment provision by holding that a
defendant may initiate release proceedings the day he is committed. In Kee,
the statute was also declared not to be in violation of equal protection and
due process. Kent and cases of its kind, while saving the statute as a whole,
will hopefully continue to expand and define the safeguards provided in
the trial of persons having a mental disease or defect.
JAwrs J. GRoss
ESTATF_ PLANNING-DEDUCTIBILITY OF LEGAL FEES
Sidney Merians v. Commissioner'
In 1967, taxpayers, husband and wife, employed a law firm to prepare
their estate plan. Counsel performed the following legal services: the
preparation of wills, taking into account current requirements for the mari-
tal deduction; the establishment of an irrevocable trust for the benefit of
the wife and the transfer of certain corporate stock to the trust; the disso-
lution of a corporation; the creation of a partnership with the trust as a
limited partner; preparation of gift tax returns with respect to the transfers
of property to the trusts; and creation of an irrevocable life insurance trust
for the primary benefit of the wife. For these services, taxpayers received
an unitemized bill indicating a fee of $2,144.00 for 42.8 hours of work at a
rate of $50.00 per hour. Taxpayers deducted the amount of the fee on
their 1967 federal income tax return, but the Commissioner disallowed the
deduction. Because there was no evidence providing a reasonable basis for
allocation, the Tax Court allowed a deduction of only 20 percent2 of the fee
50. 510 S.W.2d 477 (Mo. En Banc 1974).
51. Id. at 488-84.
1. 60 T.C. 187 (1973).
2. This is an application of the rule of Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d
540 (2d Cir. 1930), which held that if the taxpayer's records are inadequate to
provide a reasonable basis for allocation, then the government can make an
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as an ordinary and necessary expense incurred in the determination of
future tax liabilities. Although the majority of the Tax Court assumed that
the Commissioner had conceded some of the legal fees were deductible
under section 213(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and treated the
allocation of fees between the deductible and non-deductible services as
the only issue, four concurring and two dissenting opinions addressed the
question as to whether attorney's fees for services rendered in estate plan-
ning are deductible. The Commissioner acquiesced in the decision.3
No section of the Internal Revenue Code specifically allows deduction
of legal fees. Legal fees may, however, be deductible as ordinary and nec-
essary expenses incurred in a trade or business 4 or in profit-seeking activi-
ties5 or in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any
tax.0 Generally, expenses incurred for personal, family or living expenses
are not deductible.7 Estate planning fees are typically non-business ex-
penses and usually represent non-deductible personal expenses, such "as the
fee for preparation of a will.8 Their deductibility thus depends on their
relation to trade or business, profit-seeking activities, or to tax planning.9
Although the Merians majority treated the question of deductibility of
estate planning fees incurred in connection with the determination, collec-
tion or refund of any tax'0 as conceded by the Commissioner, the dissenting
judges questioned the deductibility of fees for that purpose. Section 212(3)
was enacted in 1954 to remedy the result of Lykes v. U.S.," which held that
legal expenses incurred in contesting gift tax liability were not deductible.' 2
The regulations interpreting Section 212 permit deduction of legal fees
incurred for "tax counsel." 3 The language of the statute and of the regu-
3. 1973-2 Cum. BULL. 2.
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §162.
5. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,§ 212 (1) (2).
6. Ir. REV. CODE OF 1954, §212(3).
7. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §262.
8. Estate of Helen S. Pennell, 4 B.T.A. 1039 (1926), held that expenses
incurred in the preparation of a will are not deductible.
9. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §212, states:
In the case of an individual [taxpayer], there shall be allowed as a
deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred dur-
ing the taxable year-(1) for the production or collection of income;(2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property
held for the production of income; or(3) in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of
any tax.
10. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §212(3).
11. 343 U.S. 118 (1952).
12. At this time only the predecessor § 212(1) and (2) were in existence.
These provisions were combined in § 23(a) (2) of Ixr. REV. CODE OF 1939.
13. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(a) (1) (1) states:
Expenses paid or incurred by an individual in connection with the de-
termination, collection, or refund of any tax, . . .whether the tax be
income, estate, gift, property or .. .other tax are deductible. Thus,
expenses paid or incurredby a taxpayer for tax counsel or expenses paid
or incurred in connection with the preparation of his tax returns or in
connection with any proceedings involved in determining the extent
of his tax liability or in contesting his tax liability are deductible.
[Vol. 39
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lation does not distinguish between tax advice pertaining to closed or open
transactions. However, in enacting paragraph 3 of Section 212, the House
Ways and Means Committee stated that the deduction was limited to con-
tested tax liability.14 The American Bar Association thought that the House
Report created unintended problems with respect to legal fees incurred for
computation and preparation of tax returns. Thus, the Association sug-
gested to the Senate Finance Committee that it clear the matter up.' 5 The
Finance Committee ignored the suggestion and its report"6 is substantially
the same as that of the House.
Generally, taxpayers rely on the language of Treasury Regulation
1.212-1(1) in deducting legal fees incurred for "tax counsel" regarding
closed or open transactions. 7 In Carpenter v. U.S.,18 the Court of Claims
allowed a Section 212(3) deduction for tax counseling fees incurred inci-
dent to a divorce property settlement, even though the advice was applic-
able to years subsequent to the year in which the advice was given. In so
doing, the court drew an analogy between the prospective nature of in-
vestment counsel fees, for which deductions are allowed,19 and those
incurred for tax counsel.20 The Commissioner, on the other hand, took a
narrow view of Section 212(3) prior to 1972, contending that legal ex-
penses are deductible for tax advice only to the extent that such advice
relates to a completed or closed transaction. There is some judicial support
for this view.2' However, a shift from this position was indicated by the
Commissioner's Revenue Ruling 72-54522 which allows deduction of legal
fees for tax advice incident to divorce proceedings without regard for
whether such advice related to open or closed tax events. The Commis-
sioner's concession in Merians, that some of the estate planning fees were
deductible as relating to tax advice, was consistent with Revenue Ruling
14. H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., p. 29, A59 (1954).
15. 1 Hearing Before Senate Committee on Finance on the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1954, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., p. 487 (1954). The ABA suggested that
either the word "computation" be added before the words "determination, col-
lection, or refund" in § 212(3) or that the Committee clarify the matter in its
report.
16. S. Rep. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., p. 218 (1954).
17. See note 13 supra.
18. 338 F.2d 366 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(g). See also Elma M. Williams, 3 T.C. 200 (1944),
Edward J. Mallinckrodt, 2 T.C. 1128 (1943), affd other grounds 146 F.2d 1
(8th Cir.), cert. denied 324 U.S. 71 (1945).
20. 338 F.2d at 369:
Obviously, a taxpayer does not employ investment counsel after he has
made his investments, and he should not be restricted to deductions for
expenses for tax counsel solely to discover the tax consequences of what
has already transpired or a tax liability already accrued. One of the pur-
poses of a taxpayer in obtaining tax counsel is to avoid tax contests, not
to create them, and this also serves the interest of the government in
collecting taxes.
21. Kaufman v. U.S. 227 F. Supp. 807, 815 (W.D. Mo.), appeal dismissed
328 F,2d 619 (8th Cir. 1963). This case held that legal fees for tax advice were not
deductible to the extent that they relate to future tax liability.
22. Rev. Rul. 545, 1972-2 Cum. BULL. 179.
19741
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72-545. As long as that ruling remains in effect, the Commissioner will find
it difficult to argue that Section 212(3) deductions are limited to closed
transactions.
While the Merians majority did not contend that any of the estate
planning fee was deductible under Section 212(2),23 the concurring jus-
tices in Merians thought that this issue should be considered. In an early
decision, Nancy Reynolds Bagley,24 the Tax Court permitted the deduction
of estate planning fees as an expense incurred for the management, conser-
vation or maintenance of income-producing assets. Later the Supreme
Court in U.S. v. Gilmore25 held that the origin of the claim determined the
deductibility of the expense. This limited the Bagley holding, because some
estate planning fees fail to pass the "origins test." For example, fees in-
curred for the creation of an irrevocable trust in which the grantor retains
no interest in the income or corpus would not be deductible under Section
212(2). Similarly, fees paid with respect to services which were incurred
in developing a plan of distribution of a taxpayer's property at his death
are not deductible.2 6 On the other hand, where trust income is taxable to
the taxpayer under a grantor's trust, trustees fees paid by the taxpayer are
deductible under 212(2).27 Although the deductibility of estate planning
fees under Section 212(2) is still not settled, taxpayers may be somewhat
encouraged by the Commissioner's continued acquiescence in the Bagley
holding in spite of the Gilmore decision.28
While the issue was not argued by the taxpayers or discussed by the
court in Merians, the deductibility of estate planning fees under Section
212(1) should be considered. That section allows individuals to deduct
ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in producing or collecting in-
come. Here too, the "origins test" is an obstacle for the taxpayer.29 Estate
23. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §212(2). See note 8, supra.
24. 8 T.C. 130 (1947). The estate planning services allowed in the Bagley
case included creation of inter vivos trusts (with income reserved to the taxpayer),
testamentary trusts, and cancellation and purchase of new insurance policies.
Regarding these services the Tax Court thought the analogy between investment
planning and estate planning too strong to deny deduction of fees paid for estate
planning when fees for investment planning are deductible. The court did refuse
to allow a deduction for that part of the fee paid for the creation of an inter
vivos trust for the benefit of the taxpayer's daughter, because that part of the
fee was not incurred as a management expense of property held for the produc-
tion of income.
25. 372 U.S. 39 (1963). See also U.S. v. Patrick, 372 U.S. 53 (1963).
26. See note 7, supra.
27. Earl Vest, 57 T.C. 128 (1971), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 481 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1973).
28. 1947-1 Cum. BULL. 1.
29. 4A MEnTENS, LAw oF FEDERAL INCOME TAxATioN §25.A04, p. 6. See,
Ruth K. Wild, 42 T.C. 706 (1964), in which the tax court allowed a taxpayer to
deduct that part of attorney's fees allocable to securing alimony payments in a
divorce proceeding as an expense incurred for the production of income. Two
motives of the taxpayer are involved: one is to produce income and the other is
to secure a divorce, a personal expense. In this case it is questionable whether
the origin of the expense was the taxpayer's desire for income rather than her
desire for a divorce. In any event, this case is questionable authority for the
proposition that estate planning fees are deductible under § 212(1) because the
Commissioner did not acquiesce in that decision.
[Vol. 39
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planning fees, to the extent that they relate to the production or collection
of income, meet the origin test and thus are deductible under Section
212(1). For example, a taxpayer must pay fees for the creation of a revoca-
ble trust or an agency account, the corpus of which is to be managed by
a professional trustee who will more skillfully manage the trust property,
thereby increasing income.30 It can be argued that the cost of creating the
trust, as well as the trustee's fee, is an expense incurred for the production
of income. At this point Sections 212(1) and 212(2) may overlap because
an expense which increases or produces income often maintains or con-
serves income-producing property also.31 This overlap could explain why
only deductibility under Section 212(2) was discussed in Merians.32 Never-
theless, Section 212(1) deductibility is a possibility that should be con-
sidered in allocating estate planning fees.
After establishing that legal fees for estate planning are deductible, the
taxpayer is entitled to have the court make an allocation between deductible
and non-deductible expenses.33 This is known as the Cohan Rule.34 For the
rule to be applicable, the taxpayer must show some basis for allocation.35
The amount of evidence that a taxpayer must produce in order to establish
such a basis appears to be minimal.36 However, if the taxpayer produces
no more than this minimal amount, the court in its allocation may bear
heavily against the taxpayer, "whose inexactitude is of his own making."37
Thus, in order for the taxpayer to receive the full benefit of a deduction
for tax advice, he must establish a reasonable basis for allocation between
the deductible and non-deductible fees. In Merians, the taxpayers' only
evidence was the testimony of their attorney who stated that he considered
only the tax implications of the estate plan. Although the court found that
this furnished a basis for allocation, it did not furnish a reasonable basis to
allocate the whole to deductible tax advice. Consequently, the court bore
30. However, in order for deductions to be allowed in connection with the
production of income, the income must not be tax exempt. INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 265.
31. Trustees fees are deductible under § 212(2). Earl Vest, 57 T.C. 128(1971). While these fees can be viewed as an expense of management, conser-
vation, or maintenance of income-producing property, they are also expended
for the production or collection of income.
32. In addition, the Bagley case, 8 T.C. 130 (1942), allowed deduction of
estate planning fees under § 212(2).
33. Munn v. U.S., 455 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1972), Brown v. U.S., 70-2
U.S. Tax Cas. M 9501 (N.D. Tex. 1970), George v. U.S., 434 F.2d 1336 (Ct.
C1. 1970).
84. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543 (2d Cir. 1930). Although
the Cohan rule was originally applied in allocating deductible and non-deductible
entertainment expenses, the rule has been expanded to apply to almost any situa-
tion where deductible expenses are entangled with personal expenses.
85. Arthur D. McDonald, 52 T.C. 82, 89 (1969), George L. Schultz, 50
T.C. 688, 699-700 (1960).
36. In Cohan, the taxpayer failed to keep records of amounts spent for travel
and entertainment expenses, but his estimate of amounts spent for deductible pur-
poses was held to form a basis for allocation by the court. However, the Tax Court
seems to require more than this. In George L. Schultz, 50 T.C. 688, allocation
was refused a taxpayer who failed to furnish evidence of details of the legal
services rendered even though he did present the attorney's bill to the court.
87. 39 F.2d at 543.
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heavily against the taxpayer, allowing only 20%6 of the fee as a deduction.
Therefore, the question of practical importance is what sort of evidence
establishes a reasonable basis for allocation? In Merians, the court suggested
that a bill itemizing the legal services performed and the time spent on each
activity would furnish a reasonable basis for allocation. In Revenue Ruling
72-545, 38 the Commissioner states three situations involving divorce litigation
that furnish a reasonable basis for allocation. The ruling states that in these
situations an itemized bill, allocating time between activities for which the
fees are deductible and activities for which the fees are not deductible, is
all that is required. Therefore, the lawyer's time allocations to tax advice;
to management, conservation, or maintenance of income-producing assets;
and to production or collection of income will probably stand unless they
are unreasonable. 3 Since the lawyer furnishes the evidence, he should
apportion his fees with the allocation problem in mind.
Although the Merians court allowed a deduction of estate planning
fees relating to both present and prospective tax liability, the deductibility
issue is not settled. Some members of the Tax Court do not accept the
position expressed in Revenue Ruling 72-545. Consequently, there is some
risk until the issue is settled. This risk will be minimized, however, as long
as the Commissioner continues his acquiescence in Merians. Thus, for the
present, the taxpayer is given an opportunity to offset some estate planning
expense by a tax saving. An attorney should insure that the maximum





Defendant Vaughn was convicted of robbery in the first degree. The
victims included Boyd, an off-duty policeman, and four others. At trial, the
defendant contended that his presence at the robbery was purely coinci-
dental, that he had not known his companions intended to commit the
robbery, and that he had not taken part in the crime. Testifying for the
state, Boyd described the defendant's conduct during the robbery. On
cross-examination, defense counsel asked Boyd whether shortly after the
robbery he told Carol Vaughn, defendant's wife, that he thought the defen-
dant did not know what was going on at the time of the robbery. Boyd
replied that he did not recall making the statement. On redirect examina-
tion, the prosecuting attorney, in an apparent attempt to discredit the
anticipated impeaching testimony, asked Boyd directly if he thought the
88, Rev. Rul. 545, 1972-2 Cu . BULL. 179.
89. See Schenlder, Tax Deductibility of Legal Expense, 54 A.B.A.J. 199,
208 (1968); Mariner, Professional Fees, When Are They Deductible for Estate
Planning Work, 27 J. TAXATON 800 (1967).
1. 501 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. En Banc 1973).
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defendant knew what was going on at the time of the robbery. Boyd an-
swered affirmatively. The defendant later attempted to contradict Boyd
with Mrs. Vaughn's testimony that Boyd actually told her that he did not
think that the defendant knew what was going on at the time of the
robbery. The State, however, objected to the introduction of this impeach-
ing testimony on the ground that Boyd's statement to Mrs. Vaughn was an
inadmissible conclusion. The trial court sustained this objection. The ex-
clusion of Mrs. Vaughn's impeaching testimony was assigned as error
on appeal.
The Missouri Supreme Court reversed Vaughn's conviction and
remanded for a new trial on the ground that the trial court committed pre-judicial error in excluding the impeaching testimony.2 The court held that,
after a proper foundation has been laid,3 a prior inconsistent opinion is
admissible to impeach an opinion given by a witness in court.4 In addition,
the court peripherally considered whether a witness who testifies only as to
facts may be impeached by his prior inconsistent opinion. Although it cited
the general rule that such impeachment is not proper, the court stated in
dictum that the testimony offered in the case was "probably admissible in
any event."5 The dictum implies that a prior inconsistent statement of
opinion could be used to impeach a statement of fact.
The problem in Vaughn is an outgrowth of the so-called "Opinion
Rule,"6 which has been a subject of controversy in the field of evidence for
decades. Accepted principles of nineteenth-century jurisprudence excluded
all evidence offered by lay witnesses7 in opinion form on the ground that
such testimony invaded the province of the jury.8 This rule of exclusion was
thought to foster the twin virtues of witness objectivity and judicial integ-
rity.9 The trehd of m6dern cases, however, both in Missouri and in otherjurisdictions, has been to allow the use of opinion testimony.'0 The majority
of jurisdictions have severely restricted the scope of the Opinion Rule." Thus
2. Id. at 843.
3. Id. at 842.
4. Id. at 843.
5. Id. at 842.
6. See generally C. McCoawncK, EVIDENCE §§ 11-12 (2d ed. 1972); 7J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1917-18 (3d ed. 1940).
7. A discussion of opinion testimony given by expert witnesses is beyond
the scope of this note. See generally, C. McCorancx, EVIDENCE §§ 18-14 (2d ed.1972); 2 J. WmMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 555-62, 655 (3d ed. 1940); Annot., 98
A.L.R. 1109 (1935); 32 C.J.S. Evidence §§ 546, 549-60 (1964).
8. 7 J. WIGmoMB, EVIDFccE § 1920 (3d ed. 1940).
9. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1017 (3d ed. 1940).
10. See Grady, The Admissibility of a Prior Statement of Opinion for Pur-poses of Impeachment, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 224, 230 (1956).
11. This development has been spurred in part by Professor Wigmore'sdetermined advocacy. See 3 J. WiGMOBE, EVIDENCE § 1041 (3d ed. 1940).
For Missouri cases supporting this position, see Beuttenmuller v. Vess Bottling
Co. of St. Louis, 447 S.W.2d 519 (Mo. 1969); Laycock v. United Rys., 290 Mo.
344, 235 S.W. 91 (En Banc 1921); Brown v. Kroger Co., 358 S.W.2d 429 (Spr.
Mo. App. 1962); Long v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 232 Mo. App. 417, 109 S.W.2d
85 (K.C. Ct. App. 1937); Brown v. Winnwood Amusement Co., 225 Mo. App.1180, 84 S.W.2d 149 (K.C. Ct. App. 1931); See also C. McCommcnc, EVIDENCE
§ 11 (2d ed. 1972).
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courts often admit evidence in opinion form if such evidence is not readily
available elsewhere or if it concerns a preliminary issue."2
The Opinion Rule should never be applied to out-of-court statements' 3
Opinions are excluded not because they are per se objectionable, but
because testimony to basic facts is preferred.' 4 The fact finder must draw
its own independent conclusions from the basic facts; once a lay witness
testifies to basic facts, his in-court opinion of those basic facts is superfluous
and thus can be excluded without any loss of evidence.' 5 If an out-of-court
statement is not admitted because of its opinion form, however, evidence is
lost.10 Unlike in-court testimony, a defect in the form of an out-of-court
statement cannot be cured by merely asking the declarant to state the basic
facts underlying his opinion. Because out-of-court statements do not arise
in situations susceptible to restatement in the preferred form, they must be
accepted or rejected in the form in which they occurred.' 7 Even though
out-of-court opinions may not be the preferred form of evidence, they are
preferable to having no evidence at all and should therefore be admitted
for impeachment purposes.
The purpose of the Opinion Rule, to improve the objectivity and
reliability of testimonial assertions, is especially inapplicable to prior
inconsistent statements. 18 Impeaching evidence is not offered to prove sub-
stantive facts, but to demonstrate that the witness blows hot and cold on a
subject.' 0 Emphasis, therefore, should be placed on the prior inconsistency,
not on the form of the impeaching statement 2 0 Authorities have recognized
that a witness can be effectively impeached with a statement of opinion.2'
If the substance of the opinion is inconsistent with, and thereby impeaches,
the witness' testimony, it has fulfilled its function.22
Missouri courts have vacillated on the admissibility of opinions as
impeachment evidence. Since conflicting cases do not cite one another, no
definite "Missouri position" can be determined. However, the cases can be
grouped in three classes according to their treatment of the admissibility
of opinion evidence. The most restrictive group of cases categorically dis-
12. C. McCowmcK, EvInENCE'§ 11 at 24-25 (2d ed. 1972).
13. Id. at § 18.
14. C. McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 11 (2d ed. 1972); 7 J. WiGMorE, EVIDENcE
§ 1918 (3d ed. 1940).
15. 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1918 (3d ed. 1940).
16. C. McCoRMIcK, EVmENCE § 18 (2d ed. 1972).
17. Id. at .85.
18. Id. at § 35.
19. Id. at § 34.
20. Professor Wigmore has suggested that the distinction made between fact
evidence and opinion evidence is unsound, primarily because the distinction is
often impossible to make. He advocates flexibility in the application of the
Opinion Rule and predicts its disappearance from American jurisprudence. 7 J.
WIGMonrE, EVIDENCE §§ 1919, 1926, 1929 (3d ed. 1940), and 3 J. WIGmoRE,
EVIDENCE § 1041 (3d ed. 1940).
21. C. McCoRmIcx, EVMIENCE § 35 (2d ed. 1972); 3 J. WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE
§ 1041 (3d ed. 1940).
22. Even if the court errs by admitting an opinion which fails to impeach,
such error will not be prejudicial because the opinion's lack of inconsistency will
support the in-court testimony of the "impeached" witness.
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allows. the use of opinion evidence for purposes of impeachment and allows
impeachment only by prior inconsistent statements of fact.2 3 The second
category is somewhat less restrictive, disallowing the, use of opinion testi-
mony only to impeach in-court statements of fact by a lay witness. 24 Vaughn
falls within this category of cases, which does allow impeachment by a
prior inconsistent opinion where the lay witness testifies in opinion form.25
The third position, advocated by Wigmore 6 and McCormick,2 7 allows evi-
dence of a prior inconsistent opinion to impeach any form of testimony
given by any witness. 28 The supreme court in Vaughn was reluctant to adopt
this position.
Cases from other jurisdictions can also be classified in the above three
categories. A small minority have followed the restrictive approach denying
all impeachment by prior inconsistent opinions.2 9 Several other jurisdictions
still disallow impeachment by the prior inconsistent opinion of a lay witness
or a witness testifying only as to facts.30 The vast majority of cases, how-
23. See State v. Nave, 283 Mo. 35, 222 S.W. 744 (1920) (statements of
fact may be used to impeach, but prior opinions may not); Hamburger v. Rinkel,
164 Mo. 398, 64 S.W. 104 (1901); McFadin v. Catron, 120 Mo. 252, 25 S.W.
506 (1894).
"24, See Ford v. Dahl, 360 Mo. 437, 228 S.W.2d 800 (1950) (statement of
opinion not admissible to impeach a statement of fact even though the opinion
contains a contradictory implied statement of fact); Janis v. Jenkins, 58 S.W.2d
298 (Mo. 1933) (prior inconsistent opinions not admissible to impeach lay wit-
nesses); Bright v. Wheelock, 323 Mo. 840, 20 S.W.2d 684 (1929) (inconsistent
opinion admissible to impeach a witness who testifies in opinion form, but not to
impeach a witness testifying to facts).
Denying the use of opinion evidence to impeach lay witnesses seems pre-
dicated on the false assumption that lay witness may testify only to facts and
never to opinions. For Missouri cases specifically allowing a lay witness to testify
in opinion form, see cases note 11 supra.
25. See State v. Revard, 341 Mo. 170, 106 S.W.2d 906 (1937); Bright v.
Wheelock, 323 Mo. 840, 20 S.W.2d 684 (1929); State v. Forsha, 190 Mo. 296, 88
S.W. 746 (1905); State ex rel. Highway Comm'n v. Sheets, 488 S.W.2d 783 (Mo.
App., D. St. L. 1972).
26. 3 J. WiGmoPE, EVIDENCE § 1041 (3d ed. 1940).
27. C. McCorNuIcx, EVIDENCE § 85 (2d ed. 1972).
28. Missouri courts have followed this position at least once. In State v.
Baker, 318 Mo. 542, 300 S.W. 699 (1927), a rape prosecution, defendant's wife
stated that the prosecutrix had run around nights and had admitted misconduct
with many men. The Missouri Supreme Court held that it was proper on cross-
examination to ask the witness whether or not she had said previously that the
prosecutrix was a good girl and was not guilty of misconduct with the defendant,
since this "tended to impeach the correctness of her statement . Id. at 547,
300 S.W. at 701.
29. See Allen v. Yancy, 57 Ill. App. 2d 50, 206 N.E.2d 452 (1965) (exclud-
ing such evidence because it went to the ultimate issues in the case); State v.
Baker, 233 Iowa 745, 8 N.W.2d 248 (1943); Yoder v. State, 66 Okla. Crim. 178,
90 P.2d 669 (Cr. Ct. App. 1939) (allowing impeachment by statements of fact
but not opinion); State v. Thompson, 71 S.D. 319, 24 N.W.2d 10 (1946) (same
holding as Yoder supra); Hankin v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 520, 146 S.W.2d 195(Ct. Cr. App. 1940).
30. See Dorsten v. Lawrence, 20 Ohio App. 2d 297, 253 N.E.2d 804 (1969)(witness testifying to the facts of a collision could not be impeached by his prior
inconsistent opinion as to which driver was at fault); Webb v. City of Seattle, 22
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ever, allow impeachment by a prior inconsistent opinion of a witness who
testifies in opinion form.31 Some of the most common applications of this
rule occur where the witness expressed his opinion of an item's value,3 2
the speed of a vehicle,3 3 or the guilt of a party3 4
A growing number of jurisdictions have adopted the third view per-
mitting impeachment of all forms of testimony by prior inconsistent opin-
ions.3 5 A very well-reasoned exposition in support of this position is found
in Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Eddins.3 1 There a witness testified favorably
for the defendant as to the facts of an accident. The court then permitted
the witness to be impeached by evidence that he had previously stated that
the defendant was clearly at fault. After discussing at length the history of
this type of evidence, the court adopted Wigmore's testar that inconsistency
is the controlling factor of admissibility. The court held that if a witness
testifies to facts and it can be shown that knowing those facts he previously
expressed an opinion which was clearly inconsistent with his in-court testi-
mony, then his prior opinion is admissible for impeachment purposes because
of its value to the jury in evaluating the credibility of the witness 3 8
To allow the use of prior inconsistent opinions to impeach any testimony
Wash. 2d 596, 157 P.2d 312 (1945) (disallowing impeachment by a prior opinion
of witness testifying to facts, even though the opinion contradicted inferences
from the factual testimony).
31. See People v. Moreno, 108 Cal. Rptr. 338 (Super. 1973); Wolfe v. -Madi-
son Ave. Coach Co., 171 Misc. 707, 13 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Super. 1939); Tigh v.
College Park Realty Co., 149 Mont. 358, 427 P.2d 57 (1967); Larkin v. Saltair
Beach Co., 30 Utah 86, 83 P. 686 (1905). For collection of cases see Annot., 158
A.L.R. 821-24 (1945).
32. See Dublinsky Realty Co. v. Lortz, 129 F.2d 669 (8th Cir. 1942) (allow-
ing impeachment of a landowner's valuation of property by showing former
valuation he acquiesced to for taxation purposes); Kelly v. Sonny Boy Appaloosas,
Ltd., 491 P.2d 67 (Colo. App. 1971) (allowing impeachment of a landowners
valuation of property showing former valuation on insurance policy).
83. See Delaware, L.&W.R. Co. v. Converse, 139 U.S. 469 (1891) (witness
who testified train was going 10 m.p.h. could be impeached by his prior statement
that it was going 16 m.p.h.); Wingate v. New Deal Cab Co., 217 So. 2d 612(Fla. Ct. App. 1969); Stubbs v. Daughtry, 115 Ga. App. 22, 153 S.E.2d 633R1967).
84. See Rosenfeld v. Johnson, 161 So. 2d 703 (Fla. Ct. App. 1964); Com-
monwealth v. Jackson, 281 S.W.2d 891 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955) (allowing impeach-
ment as to opinion of guilt in a murder case); Birch v. Howard, 435 S.W.2d 945(Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1968) (allowing impeachment as to opinion of fault in
accident); Hutson v. State, 296 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1956).
85. See Snohomish County v. Great North. Ry., 180 F.2d 996 (9th Cir.
1942) (lay witnesses impeached by prior opinions on scientific matters); F. W.
Martin & Co. v. Cobb, 110 F.2d 159 (8th Cir. 1940); Crowley v. Dix, 136 Conn.
97, 68 A.2d 366 (1949); Griffin v. Barrett, 185 Ga. 443, 195 S.E. 746 (1938);
State v. Matheson, 130 Iowa 440, 103 N.W. 137 (1905) (allowing impeachment
by prior inconsistent opinion of a lay witness who testified to facts); Holder v.
State, 119 Tenn. 178, 104 S.W. 225 (1907) (witness testifying to facts supporting
criminal defendant's alibi was impeached by his prior statement which implied
the defendant was guilty of the crime).
36. 177 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1949).
37. See 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1041 (3d ed. 1940).
38. 177 F.2d at 958.
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of a witness seems the better position for the reasons given above, especially
in a jurisdiction such as Missouri which does not permit such evidence to
be used substantively. Nonetheless, the Missouri court in Vaughn was
reluctant to definitively adopt this position when the facts presented did
not require a decision on the matter. When a suitable factual situation
presents itself, however, the Court should adopt the rule permitting prior
opinions to be used to impeach all forms of inconsistent testimony given
by any witness.
ARTmUm E. FLORE 11
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES-
SCOPE OF REVIEW AND PRIVATE BIGHTS
Hill v. State Department of Public Health and Welfare1
The plaintiff had received general relief from the State of Missouri
since June, 1965, because of a permanent and total disability.2 Thereafter,
pursuant to section 208.010.2(1) (a) and (b), RSMo 1969, the Jackson
County office of the Division of Welfare suspended her aid for approxi-
mately five months on the ground that she had transferred an interest in
real estate without receiving fair and valuable consideration therefor.
An appeal to the Director of the Department followed, and a hearing
was held before a referee.3 The key evidence presented at that hearing was
undisputed. 4 Ada Hill had been the owner by inheritance of an undivided
1/15th interest in 120 acres of farmland in Louisiana. In April of 1965, she
joined with four of her brothers and sisters in conveying their respective
interests in the property to another brother in return for the latter's oral,
unsecured promise to pay each of them $400.00 within a week. The brother
defaulted on his promise to pay, leaving the plaintiff with nothing to show
for her conveyance. Because of this, the Director decided that the oral,
unsecured promise to pay was not "fair and valuable consideration" within
the meaning of section 208.010.2(1) (a), RSMo 1969. On appeal, the Circuit
Court of Jackson County affirmed the Director's decision. The Missouri
Supreme Court reversed.5
The circuit court limited the scope of its review to that provided in
section 208.100, RSMo 1969.6 While section 208.100 allows appeals to the
1. 508 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. En Banc 1973).
2. § 208.051, RSMo 1959, not changed in 1969.
3. The hearing was provided for under § 208.080, RSMo 1969.
4. 503 S.W.2d at 7.
5. Id. at 12.
6. Traditionally, appeals from administrative decisions "are strictly creatures
of the statute, and this is particularly true of appeals to the courts from the
determination of administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions."
Howlett v. Social Security Comm'n, 347 Mo. 784, 788, 149 S.W.2d 806, 809(En Banc 1941). The power and jurisdiction of a court upon such appeal is
limited to that granted by the terms of the statute which creates the right. Maltz
v. Jackoway-Ratz Cap Co., 336 Mo. 1000, 82 S.W.2d 909 (1934); State ex rel.
Missouri Gravel Co. v. Workman's Comp. Comm'n, 234 Mo. App. 232, 118
S.W.2d 1034 (St. L. Ct. App. 1938).
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circuit court from determinations by the division of welfare, it permits the
court to remand only where the aggrieved party did not receive a fair
hearing or if the determination of fact by the Director was arbitrary and
unreasonable.r The terms "arbitrary and unreasonable" have been inter-
preted to mean that a reviewing court may not overturn a determination of
fact by the Director of Welfare where there is substantial evidence to
support the finding.8 The court can only review the record of the adminis-
trative proceeding, it may not hear new evidence or testimony.9 Further-
more, the court may consider only the competent evidence favorable to the
Director's finding' ° and may not hold the Director's decision arbitrary and
unreasonable merely because a contrary conclusion could have been
reached upon the same evidence." Finding that plaintiff had a fair hearing
and that the Director's decision was not arbitrary or unreasonable, the
circuit court accordingly affirmed.
12
7. Section 208.100, RSMo 1969 states:(1) "Any applicant aggrieved by the action of the director of public
health and welfare by the denial of benefits in passing upon the appeal
to said director may appeal to the circuit court of the county in which
such applicant resides within ninety days from the date of the action
and decisions appealed from.
(5) Upon the record so certified by the director of public health and
weltare, the circuit court shall determine whether or not a fair hearing
has been granted the applicant. If the court shall decide for any reason
that a fair hearing and determination of the applicant's eligibility and
rights under this law was not granted the individual by said director,
or that his decision was arbitrary and unreasonable, the court in such
event shall remand the proceedings for redetermination of the issues
by said director.
8. Wallin v. State Dep't of Pub. Health & Wel., 422 S.W.2d 345 (Mo. En
Banc 1967); Collins v. Division of Wel., 364 Mo. 1032, 270 S.W.2d 817 (En
Banc 1954); Dunnegan v. Gallop, 374 S.W.2d 407 (Spr. Mo. App. 1964); Bollin-
ger v. State Dep't of Pub. Health & Wel., 254 S.W.2d 257 (St. L. Mo. App. 1953).
9. Norman v. State Dep't of Pub. Health & Wel., 283 S.W.2d 143 (Spr.
Mo. App. 1955).
10. Wallin v. State Dep't of Pub. Health & Wel., 422 S.W.2d 345 (Mo. En
Banc 1967); Collins v. Division of Wel., 864 Mo. 1032, 270 S.W.2d 817 (En
Banc 1954).
11. Norman v. State Dep't of Pub. Health & Wel., 283 S.W.2d 143 (Spr.
Mo. App. 1955).
12. Under § 208.100, RSMo 1969, the court need only determine that the
decision of the Director was not arbitrary or unreasonable to affirm the holding.
Wallin v. State Dep't of Pub. Health & Wel., 422 S.W.2d 345 (Mo. En Banc
1967); Ellis v. State Dep't of Pub. Health & Wel., 365 Mo. 614, 285 S.W.2d 634
SEn Banc 1955); Collins v. Division of Wel., 364 Mo. 1032, 270 S.W.2d 817
En Banc 1954); Lee v. State Dep't of Pub. Health & Wel., 480 S.W.2d 305 (Mo.
App., D. Spr. 1972); State Dep't of Pub. Health & Wel. v. Jenings, 464 S.W.2d
750 (K.C. Mo. App. 1970); Dunnegan v. Gallop, 374 S.W.2d 407 (Spr. Mo. App.
1964); Velghe v. State Dep't of Pub. Health & Wel., 862 S.W.2d 747 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1962); Powers v. State Dep't of Pub. Health & Wel., 859 S.W.2d 23 (K.C.
Mo. App. 1962); Weidmaier v. State Dep't of Pub. Health & Wel., 343 S.W.2d 93
(K.C. Mo. App. 1961); Sullivan v. State Dep't of Pub. Health & Wel., 295 S.W.2d
190 (St. L. Mo. App. 1956); Humphrey v. State Dep't of Pub. Health & Wel., 286
S.W.2d 563 (Spr. Mo. App. 1956); Kelly v. State Social Sec. Comm'n, 236 Mo.
App. 1058, 161 S.W.2d 661 (K.C. Ct. App. 1942).
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On appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court, the plaintiff claimed she had
a right of review under article V, section 22 of the Missouri Constitution. 3
The judicial review afforded by article V, section 22 as embodied iby the
Missouri Administrative Procedure Act14 is arguably much broader and gives
the court more latitude to overturn administrative agency decisions. The
judicial test used in examining the evidence under the act is called the
substantial evidence -test. The statute states: "The inquiry may extend to
a determination of whether the action of the agency... (3) Is unsupported
by competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record."' 5 Whereas
under section 208.100, RSMo 1969, the court may not disturb the decision
of the Director unless it is arbitrary and unreasonable,-meaning that the
evidence favorable to the agency is not substantial to support its decision 6
-judicial review under article V, section 22 allows the court to examine
the entire record and reverse the agency if the Director's decision was
clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.17
The circuit court had refused to allow review under Missouri Con-
stitution, article V, section 22.1 The right to constitutional review hinged
on whether the plaintiffs welfare payments were "private rights"19 within
the ambit of the term as it is used in section 22. Relying on Ellis v. State
Department of Public Health and Welfare,20 the circuit court held that
these benefits were not payments to which one is entitled as a matter of
right, but rather were gratuities given by the state.2 1 The Missouri Supreme
13. Article V, § 22 provides:
All final decisions, findings, rules and orders of any administrative
officer or body existing under the constitution or by law, which arejudicial or quasi-judicial and affect private rights, shall be subject to
direct review by the courts asprovided by law; and such review shall
include the determination whether the same are authorized by law, and
in cases in which a hearing is required by law, whether the same are
supported by competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record.
(emphasis added).
14. Section 536.140, RSMo 1969 is the section of the Missouri Administrative
Procedure Act specifying the scope of judicial review.
15. Id.
16. See notes 6-10 and accompanying text supra.
17. Kirkwood v. Missouri State Bd. of Med., 478 S.W.2d 690 (Mo. App.,
D. St. L. 1972).
18. 503 S.W.2d at 8.
19. A private right has been defined as "some power or privilege to which
one is entitled upon principles of morality, religion, law, or the like. It means a
natural right peculiar to an individual." State v. Pankratz, 238 Minn. 517, 57
N.W.2d 635, 647 (1953). See also Savoie v. Town of Bourbonnais, 389
Ill. App. 551, 90 N.E.2d 645 (1950); Board of County Comm'rs v. Good, TP.
Harper County, 188 Okla. 151, 107 P.2d 805 (1940). Missouri courts have not
specifically defined the term, but have made case by case determinations. State
ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Weinstein, 322 S.W.2d 778 (Mo. En Bane 1959)
(license to lay water lines on a state right of way was a privilege equivalent to a
private right); City of St. Louis v. Murphy, 359 Mo. 854, 224 S.W.2d 68 (En
Banc 1949) (police retirement fund benefits were a private right); Smith v.
Missouri State Highway Comm'n, 488 S.W.2d 230 (Mo. App., D. K.C. 1972)(assistance under Highway Relocation Assistance Act was private right).
20. 865 Mo. 614, 285 S.W.2d 634 (Mo. En Banc 1955).
21. 503 S.W.2d at 8.
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Court, however, specifically overruled El!is and held that welfare benefits
are "private rights" protected by the Missouri Constitution.22 Employing the
substantial evidence test embodied in the Missouri Administrative Procedure
Act, the court then held that the evidence was not competent and sub-
stantial to support the decision of the Director and reversed the decision of
the circuit court and the Director.23
In holding that welfare benefits are private rights, the Missouri court
adopted the prevailing thinking of both the courts24 and the writers in the
area.-2 1 Nevertheless, while the court needed to make the constitutional
determination in order to take jurisdiction in Hill,26 the court was not com-
pelled to sink its judicial anchor in the sands of the Missouri Administrative
22. Id. at 10-11.
23. Id. at 12.
24. The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the concept that constitutional
rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a "right" or
as a "privilege." Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). In holding that
notice and an evidentiary hearing were required prior to the termination of public
assistance benefits, the Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly, 897 U.S. 254 (1970),
specifically treated welfare payments as rights protected by due process. 897 U.S.
at 261. See also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 894
U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 837 (1969);
Speizer v. Randall, 857 U.S. 513 (1958); Slochower v. Board of Higher Ed., 850
U.S. 551 (1956); Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941);
Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 873 (1908).
25. As stated in Goldberg v. Kelly, 897 U.S. 254 (1970):
It may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more like
property" than a "gratuity." Much of the existing wealth in this country
takes the form of rights that do not fall within traditional common-law
concepts of property. It has been aptly noted that "[s]ociety today is
built around entitlement. The automobile dealer has his franchise, the
doctor and lawyer their professional licenses, the worker his union mem-
bership, contract, and pension rights, the executive his contract and stock
options; all are devices to aid security and independence. Many of the
most important of these entitlements now flow from government: sub-
sidies to farmers and businessmen, routes for airlines and channels for
television stations; long term contracts for defense, space, and education;
social security pensions for individuals. Such sources of security, whether
private or public, are no longer regarded as luxuries or gratuities; to
the recipients they are essentials, fully deserved, and in no sense a form
of charity. It is only the poor whose entitlements, although recognized
by public policy, have not been effectively enforced." Reich, Individual
Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE LJ.
1245, 1255 (1965).
Id. at 261n.8. See also Reich, The New Property, 78 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
A textual discussion of article V, section 22 of the Missouri Constitution,
Procedure Before, and Review of Decisions of Missouri Administrative Agencies,
37 V.A.M.S. 145, states:
It follows that the expression 'private rights' is also used in an extremely
broad sense, since some of the matters dealt with by the agencies under
consideration are, in a sense, privileges; e.g., the granting of certificates
of convenience and necessity by the Public Service Commission.
37 V.A.M.S at 157.
26. Had the court decided that there was no valid constitutional issue in the
case, the Kansas City Court of Appeals would- have been the proper forum to
review the circuit court.
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Procedure Act to put the controversy at rest. The evidence was undisputed
that the plaintiff had relinquished her interest in real estate for an oral,
unsecured promise to pay.27 The question presented to both the circuit court
and the supreme court was: does "fair and valuable consideration" as
defined in section 208.010, RSMo 1969, embrace an oral, unsecured prom-
ise to pay?28 The issue was one of statutory interpretation, a question of
law and not of fact. While a court's review of administrative fact deter-
minations is limited, an administrative body's interpretation of a statute
does not preclude or restrict an appellate court's ability to review the issue.29
Clearly, the Missouri Supreme Court could have characterized the issue
in the case as one of statutory interpretation 0 and remanded the case to
the court of appeals for a determination of what constitutes fair and valu-
able compensation.31 The court could have thereby avoided deciding the
issue whether welfare payments are "private rights."
The supreme court, however, chose to apply article V, section 22 to
welfare payments. The overruling of Ellis was probably inevitable in the
light of Goldberg v. Kelly 3 2 and subsequent decisions. In overruling Ellis,
however, the court may have opened the doors to a series of problems and
27. 508 S.W.2d at 7.
28. Section 208.010.2(1) (a), RSMo (1973 Supp.) defines "fair and valuable
consideration" as:
... money or real or personal property received at the time of the trans-
action approximately equal to the value of the property encumbered,
assigned, conveyed or transferred, and shall not for the purposes of this
statute be construed to include support, services, or other advance-
ments made or to be made by a relative to the claimant.
A payment of a loan to a relative may be recognized and eligibility
not affected if the claimant can establish to the satisfaction of the divi-
sion of welfare that the loan was bona fide and the proceeds of the loan
were used by the claimant for his or his dependent's support or benefit.
29. "An interpretation of a statute by an administrative body does not
preclude, restrict, or control the right of a complete review of such issue by the
appellate court." Kroger Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 814 S.W.2d 250, 254 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1958). "[Wlhere the ruling of the administrative body is clearly an
interpretation or application of law such is not binding on us [the court], and in
such case it is within our province, and indeed it is our duty to review and cor-
rect erroneous administrative decisions." Smith v. Missouri State Highway Comm'n,
488 S.W.2d 230, 285 (Mo. App. D. K.C. 1972). See also Haynes v. Unemploy-
ment Comp. Comm'n, 358 Mo. 540, 188 S.W.2d 77 (1944); Crawford v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 482 S.W.2d 739 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972); Gilmore v. Thompson,
413 S.W.2d 20 (St. L. Mo. App. 1967); Gordon v. Puritan Chem. Co., 406
S.W.2d 822 (Spr. Mo. App. 1966); Horrell v. Chase Hotel, 174 S.W.2d 881
(St. L. Mo. App. 1948).
30. Hill resembles Bradley v. Hill, 457 S.W.2d 212 (Spr. Mo. App. 1970),
in which the court interpreted § 208.010, the same statute at issue in Hill. The
court in Bradley reversed, holding that the Directors decision was arbitrary and
unreasonable because he employed an improper definition of the statutory term
"transfer" used in § 208.010. A court of appeals could have resolved the con-
troversy in Hill by interpretihig the term 'fair and valuable consideration."81. A remand to the court of appeals would have been necessary because,
the constitutional issue bbing moot, the supreme. court would have lackedjurisdiction. , I
82. See note 24 supra.
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hidden consequences. Courts have traditionally viewed administrative
agencies as having more expertise and a better ability to "fit" statutes to
the realities of life.A3 In his treatise on administrative law, Kenneth Culp
Davis indicates that while construction of statutes is normally the province
of the courts, this situation yields when "the problem is one of working out
the agency's policy."3 4 The Missouri courts have usually taken a hands off
approach .3 The agency in the case at bar was attempting to establish a
policy as to what was "fair and valuable consideration" within the meaning
of section 208.010.2(1) (a), RSMo 1969. The traditional view has merit
here, in that the agency is much closer to the day to day operations of the
welfare system than is the court, and the administrative referee probably
has a better grasp of the situation and more ability to adequately "fit" the
statute and its conditions to the contemporary world.3 6
The Hill decision may also have thrust the Welfare Department into the
procedural grasp of the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act.3 7 This act
establishes procedural and due process requirements for those administrative
agencies not expressly covered by other administrative procedure statutes.
While the Missouri welfare statutes specify some administrative procedure
and due process requirements, they are not as detailed and as stringent as
those of the Administrative Procedure Act.38 The act provides for a complex
and elaborate system of administrative hearing and judicial review for
33. "So long as there is warrant in the record for the judgment of the expert
body it must stand .... The judicial function is exhausted when there is found
to be a rational basis for the conclusions approved by the administrative body."
Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1989).
34. 4 K. DAvis, ADm.nNImAvE LAW TREATISE § 80.09 at 242 (1958). Davis
does point out, however that
[o]n ordinary problems of interpreting statutes, except when the subject
matter is technical and nonlegal, the courts are the specialists, whether
analysis of legislative history is called for or whether the main process
is one of finding the meaning of the words.
Id. § 80.09, at 242.
85. See, e.g., Iron County v. State Tax Comm'n, 487 S.W.2d 665 (Mo. En
Bane 1968). See also Barnhart, Judicial Review: Weight Given to Conclusions of
Law by a Hearing Examiner, 86 Mo. L. REv. 288 (1971).
86. Friedhoff, Mandamus and Discretionary Acts-A Novel Approach, 84 Mo.
L. REv. 408 (1969).
Certainly an arbitrary agency decision should be struck down, but
when a decision is rendered in good faith and on a rational basis, it is at
least arguable that the court contravenes legislative intention by substi-
tuting its judgment. The basic difficulty in most situations is a lack of any
clear guidelines in the court's choosing in one instance to overrule an
agency and in another to uphold its decision.
Id. at 409. See also State ex rel. Keystone Laundry & Dry Cleaners, Inc. v. Mc-
Donnell, 426 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1968); 4 K. DAvis, AnDbnNusrivs LAw TnnTIsn.§ 30.14 (1958).
37. Chapter 536, RSMo 1969.
88. See § 208.080, RSMo 1969, and compare to the requirements of
§ § 536.063, .067, .070, .073, .077, and .080. While it is beyond the scope of this
note to make a detailed comparison, the sheer volume of the administrative
sections in the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act indicates that more detailed
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"contested cases," a contested case being "a proceeding before an agency
in which legal rights, duties or privileges of specific parties are required
by law to be determined after hearing."3 9 Having determined that welfare
payments are private rights, the court has now opened the door for future
claimants to argue that they should be afforded the additional procedural
safeguards of the Administrative Procedure Act.40 Such a situation would
add inevitably to the already burdensome workload of the Division of
Welfare. To comply with these new administrative and procedural demands
would be difficult with present staff and budget. It seems clear that if the
Constitution requires additional procedural safeguards, the state must add
to the Division's staff in a commensurate fashion.
In addition, the Missouri Supreme Court may also have added a new
weapon to the judicial arsenal of remedies of the welfare recipient who feels
that his rights have been denied by the state. Not only does Hill expand
judicial review of the administrative decisions and arguably add to the
procedural due process requirements, but it may also have made available
section 1983 actions in the federal courts. Section 198341 allows for suit in
federal court against anyone who "under color of any statute . . . of any
State... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges ... secured by the Con-
stitution and laws... ." If the due process of the Administrative Procedure
Act is constitutionally required, then one aggrieved under that act may file
an action for a section 1983 violation of his right to due process under the
14th amendment to the Constitution. One Fifth Circuit case 42 allowed
a person denied a liquor license to bring a 1983 action. It seems certain that
the federal courts in Missouri would find the rights of a welfare recipient
more sacrosanct than a liquor license.
WALTER E. HUZENGA
39. § 536.010 (2), V.A.M.S. 1974 Supp.
40. A claimant would contend that cases such as Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970), require additional procedural safeguards embodied in the
Missouri Administrative Procedure Act. The counterargument is that the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act does not apply where "other provision for judicial review
is provided by statute," § 536.100, RSMo 1969, and that the procedural safe-
guards of Chapter 208, RSMo 1969, are adequate to satisfy due process.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
42. Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964). Cf. Kopper Kettle
Restaurants, Inc. v. City of St. Robert, 489 S.W.2d 1 (Spr. Mo. App. 1969). See
also Weinstein, Contested Case in Missouri Liquor Licensing, 86 Mo. L. Rav. 445(1971).
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MASTER AND SERVANT-SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT-
USE OF EXCESSIVE VIOLENCE
Wellman v. Pacer Oil Co.1
Plaintiff, Lionel Wellman, went to a service station operated by defen-
dant Pacer Oil Co. to obtain gasoline. Allen Gamble, an employee of Pacer,
serviced his car. Plaintiff left the station, but soon thereafter the hood of
the car flew up. After returning to the station, plaintiff accused Gamble of
"messing up" the hood. In the ensuing argument, Gamble pulled a gun and
shot plaintiff. Plaintiff, dazed, got back into his car, but Gamble opened the
door and shot plaintiff again, inflicting serious and permanent injury.
Wellman sued Gamble, Pacer, and station manager Ben Clarke to recover
for his injuries. The jury found against Pacer in the amount of $42,000 actual
damages and $18,000 punitive damages.2 A directed verdict was entered for
Clarke. Gamble defaulted.
Pacer appealed the verdict contending that Gambles acts in shooting
plaintiff were not within the scope and course of his employment.3 The
Missouri Supreme Court reversed the verdict by a 4-3 margin holding that
the actions of Gamble were so outrageous and criminal-so excessively
violent-as to be totally without reason or responsibility and hence were,
as a matter of law, not within the scope of his employment.4
The trial court held Pacer liable under the doctrine of respondeat
superior,5 a common law concept6 making the master liable for certain
tortious acts of his servant.7 Though there is no unanimity as to what social
policies are furthered by this doctrine," the general principle is firmly
entrenched in the law. The prerequisites for its application are clear. The
relationship of master and servant must be shown to exist9 at the time of
1. 504 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. En Banc 1973).
2. Id. at 56.
3. Id. at 57. There was no evidence that Clarke or anyone connected with
Pacer had any knowledge that Gamble carried a gun. Pacer's employees were
given no instructions concerning the carrying of weapons during business hours.
There was also no evidence that Pacer knew or had reason to believe that Gamble
had violent tendencies.
4. Id. at 58.
5. Id. at 57. Respondeat superior is the chief theory used to hold a master
liable for injuries to third persons proximately caused by acts or omissions of his
servants. Stawasz v. Aetna Ins. Co. 99 II. App. 2d 131, 240 N.E.2d 702 (1968);
Grace v. Smith, 270 S.W.2d 79 (K.C. Ct. App. 1954), aff'd, 365 Mo. 147, 277
S.W.2d 503 (En Banc 1955); 57 C.J.S. Master & Servant § 561 (1948).
6. Blasinay v. Albert Wenzlich Real Estate Co., 235 Mo. App. 526i 138
S.W.2d 721 (St. L. Ct. App. 1940).
7. Roberts v. Gagnon, 1 App. Div. 2d 297, 149 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1956).
8. See Johnson v. Brewer, 266 Ky. 314, 98 S.W.2d 889 (1936); Watkins v.
Southcrest Baptist Church, 399 S.W.2d 530 (Texas 1966). See also Curtis,
Master and Servant-Frolic and Detour, 2 Mo. L. REv. 351 (1937); Douglas,
Vicarious Liability And Administration Of Risk, 88 YAL.E L.J. 584 (1929); Laski,
The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE: L.J. 105 (1916).
9. Lewis v. Constitution Life Co., 215 P.2d 55 (Calif. 1950); Usery v.
Dr. Pepper Bot. Co., 385 S.W.2d 335 (Spr. Mo. App. 1969). The relationship of
master and servant is based on contract, express or implied. O'Brien v. Rindskopf,
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the injury10 and in respect to the very transaction out of which the injury
arose." If these requirements are met, then the master's liability depends
whether the servant's conduct was within the scope and course of his
employment.12
Missouri measures whether an act is within the scope of employment
not by the time or motive of the act, but whether it was done by virtue of
his employment and in furtherance of his master's business.' 3 The generality
of this test makes its application difficult 14 and resolution of the scope of
employment issue depends upon the particular facts and circumstances of
the case.15 The test, however, limits the ambit of the employer's liability to
situations which bear some relationship to his business.
The test is particularly difficult to apply where the alleged tort is
intentional. Early cases refused to hold the master liable on the theory that
intentional torts were not authorized by the master, even though the acts
were in furtherance of the employer's interests and committed while per-
forming the duties of employment.'" The modem approach holds the
master liable in such situations if the servant's acts were connected with
the duties of employment.' 7
384 Mo. 1288, 70 S.W.2d 1085 (1984). A servant is a person employed to per-
form services for another who, with respect to his physical conduct in the perfor-
mance of the service, is subject to the other's control or right to control. Brenner
v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 286 Mo. App. 524, 158 S.W.2d 171 (K.C. Ct. App.
1942).
10. Biel, Inc. v. Kirsch, 240 Ind. 69, 161 N.E.2d 617 (1959).
11. Usery v. Dr. Pepper Bat. Co., 885 S.W.2d 885 (Spr. Mo. App. 1969).
12. Linam v. Murphy, 860 Mo. 1140, 232 S.W.2d 987 (1950); Kinnard v.
Rock City Const. Co., 89 Tenn. App. 547, 286 S.W.2d 852 (1955); Shinn, Master
And Servant-Scope Of Employment, 16 Mo. L. REv. 169 (1951). For a general
history of the development of the doctrine of respondeat superior and the scope
of employment test see 6 C. LABATT, Co vrmr Ams ON THE LAw OF MAsTER
AwD SERvANT § 2288 (1913).
18. Burks v. Leap, 418 S.W.2d 258 (Mo. 1967); Wolf v. Terminal R. Ass'n,
282 Mo. 559, 222 S.W. 114 (1920); Garretzen v. Duenckel, 50 Mo. 104 (1872).
14. Shinn, Master And Servant-Scope Of Employment, 16 Mo. L. REv. 169,
171 (1951). See also Mo. APpaovED INsr. § 18.05 (1969), which states, "Acts
are within the 'scope of employment' as that term is used in this instruction if:
1. they were a part of the work (name of servant) was employed to perform,
and 2. they were done by (name) to serve the [business] [interests] of (mas-
ter)." In practice, this instruction is general enough to permit a jury to find a
broad range of conduct within the bounds of scope of employment.
15. Hurley Pickett Lake Farms, Inc. v. Sullivan, 245 Ark. 709, 484 S.W.2d
88 (1968); Chiles v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 280 Mo. App. 850, 91 S.W.2d
164 (1986); Schmitt v. American Press, 42 S.W.2d 969 (St. L. Mo. App. 1931).
16. See, e.g., Jones v. St. Louis, Naples, and Peoria Pocket Co., 48 Mo. App.
898 (St. L. Ct. App. 1891).
17. Fields v. Sanders, 29 Cal.2d 834, 180 P.2d 684 (1947); Note, Master
And Servant-Master's Liability-Willful Torts Of Servant-Scope Of Employment,
88 OR. L. REv. 803, 804 (1954); Annot., 172 A.L.R. 525 (1947). The rationale
of respondeat superior applies with equal force to intentional and negligence torts.
Blasinay v. Albert Wenzick Real Estate Co., 235 Mo. App. 526, 188 S.W.2d 721
(St. L. Ct. App. 1940). Liability may arise even though the specific tortious act
was neither commanded nor expressly authorized. Bass v. Kansas City Journal Post
Co., 847 Mo. 681, 148 S.W.2d 548 (1941).
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Prior to Wellman, a jury could find a servant's tortious act to be within
his scope of employment regardless of the maliciousness or criminality of
the servants conduct. In Haehl v. Wabash R. Co., 8 deceased was shot by
defendant's bridge watchman as he complied with the watchman's command
to leave the bridge. The jury found that the watchman had acted within the
scope of his employment, and a judgment was entered against the defendant.
In affirming the lower court's decision, the Missouri Supreme Court held
that the scope of employment issue had been properly submitted to the jury
and that "it was not necessary, to render the defendant liable, that it should
have authorized its watchman to kill the deceased, or sanctioned the deed
after it was done; and however wanton or malicious it was, the principal
is liable if it was done in the course of the servant's employment."19 A
similar result was reached in Paniwani v. Star Service.20 There defendant's
employee struck plaintiff in the face with the nozzle of a gasoline pump
hose after the plaintiff insisted that the employee check the oil and tires on
his car. The court held that the plaintiff made "a submissible case of a
vicious, unprovoked assault and battery 'as plaintiff was engaged in trying
to settle a controversy concerning a portion of defendant's business, on the
premises, during working hours..." "21
Wellman expressly overrules Haehli and Paniwani to the extent they
disregard the maliciousness and criminality of the servants conduct in
determining whether the plaintiff's case is submissible.22 Wellman adopts
an excessive violence rule: a servant's conduct can be so outrageous, crim-
inal, and excessively violent that, as a matter of law, it falls outside the
scope of his employment.23 Although new in Missouri, this rule is supported
by decisions in other jurisdictions. 24
In adopting the excessive violence rule, the Weilman majority cited with
approval several comments from the Restatement (Second) of Agency.25
Section 231, comment a, states that "the master is not responsible for acts
which are clearly inappropriate to or unforseeable in the accomplishment of
the authorized result."26 This immunity is founded on the assumption that if
Cases holding the master liable for his servant's intentional torts have been
categorized according to their fact situations. Mechem's three broad categories are:
{1) torts incidental to a custodial job where the use of force is a natural incident;
(2) torts resulting from wrongful means used to promote the master's business;
() torts resulting from friction naturally engendered by the master's business. P.
MEcHEm, OuTLNEs or TrH LAw or AGENCY § 895 (4th ed. 1952).
18. 119 Mo. 825, 24 S.W. 737 (1893).
19. Id. at 340-41, 24 S.W. at 741. (emphasis added).
20. 395 S.W.2d 129 (Mo. 1965).
21. Id. at 131-82.
22. 504 S.W.2d at 60.
28. Id. at 58.
24. Lombardy v. Stees, 290 P.2d 1110 (Colo. 1955); Martin v. Jones, 802
Mich. 855, 4 N.W.2d 686 (1942); Lunn v. Boyd, 403 Pa. 231, 169 A.2d 103
(1961); Potter Title & Trust Co. v. Knox, 381 Pa. 202, 113 A.2d 549 (1955);
Howard v. Zaney Bar, 869 Pa. 155, 85 A.2d 401 (1952); Adami v. Dobie, 440
S.W.2d 830 (Texas 1969); 53 A.L.R.2d 720 (1957).
25. 504 S.W.2d at 58.
26. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) or AGENcY § 231, comment a (1957).
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the act is not appropriate or expected, it can be neither authorized nor
incidental to an authorized act.2 7 It may be unfair to hold a master liable if
he could not anticipate the act of violence; liability for such an act may not
be a normal risk of the master's business. 28 Wellman quotes from section 235,
which states that a servant's act is not within the scope of his employment
unless done with intent to perform it as a part of or incident to his employ-
ment.29 Comment c to section 235 also states that an act done in an outra-
geous or abnormal manner is evidence that the servant lacked intent to
serve his master.30
Section 235, comment c, is consistent-with prior Missouri law. A few
earlier decisions have held, as a matter of law, that a servant's tortious act
was not done with an intent to further his master's business . 1 In accordance
with section 235, these courts have examined the servant's conduct and the
circumstances of the case in order to ascertain the servant's intent. In State
ex rel. Gosselin v. Trimble,32 for example, defendant's employee, a taxicab
driver, assaulted the plaintiff after plaintiffs auto bumped the defendant's
taxicab. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant employer. On
appeal, the plaintiff contended that the employee's assault was an attempt
to abate a trespass to his master's property, and therefore was in the scope
and course of his employment.3 3 In affirming the trial court, the Supreme
Court rejected this argument, holding that the employee's words and actions,
together with the surrounding circumstances, demonstrated that the assault
was not an attempt on his part to do his master's business.34
The adoption of section 231, comment a, on the other hand, has altered
Missouri respondeat superior law. Wellman is the first Missouri case to hold
a servant's conduct to be so violent that, as a matter of law, no jury could
reasonably find that the conduct arose naturally from the performance of
the servants work. Section 231, comment a, states that a master is not
responsible for a servants act which is unforeseeable or inappropriate to the
accomplishment of the authorized result. 35 The dissent saw this section as
injecting a new and additional requirement of foreseeability into the Mis-
souri doctrine of respondeat superior36 An analysis of prior cases, however,
27. RxsTATEmENr (SEcoND) OF AGENCY §§ 228-29, 235, 245 (1958);
Lombardy v. Stees, 290 P.2d 1110 (Colo. 1955) (no testimony to show assault
expressly or impliedly authorized); Howard v. Zaney Bar, 869 Pa. 155, 85 A.2d
401 (1952) (use of violence was a gross abuse of all authority).
28. Hahn v. Owen, 176 Miss. 296, 168 So. 622 (1936).
29. RESTATEm:ENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 235 (1958).
80. Id. comment c.
31. Porter v. Thompson, 357 Mo. 31, 206 S.W.2d 509 (1947); Milazzo v.
Kansas City Gas Co., 180 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1944); State ex rel. Gosselin v. Trimble,
328 Mo. 760, 41 S.W.2d 801 (1931); Tockstein v. P.J. Hamill Trans. Co., 291
S.W.2d 624 (St. L. Mo. App. 1956); Rohrmoser v. Household Fin. Corp., 86
S.W.2d 103 (St. L. Mo. App. 1935).
32. 328 Mo. 760, 41 S.W.2d 801 (1931).
33. Id. at 764, 41 S.W.2d 803.
84. Id. at 769, 41 S.W.2d at 805. See also Rohrmoser v. Household Fin. Co.,
86 S.W.2d 103 (St. L. Ct. App. 1935) (bill collector held not to be acting within
sco e of employment when he suggested to plaintiff that men would pay to be
with her and then tore plaintiff's dress).
35. RESTATEM:ENT (SEcoND) or AGENCY § 231, comment a (1958).
36. 504 S.W.2d at 60.
1974]
39
et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
indicates that a foreseeability requirement has always been implicit in
Missouri respondeat superior law. Missouri Approved Jury Instruction sec-
tion 13.02, which is applicable specifically to servants' assaults on third
parties, states that a servants acts are within the scope and course of his
employment if (1) done to further the interests of the master and (2) such
acts naturally arise from the performance of the servant's work.37 The second
requirement of section 13.02, by its use of the word "naturally," implies that
the servants conduct must be usual, customary, and expected. This amounts
to a requirement of foreseeability. The substantive requirements of this
instruction are soundly grounded in Missouri case law.38
Although foreseeability is not a totally new requirement in Missouri
respondeat superior law, Wellman does place a new emphasis on the fore-
seeability of the servant's conduct. Prior to Wellman, the foreseeability of a
servant's conduct was a jury question regardless of how malicious or crim-
inal the conduct was.39 Wellman appears to hold that, in certain situations,
the master may not be held liable for his servants conduct even if the
servant acted in connection with his employment with the intent to further
his master's business.40 Wellman may therefore be interpreted to require
a higher degre of foreseeability than previous cases before a master can be
held liable for his servants intentional torts. As yet, Missouri courts
have not applied the Restatement foreseeability analysis to cases other
than those involving excessively violent conduct. The Supreme Court has
"noted"41 but not adopted section 245 of the Restatement, which would hold
the master liable for his servants violent intentional torts if they were "not
unexpected in view of the duties of the servant."42 It will remain for future
cases to determine whether a higher standard of foreseeability will be
applied to nonexcessively violent conduct. The problem with the excessive
violence test will be in its application. Having the court, instead of the jury,
determine if the conduct is so excessively violent as to take it out of the
scope of employment is of doubtful value. Where it is possible to draw
only one legal inference as to whether certain acts are within the scope of
employment, the court should decide the issue.43 Excessive violence and
37. Mo. APPEovED INsTR. § 13.02 (2d ed. 1969).
38. See Mo. Ari',ovED LrsTm. § 13.02 Committee's Comment (2d ed. 1969).
39. See, e.g., Haehl v. Wabash R., 119 Mo. 325, 24 S.W. 737 1893).
40. Several cases cited by the majority were decided on the basis that the
employee in resorting to excessive violence could not have acted with the intent to
further his masters business. Lombardy v. Stees, 290 P.2d 1110 (Colo. 1955);
Martin v. Jones, 302 Mich. 355, 4 N.W.2d 686 (1942); Lunn v. Boyd, 403 Pa.
231, 169 A.2d 103 (1961); Adami v. Dobie, 440 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. 1969). The
majority expressly refused to consider this theory as determinative in Wellman.
504 S.W.2d at 57-58. Therefore, the majority's citation of these cases is confusing.
The majority may be citing these cases only for their reference to excessive
violence.
41. Henderson v. Laclede Radio, Inc., 506 S.W.2d 484, 436 (1974).
42. RESTATEMEMT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 245 (1957).
43. Carroll v. Hillendale Golf Club, 156 Md. 542, 144 A. 693 (1929);
Simmons v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 340 Mo. 1118, 104 S.W.2d 357 (1937);
Barger v. Green 255 S.W.2d 127 (K.C. Mo. App. 1953); Barry v. Oregon Trunk
Ry., 197 Or. 246, 258 P.2d 260 (1953).
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outrageous conduct, however, are ambiguous standards. The Restatement
distinction between "minor" and "serious" crimes44 is equally ambiguous
and offers no meaningful standard for distinguishing between different types
of employment and the reasonableness of conduct in a particular situation.
It is dubious whether excessive violence alone is sufficient to mandate draw-
ing only one legal inference.45
Whether excessive violence on the part of the employee should take
his actions outside the scope of employment should be a matter of public
policy.46 The ultimate question is the extent to which the law should hold a
master liable for his servant's actions. Deciding the issue as a matter of law
is a practical solution to the tendencies of juries to find the "deeper pocket"
employer liable.4 7 Generally, however, there has been a trend toward expand-
ing the master's liability with a corresponding broadening of the definition
of the term scope of employment.4s Wellman goes against this trend.
Two possible approaches seem to be open to the court in future cases.
The court can either examine the basis of the excessive violence rule, i.e.
the lack of expectability and necessary purpose, or it can automatically infer
these elements from the outrageousness or criminality of the conduct. If the
former approach is adopted, the Wellman rule may be narrowly interpreted
leaving most cases to be decided by the jury. The latter approach would
remove a great many respondeat superior intentional tort cases from the jury.
The sweep of Wellman must be clarified by subsequent appellate decisions.
DANA A. HocKNsmrrH
44. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF AGENCY § 281, comment a (1958). "Minor"
crimes are considered foreseeable; "serious" crimes are not. See 504 S.W.2d at 61.
45. judicial determination of scope of employment would also change trial
tactics. The plaintiff must introduce evidence and prove the facts which he claims
makes the employer liable under respondeat superior. But if he proves facts
showing excessive violence, the servant's acts may not be within the scope of
employment; hence, plaintiff loses. A request for punitive damages compounds
the problem. Plaintiff must show willful and wanton behavior by the employee,
but he must be careful not to show "excessive" violence.
46. Watkins v. Southerest Baptist Church, 899 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. 1966);
Blessing v. Pittman, 170 Wyo. 416, 251 P.2d 248 (1952).
47. Note, Agency-Intentional Torts-Liability Of The Master, 28 N.C.L.
RBv. 881, 885 (1950).
48. Note, Master And Servant: Scope Of Employment: Liability For AssaultAnd Battery Committed By Servant, U.C.L.A. INTmA. L. Rxv. 78, 74 (1952).
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PARTNERSHIPS-SETTLEMENT OF FORMER
PARTNER'S ACCOUNT WHEN THE BUSINESS IS CONTINUED
AFTER A DISSOLUTION
Schoeller v. Schoeller1
The Schoeller family (mother, father and three sons) formed a partner-
ship in 1959 to operate a grocery business in Liberty, Missouri. All the
capital was furnished by the parents, but the profits were to be shared
equally. The partnership was dissolved in 1962 when one of the sons,
Forrest J. became physically unable to perform his tasks, and either left or
was eased out by the others. Rather than being wound up, the business was
continued, at first without acrimony but later against the backdrop of a
family quarrel. There was no winding up and termination until 1971.2
Forrest J. Schoeller sued for an accounting in 1967. In the first appeal
of this case,3 the dissolution was confirmed. Plaintiff was held entitled to
an accounting and, in addition to the value of his interest in the partnership
as of dissolution,4 the option of legal interest on this amount for the time
1. 497 S.W.2d 860 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973).
2. This case was decided under the Uniform Partnership Act [hereinafter
cited as UPA] which is chapter 358, RSMo 1969. Basic terms and meanings as
used in this note are:
Dissolution. Defined by statute as "the change in the relation of the
partners caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on as
distinguished from the winding up of the business." §358.290, RSMo 1969 (UPA
§ 29). This definition can mislead as dissolutions may occur without a partner
dropping out. Specific causes of dissolution are set out at §358.310, R.S.Mo 1969
(UPA § 31). See generally, Bromberg, Partnership Dissolution-Causes, Conse-
quences, and Cures, 43 TE As L. REv. 631 (1965).
Winding Up. This is "the process of settling partnership affairs after dissolu-
tion." Official Comment to UPA § 29, reprinted in 6 UurFomr LAws ANNOTATED
365 (master ed. 1969).
Continuation. Refers to the carrying on of the business as a going concern
by the partners remaining after a dissolution. This can occur as a matter of right
when there has been a dissolution contrary to the partnership agreement, an
expulsion pursuant to a provision of the agreement, or by an express agreement to
continue. J. CnANE & A. BRomERo, PARTNERSEaP § 83A (1968). Frequently,
however, the business is continued as a matter of fact, if not as a matter of right,
without settlement of the accounts. Distinguishing between winding up and con-
tinuation is often difficult but the difference may be critical. Facts control. Even
so, neither the passage of time nor participation in new transactions is dispositive
of whether the business is in a state of winding up or continuation. Hurley v.
Hurley, 33 Del. Ch. 231, 91 A.2d 674 (Sussex 1952); McGee v. Russell's Ex'rs,
150 Va. 155, 142 S.E. 524 (1928).
Termination. Refers to the point in time at which winding up is completed.
§ 858.800, RSMo 1969 (UPA § 80).
8. Schoeller v. Schoeller, 465 S.W.2d 648 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971).
4. The term "interest in the partnership," as used throughout this note refers
to the partner's total monetary claim in the firm on the day of dissQlution. This
claim is based on all the equitable concepts which govern an accounting. It
embraces at least capital or other property contributed to the partnership and
undistributed partnership profits. As equity demands, it may also include adjust-
ments for the fair market value of assets and good will. See Sorokach v. Trusewich,
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until termination, or the portion of the subsequent profits of the continued
business attributable to his interest 5 The business prospered under the
guidance of the brothers and plaintiff opted for his derivative portion of
the profits.
The trial court rendered an accounting, but plaintiff, dissatisfied, again
appealed to the Kansas City District of the Missouri Court of Appeals,
raising several questions concerning the rights of a retired partner -when the
partnership business is continued. Because of the extraordinary period of
time and degree of success involved in the continuation, the court viewed
the situation as unique in Missouri appellate history." The dispute centered
on the measure of plaintiffs interest at dissolution and the calculation of
the subsequent profits of the enterprise. In responding to the questions
raised, the court held, inter alia, that (1) plaintiffs ratio of participation in
the profits made after dissolution should be based on the amount of his
account at dissolution less the capital originally furnished him by his
5. This is based on § 358.420, RSMo 1969 (UPA § 42) which provides
in part:
When any partner retires or dies, and the business is continued under
any of the conditions set forth in subsections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of
section 358.410, or subdivision (2) of subsection 2 of section 358.880
without any settlement of accounts as between him or his estate and
the person or partnership continuing the business, unless otherwise
agreed, he or his legal representative as against such persons or partner-
ship may have the value of his interest at the date of dissolution
ascertained, and shall receive as an ordinary creditor an amount equal
to the value of his interest in the dissolved partnership with interest,
or, at his option or at the option of his legal representative, in lieu of
interest, the profits attributable to the use of his right in the property
of the dissolved partnership ....
This option is fundamental to the problems presented in Schoeller. The
statutory cross-references refer to particular forms of continuation, with emphasis
on the status of creditors. It has been debated whether invoking the § 42 option
requires taking precisely one of these forms, or if the option is available when the
remaining partners otherwise continue. It is a problem particularly if a partner
withdraws without giving consent to the continuation under the terms of§ 358.410.3 RSMo 1969 (UPA § 41(8)). In the first appeal of Schoeller, such
consent was in issue. The court, however, concluded that expulsion (another pro-
vision of the statute) comprehended voluntary withdrawal, making consent
immaterial. 465 S.W.2d at 654. Other courts have been more exacting. See Blut
v. Katz, 13 N.J. 374, 99 A.2d 785 (1953), criticized in Note, Profit Rights and
Creditor's Priorities After a Partners Death or Retirement: Section 42 of the
UPA, 63 YALe. L.J. 709 (1954). See also Zach v. Schulman, 213 Ark. 122, 210
S.W.2d 124 (1948); Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d 1084 (1948).
The Missouri Supreme Court recently allowed the § 42 option where the
business was continued without consent of the former partner and without settle-
ment of accounts, yet failed to discuss the apparent conflict with the literal read-
ing of the statute. Smith v. Kennebeck, 502 S.W.2d 290 (Mo. 1973). Other
courts have suggested that this broader application to continuation problems is
preferred. See Blut v. Katz, supra at 384-85, 99 A.2d at 790 (dissenting opinion);
M. & C. Creditors Corp. v. Pratt, 172 Misc. 695, 17 N.Y.S.2d 240, a'd mem.,281 N.Y. 804, 24 N.E.2d 482 (1989); J. CnANE & A. BroimBEc, supra note 2,§ 86. Compare UPA § 42 with Partnership Act of 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 39,§ 42.
6. 497 S.W.2d at 867.
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parents;7 and (2) reasonable compensation to the continuing partners should
be charged as an expense to the partnership for purposes of calculating the
profits for the period between dissolution and termination.8
In the ordinary case of a winding up of a partnership after dissolution,
creditors are paid first. Thereafter, partners who supplied capital are enti-
tled to its return followed by a division of any remaining profits in agreed
proportions, or equally absent agreement.9 This common law approach,
now embodied in the Uniform Partnership Act, is recognized in numerous
decisions.10 But in a case like Schoeller, where the business is continued
without immediate winding up, there is the additional problem of account-
ing for profits generated subsequent to dissolution. This problem is gov-
erned by section 42 of the Uniform Partnership Act." The retired or
excluded partner or a deceased partner's estate becomes a creditor of the
firm, entitled to claim an amount equal to the value of his interest in the
dissolved partnership and either interest on that share or the profits sub-
sequent to dissolution "attributable to the use of his right in the property
of the dissolved partnership." 12
7. Id. at 868.
8. Id. at 870-71.
9. §§ 358.180, .400, RSMo 1969 (UPA §§ 18, 40).
10. See, e.g., Cooper v. Cooper, 289 Ala. 263, 266 So.2d 871 (1972); Rossi
v. Rossi, 154 Colo. 21, 889 P.2d 191 (1963); Vassallo v. Sexauer, 22 Mich. App.
188, 177 N.W.2d 470 (1970).
11. See statute quoted note 5 supra.
12. There are several confusing aspects to the terminology employed in UPA
§ 42. First, the base amount on which either legal interest or pro fit is calculated
is described by two different terms: the "value of his interest in" and "his right
in the property of" the old firm. The authorities, however, assume that the two
terms refer to the same thing. J. CnANE & A. BROMBERG, supra note 2, § 86(c);
1 S. ROWLEY, supra note 4, § 42.3. Courts often paraphrase the option so as to
emphasize but a single concept.. In the first appeal of the present case it was said
that the former partner could have either interest or profits based on his "interest"
in the firm. 465 S.W.2d at 654. See also Nichols v. Ellins, 2 Ariz. App. 272, 278,
408 P.2d 34, 40 (1965) (interest or profits on a partner's "share"); Froess v.
Froess, 284 Pa. 369, 374-75, 131 A. 276, 278 (1925) (using term "property" in
both branches of option); Sechrest v. Sechrest, 248 Wis. 516, 518, 22 N.W.2d
594, 596 (1946) (choice based on "assets belonging to him").
Further confusion may arise from comparing the terms of § 42 with those
found in the property rights sections of the uniform act. These are §§ 358.240-
.280, RSMo 1969 (UPA §§ 24-28). Specifically, § 858.240, RSMo 1969 (UPA
§ 24) provides: "The property rights of a partner are his rights in specific partner-
ship property, his interest in specific partnership property, his interest in the
partnership, and his right to participate in the management." The rights in
spcific partners hip property are the attributes of a special co-tenancy in partner-
spcreated and defined by § 58.250,RSMo 1969 (UPA § 25) dealing with a
partner's right to use specific property for partnership purposes and limiting his
use to those ends. This right is not in the nature of a monetary interest in the
firm and should not be confused with the "right in the property" discussed in § 42.
A partner's financial interest in the partnershp is defined by § 358.260,
RSMo 1969 (UPA § 26) as "his share of profits and surplus, [which] is personal
property." This usage apears to comport with the equivalent terms "interest"
and "right in the property' of § 42.
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It is thus important to know what to include in measuring this interest
or right in the property of the dissolved partnership. If the former partner
has no color of claim to contributed capital because he neither contributed
to it, had no obligation to do so, nor received a portion of the capital as a
gift,13 then his interest should not include any of this amount for purposes
of calculating his section 42 rights. What the former partner has a right to
receive could hardly include any capital to which he has no claim, even if
it had been allocated on the firm books to his capital account.
However, where one partner's capital is loaned by one or more of the
others, further analysis is needed. Such transactions, while related to part-
nership business, may be treated quite independently of firm affairs.'4
Early partnership law distinguished the relationships of partner to firm
on one hand and partner to partner on the other.' 5 The rule developed
that copartners could not contest at law any matter related to partnership
affairs until after an equitable accounting.' 6 A basic settling of accounts in
the firm was thought first necessary.lr Exceptions to this rule were recog-
nized where there was a suit on a promissory note given by one partner to
another,'8 or on an agreement to reimburse for capital advanced-x9 In such
cases, however, an obligor traditionally could not set up as a counterclaim
his right to profits from the partnership because this introduced a new
entity (the partnership) and mutuality of parties failed.20 When an action
for an accounting was brought first, a partner's debt to his firm could be
considered.2' It was thought, however, that any claims in completely per-
sonal capacities, should not be charged or credited in the settlement 22 and
profits should be divided without regard for one partner's obligation to
another for the whole sum of the formers capital.2
In modem cases, all matters relating to the partnership may be heard
together2 4 and personal debt may be charged against a former partner's
13. Such zero-investment partners are often found in parent-child partner-
ships. See Rossi v. Rossi, 154 Colo. 21, 889 P.2d 191 (1963).
14. F. MECHEM, ELEMENTs OF THE LAw OF PATNtsHmP § 198 (2d ed.
1920).
15. See generally 2 S. ROWLEY, supra note 4, ch. 48; J. SToRY, CovmMN-
TARY oN TnE LAw OF PARTNEnsp § 219 (7th ed. 1881).
16. Springer v. Cabell, 10 Mo. 640 (1847); Johnson v. Ewald, 82 Mo. App.
276 (St. L. Ct. App. 1900); 2 S. ROWLEY, supra note 4, § 48.4. The same rile
applied after a dissolution. Bond v. Bemis, 55 Mo. 524 (1874).
17. F. MEcHEm, supra note 14, § 204.
18. Popovsky v. Griwach, 361 Mo. 1120, 238 S.W.2d 363 (1951); 2 S.
RowL-Y, supra note 4, § 48.13.
19. Eller v. Salathe, 44 Wyo. 369, 12 P.2d 386 (1932); F. MECHEm, supra
note 14, § 211.
20. See Glaus v. Gosche, 118 S.W.2d 42 (St. L. Mo. A pp. 1938); 2 S.
RowLm, supra note 4, § 48.25. But cf. Stein v. Jung, 492 S.W.2d139 (Mo. App.,
D. St. L. 1973).
21. Bass v. Daetwyler, 305 S.W.2d 839 (Spr. Mo. App. 1957); 68 C.J.S.
Partnership § 487e (1950).
22. 2 S. ROWLEY, supra note 4 § 47.16.
23. Bowen v. Velliquette, 153 Cal. App. 2d 847, 315 P.2d 95 (1957).
24. See Van Ruiten v. Van Ruiten, 268 Cal. App. 2d 619, 74 Cal. Rptr.
186 (1969); Hahn v. Hahn, 488 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972).
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interest at termination; the final settlement of partnership affairs may con-
veniently account for what partner A owes partner B in their personal
capacities. A suffers no harm unless the debt is set off against his interest
at the time of dissolution so that it reduces his recovery from the subsequent
profits. Even so, one's interest in the partnership and his personal obligation
to another partner are treated separately. Thus in a continuation case where
a partner dies or retires while a debtor to another partner, the determina-
tion of "value of interest" and "right in the property" should comprehend
rights vis-At-vis the firm only, and should not consider any inter-partner debt.
Inter-partner debt was excluded from this determination in Wikstrom
v. Davis. 25 There a partner was wrongfully excluded from the business,
working a dissolution. At the inception of the partnership he had given
notes to the other partners for 49% of the original capital'and he was to
have 49% of the profits. At dissolution this debt was largely unpaid, yet his
interest was held to be 49% for purposes of sharing in the profits earned
when the other partners continued successfully. 26
But in Yeomans v. Lysfjord,2 7 a different view prevailed. There, plain-
tiff had given notes to his copartners for his capital investment, and chose
the derived profits when the partnership was continued after dissolution.
The court said the right to profits was based on ownership, and without
much discussion concluded that the debt should be discharged by deducting
it from plaintiffs interest at dissolution.28 This item alone caused more than
a 50% reduction in his interest, meaning a corresponding reduction in his
share of post-dissolution gains.29
The relationship created between plaintiff Schoeller and his parents
in setting up the capital structure of the partnership was unclear. Initially,
the original capital was to remain the parent's property.30 Subsequently,
however, the plaintiff executed a note in favor of his father in the exact sum
of this initial capital. 81 The court failed to consider the distinctions sug-
gested here, however, and treated this loan transaction as a sham executed
for tax avoidance purposes.3
2
At dissolution, each of the three son's capital accounts was about 30%
of the partnership. However this figure was not used as the factor applied
25. 211 Ore. 254, 315 P.2d 597 (1957).
26. These profits were then set off against the excluded partner's debt to
the others. If the debt had been charged against his interest at dissolution, he
would have received nothing from the subsequent profits since on that date his
debt exceeded 49% of the net worth of the firm.
27. 162 Cal. App. 2d 857, 327 P.2d 957 (1958).
28. Id. at 363, 827 P.2d at 961.
29. This situation may encourage a tardy winding up, since there is less
incentive for the continuing partners to settle. Contrast this with the principle
expressed in Wikstrom that the § 42 option is designed to compel the continuing
partners to hasten the winding up. 211 Ore. 254, 278, 315 P.2d 597, 608.
30. 497 S.W.2d at 865.
31. Id. at 866. The circumstances surrounding this transaction are explained
more fully in the opinion on the first apneal. Schoeller v. Schoeller, 465 S.W.2d
648 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971).
32. 497 S.W.2d at 866.
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to the profits of the continued enterprise for purposes of plaintiffs claim
under section 42. Instead, the court thought that the proper factor was the
ratio between plaintiffs capital account at dissolution less his account when
the partnership began, and the total of all the capital accounts at dissolu-
tion.33 The court offered no authority, but emphasized that none of the
sons had ever personally paid the initial capital and yet their capital
accounts had trebled from the time the partnership was formed until
dissolution.3 4 Apparently the court felt that the plaintiff should not profit
from capital which he had neither contributed nor been obligated to pay.
Another issue raised by the case is the allowance of compensation to
remaining partners. Generally, absent agreement, there is no right to
compensation for work done in the firn's behalf.3 5 A partner's share in the
profits is intended to be remuneration for his participation. 6 A dissolution,
however, whether followed by a continuation or a prompt winding up,
changes the relationship of the parties.37 Some authorities have suggested
that even an express agreement for compensation is without effect once a
dissolution occurs, and the general rule of no compensation may be applied
against those who remain.38 More typical are instances where courts have
sought to avoid the harshness of the rule against compensation as applied
either before or after a dissolution.39 These cases frequently have applied
the maxim: He who seeks equity must do equity.40 A withdrawing partner
who demands that profits from his capital be accounted for must give credit
for the time, skills and efforts of the continuing partners which have pro-
33. Plaintiff's capital accounts at dissolution and at the beginning of the
partnership were $30,098 and $11,382 respectively, and the total of all the
capital accounts at dissolution was $100,805. Plaintiffs rate of participation in$30,098 - $11,382
the post-dissolution profits was $30,098-_$11,_8 = 18.566%. Id. at 868.
$100,805
34. Id. at 868.
35. E.g., Gaston v. Kellogg, 91 Mo. 104, 3 S.W. 589 (1887); Koenig v.
Huber, 210 N.W.2d 825 (S.D. 1973); Waagen v. Gerde, 36 Wash. 2d 563, 219
P.2d 595 (1950).
36. J. CRAE & A. BROMBERG, supra note 2, § 65(e). Section 358.180(6),
RSMo 1969 (UPA § 18(f)) provides:
No partner is entitled to remuneration for acting in the partnership
business, except that a surviving partner is entitled to reasonable com-
pensation for his services in winding up the partnership affairs[.]
A precedingpart of the statute makes this subject to agreement.
37. § 358.290, RSMo 1969 (UPA § 29).
38. Murphy v. Marvel, 49 Pa. Super. 576 (1912). It should be clear that
a dissolution does not terminate all internal obligations. See J. CRANu & A. BRom-
BERG, supra note 2, at 445n. 90. In particular, a managing partner's fiduciary
duty survives dissolution. Schneider v. Schneider, 347 Mo. 102, 146 S.W.2d 584(1941); Stein v. Jung, 492 S.W.2d 139 (Mo. App. D. St. L. 1973).
39. See Steinberg v. Goodman, 27 N.Y.2d 304, 265 N.E.2d 758, 317
N.Y.S.2d 342 (1970); Greenan v. Ernst, 408 Pa. 495, 184 A.2d 570 (1962). See
also Fry v. Ashley, 228 Ore. 61, 363 P.2d 555 (1961). A significant exception to
the rule of no compensation is found in UPA § 18(f). See statute quoted note
36 supra, and note 47 and accompanying text infra.
40. See e.g., Drummond v. Batson, 162 Ark. 407, 258 S.W. 616 (1924);
Annot., 80 A.L.R. 12, 79 (1932).
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duced the profit.41 Accordingly, these courts have inquired into the degree
to which the profits during continuation are a product of the remaining
partner's skill and efforts as opposed to capital alone.40 2
In Schoeller, plaintiff contended that salaries paid to the continuing
partners over the period of continuation should not be charged to the firm
as ordinary expenses, but included in the pool of partnership earnings to
which his profit sharing ratio applied.43 Plaintiff buttressed his contention
with section 18(f) of the Uniform Partnership Act 4 and the Oregon case of
Wikstrom v. Davis.4" In Wikstrom, as in Schoeller, pre-dissolution salaries
had been paid the partners by agreement, express or implied. The court,
however, denied the continuing partners credit for these payments and
ruled that plaintifffs share in the aggregate profits should be determined
without first deducting the payments to the continuing partners.40 Both
Wikstrom and Schoeller noted that the exception to the no remuneration
rule of 18(f)was inapposite because the claims were plainly for a period of
continuation and not of winding up.47 The Oregon court applied the general
rule expressed in the statute and denied compensation credits.48 In Schoeller,
however, the court followed the equitable maxim and allowed reasonable
salary credits to the remaining partners even though there was no specific
agreement.49 Why the court automatically limited the amounts to the
salary schedule in effect at the time of dissolution is unclear 0 If reason-
able credit is to be allowed, then equity should inquire into the real value
of the continuing partner's services, especially where the retiring partner
41. See cases cited.in 1 S. RowLEY, supra note 4, at 815 nn.70 & 71; Annot.,
55 A.L.R.2d 1891, 1423 (1957), supplementing 80 A.L.R. 12 (1932). For a
criticism of the erosion of the no-compensation rule, see J. CRANE & A. BROM-
nEnG, supra note 2, § 65(e).
42. Perhaps the most serious encroachment on the §42 option was reached
in a case which refused a wrongfully excluded partner any share of profits on
continuation because the profits were not produced by her efforts. Laterra v.
Laterra, 134 N.J. Eq. 162, 34 A.2d 289 (Ct. Err. & App. 1943).
43. 497 S.W.2d at 869. The business was continued primarily by laintiff's
brothers. At the time of dissolution, the active partners were drawing 150 per
week. The trial court allowed this rate to apply for 1962 through 1965 and for
1971, but allowed $200 per week for 1966 through 1970. On appeal, compensa-
tion was limited uniformly to the schedule effective at dissolution. Id. at 869-70.
44. See statute quoted note 36 supra.
45. 211 Ore. 254, 315 P.2d 597 (1957).
46. Id. at 282-83, 315 P.2d at 610.
47. Both courts seem to have missed the point that the § 18(f) exception
for a survivor who winds up the affairs refers to one who survives the death of
a partner, not merely one who remains in the business after any dissolution.
Chazen v. Most, 209 Cal. App. 2d 519, 523, 25 Cal. Rptr. 864, 867 (1962).
48. 211 Ore. at 283, 315 P.2d at 610. The court was influenced, however,
by the continuing partners' wrongdoing.
49. 497 S.W.2d at 869.
50. Pegging the fair salary figure at the pre-dissolution rate has beenjustified on the theory that this must represent what the parties at one time
agreed to be fair. Tucker v. Tucker, 370 Pa. 8, 87 A.2d 650 (1952). In the
present case the parents had reserved the power to set salaries, but the court
might have viewed plaintiff's tardiness in seeking a winding up as tacit approval
of the way the others were running things. There is some intimation of this, but
the court clearly based its allowance of salaries on equitable concepts.
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remains silent for a protracted continuation period. The position of allowing
reasonable compensation is an enlightened one. But if SchoeUer indicates
that the court will apply a mechanical standard in determining the amount
of compensation, its application in another case could be unfortunate, either
by being inadequate to the continuing partners5 1 or by extracting an
inequitable amount from the profits due the former partner under the
section 42 option.
Schoeller may be the most thorough discussion yet by a Missouri court
of the rights of partners after a dissolution. While the decision clarifies some
rights, the desirability of comprehensive partnership agreements, covering
the contingencies of dissolution, buying out, and continuation is not dimin-
ished.5 2 Unfortunately, many partnerships, especially family operations, are
formed and conducted with a minimum of formality.5 3 Uncontemplated
events may bring about a dissolution with consequences mystifying to the
partners who in good faith continue the business. The lesson of Schoeller
is one in prevention rather than cure.
LLOYDo R.HNE
51. See Blut v. Katz, 36 N.J. Super. 185, 115 A.2d 119 (App. Div. 1955).
52. Lord Eldon gave appropriate advice in an opinion which discussed some
of the same problems flound in the present case:
I cannot forbear intimating once more, that commercial men, when enter-
ing into partnerships, should... provid[e] by express covenants in what
manner the affairs of the partnership are to be wound up. . . . [A
partnership] may not expire for years after the period in which, in one
sense of the words, we say it does expire ....
It is, therefore, of the last importance, that all partnerships should sub-
sist, if possible, upon written articles; and that these written articles
should Pay down a clear rule, in what way the interests of the partners,
in the different events that may occur, are to be disposed of.
Crawshay v. Collins, 38 Eng. Rep. 358, 364 (Ch. 1826). Crawshay dealt with
whether there should be a right to profits attributable to the unsettled account
of a former partner and the effect thereon of certain intra-firm obligations. The
case is an important source of some of the rights now codified in UPA § 42. For
materials on avoiding post-dissolution problems, see Bromberg, Partnership
Dissolution - Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 43 TExAs L. REv. 631 (1965);
Note, Partnership Continuation Agreements, 72 IAv. L. REv. 1302 (1959).
53. See, e.g., Urzi v. Urzi, 140 Cal. App. 2d 589, 295 P.2d 539 (1956);
Elias v. Elias, 428 Pa. 159, 237 A.2d 215 (1968).
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PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN PROBATION AND PAROLE
Douglas v. Buderl
On probation after the suspended imposition of sentence on two man-
slaughter charges, James Douglas received a traffic citation 2 for his involve-
ment in a seven-vehicle, chain-reaction accident. At his next scheduled
meeting with his probation officer, Douglas reported the citation and
subsequently, a single probation revocation hearing was held. Contrary to
the recommendation of the prosecutor and the probation officer, the judge
held that the delay in reporting the citation violated the terms of Douglas'
probation,8 revoked the probation, and sentenced Douglas to two years in
prison. Finding procedural due process not to be in issue, the Missouri
Supreme Court held that Douglas received substantive due process and
accordingly affirmed.4 The United States Supreme Court, also ignoring the
procedural due process issue, reversed on substantive due process grounds.5
A convicted man's freedom granted by probation or parole" has been
labeled conditional liberty to emphasize its dependence upon him conform-
ing to the pattern of behavior demanded by the state.7 Until recently, condi-
tional liberty was considered a privilege rather than a right s and subject
to revocation without procedural due process. Since probation and parole
could only mean less punishment than a convict's original sentence, it was
thought that the convict had no rights in regard to probation and parole
1. Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S. 430, rev'g, 485 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. 1973).
2. Defendant was issued a citation for driving too fast for the weather
conditions. 485 S.W.2d at 610.
3. The condition of probation was that all arrests for any reason must be
reported without delay. Before a judge exercises his discretion in regard to proba-
tion, the probation officer may also exercise his discretion in reporting an alleged
violation. For an opinion that a traffic ticket is the sort of minor offense that
should not be reported, see Dicerbo, When Should Probation Be Revoked?, 30
FED. PnoD 11 (June 1966).
4. State ex rel. Douglas v. Buder, 485 S.W.2d 609, 610 (Mo. 1973).
5. Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S. 430, 483 (1973).
6. In State v. Brantley, 353 S.W.2d 793 (Mo. 1962), the court gave the
following explanation of the distinction between these two terms:
A principal distinction is that a 'parole" operates prior to the expiration
and after the commencement of the service of sentence; and 'proba-
tion' is granted prior to the imposition of sentence or prior to the
commencement of the service of a sentence imposed.
Id, at 795.
7. See Weihofen, Revoking Probation, Parole or Pardon Without a Hearing,
32 J. Cim. L.C.&P.S. 531 (1942); 65 HAzy. L. REv. 309 (1951); Comment,
Revocation of Conditional Liberty-California and the Federal System, 28 S. CAL.
L. REv. 158 (1954).
8. 11 DUQUESNE L. 13Ev. 693, 696 (1978). For an explanation of concepts
supporting the right-privilege distinction see Comment, Parole Revocation Hear-
ings-Pro usticia or Pro Camera Stellata; 10 SANTA CL.A LAw. 319, 330 (1970);




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [1974], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss4/6
RECENT CASES
revocation9 and that the application of procedural due process would unnec-
cessarily place heavy administrative burdens upon the probation and parole
systems. 10 In the past few years, however, procedural due process has been
increasingly applied to the revocation of conditional liberty.11
In a 1967 probation revocation case involving sentencing, Mempa v.
Rhay,12 the Supreme Court held that an individual facing sentencing was
entitled to be represented by counsel on the issue of the sentence to be
imposed.' 3 The Court reasoned that sentencing is a critical stage 4 of a
criminal prosecution and that without the benefit of counsel substantial
rights are irretrievably lost.'5
In the 1972 decision of Morrissey v. Brewer,16 the Supreme Court
rejected the right-privilege distinction 17 as a test for determining the appli-
cability of procedural due process to a non-judicial parole revocation.',
Instead, the Court found the critical question to be whether the state's
interest in disregarding procedural due process outweighs the individuals
interest in requiring it.' 9 Although the Court recognized the state's strong
interest in a speedy, uncomplicated reincarceration should the parole fail, the
Court also held that the state's interest is mitigated by its financial and
societal stake in the success of parole,2 0 a stake best served by providing
procedural safeguards designed to avoid an erroneous revocation.21 On the
9. As the Court stated in Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935):
[W]e do not accept the petitioner's contention that the privilege has a
basis in the Constitution, apart from any statute. Probation or suspen-
sion of sentence comes as an act of grace to one convicted of a crime,
and may be coupled with such conditions in respect of its duration
as Congress may impose.
Id. at 492.
10. Sklar, Law And Practice In Probation And Parole Revocation Hearings,
55 J. Clum. L.C.&P.S. 175, 195 (1964).
11. E.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v: Brewer, 408
U.S. 471 (1972).
12. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
13. Id. at 137.
14. A "critical stage in the criminal process" for purposes of the sixth amend-
ment is one in which defendant's rights or defenses may be lost, or the outcome
of the case may in some other way be substantially affected. State v. Williams,
97 N.J. Super. 573, 601, 235 A.2d 684, 698 (1967).
15. Mempa v. Rbay, 889 U.S. 128, 134-36 (1967).
16. 408 U.S. 471 (1972). Morrissey's parole was revoked on the recom-
mendation of his parole officer with no opportunity for a hearing.
17. For a criticism of the right-privilege distinction see Van Alstyne, The
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 Htalv. L. R v.
1439 (1968).
18. Morrissey's parole was revoked by Iowa Board of Parole. Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 472 (1972).
19. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482-83 (1972). The Court carefully
distinguished this balancing test from a due process rationale which guarantees the
accused's rights during criminal prosecution. Id. at 489. This suggests that the
character of the due process required may depend in part on whether original
liberty or only conditional liberty is at stake.
20. Id. at 484. See generally Cohen, Sentencing, Probation, and the Reha-
bilitative Ideal: The View From Mempa v. Rhay, 47 TExAs L. REV. 1, 32 (1968).
21. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (1972).
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other side of the fulcrum, a mistaken revocation would inflict a "grievous
loss" on the parolee and those dependent upon him. It would breach the
state's implicit promise that the parolee would have his freedom as long as
he met the conditions of his parole.22
After balancing the competing interests, the Court determined that
procedural due process is necessary in a parole revocation; a two-stage
hearing process with certain procedural safeguards is required.23 First, a
preliminary hearing must be held to determine whether there is probable
cause to believe that a parole violation occurred. Then a final hearing must
be held to determine (a) whether a violation had in fact occurred and if so,
(b) the advisability of a revocation. In both stages of this hearing process,
the parolee is entitled to: present his case before a neutral hearing body,
receive notice of alleged violations, present witnesses and evidence, employ
a limited right of cross-examination, and receive a written statement of find-
ings.24 The two-step hearing procedure and other requirements of Morrissey
were applied to probation, revocation proceedings in Gagnon v. ScarpeUi.25
In Gagnon, a case not involving sentencing, the Court could not perceive
any relevant difference between parole and probation revocations. 26
Morrissey involved a non-judicial revocation of parole; Gagnon involved
a non-judicial revocation of probation.27 In Douglas the Missouri Supreme
Court distinguished and refused to apply the Morrissey test because Douglas'
probation was revoked by a judge.28 Finding the two-step hearing process
22. Id. at 482.
28. Id. at 485.
24. Id. at 489. The Court, however, specifically reserved the question
whether an indigent parolee is entitled to the assistance of counsel. In the later
decision of Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1978), the Court did require that
counsel be provided to indigent probationers in complex cases. 411 U.S. at 790.
25. 411 U.S. 778 (1978). Gagnon's probation was revoked without a hearing
by the Wisconsin Department of Public Welfare.
26. Id. at 782.
27. See notes 17 and 24 supra.
28. 485 S.W.2d at 610. Accord, State v. Wilhite, 492 S.W.2d 397 (Mo.
1978).§ 549.141, RSMo 1969 provides that probation or parole revocation is not
subject to review by any appellate court. § 549.101, RSMo 1969 expressly allows
a court to revoke a parole or probation without a hearing, while § 549.265, RSMo
1969 expressly requires a hearing before the state board can revoke a parole. For
further details, see 55 J. Crim. L.C.&P.S., supra note 9, at 176-80. This statutory
distinction between probation and parole may have influenced the court in
Douglas to distinguish Morrissey as a revocation before a state parole board, not
applicable to a judge's revocation. Cf. State v. Green, 494 S.W.2d 356 (Mo.
1978).
The Missouri Supreme Court has recognized that the "spirit" of the Morrissey
and Gagnon decisions requires that a probationer, before judicial revocation, be
afforded certain rights, inter alia, a preliminary hearing. Moore v. Stamps, 507
S.W.2d 989, 949-50 (Mo. App., D. St. L. En Banc 1974). The court, however,
reaffirmed its position that "one hearing by the court which granted probation will
satisfy due process if the hearing is held within a reasonably short period of
time after an alleged violation or after an arrest for a violation and the require-
ments of due process as outlined above for the final hearing are afforded." Moore
v. Stamps, 507 S.W.2d 939, 950 (Mo. App., D. St. L. En Banc 1974). See also
Brandt v. Percich, 507 S.W.2d 951 (Mo. App., D. St. L. En Banc 1974).
Mo. Pnor. Cnmm. CODE § 4.060 would give a probationer facing revocation
the right to a preliminary hearing.
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and other procedural requirements of Morrissey inapplicable and implying
that the Mempa requirements had ben complied with, the Missouri Supreme
Court reviewed the revocation from a substantive due process perspective.
Not finding an arbitrary or capricious exercise of power, the court upheld
the revocation.29 The United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari.
In considering Douglas only one month after its decision in Gagnon, the
United States Supreme Court had the opportunity to make it clear that the
two-step hearing process of Morrissey applied to all situations involving the
revocation of a parole or a probation, including those involving revocation
and sentencing before a judge. Instead, the Supreme Court did not mention
Morrissey and reversed the revocation of Douglas" probation on narrow due
process grounds-the lack of evidence of a probation violation ° and a lack
of fair notice to Douglas that a traffic citation constituted an arrest and
therefore had to be immediately reported to his parole officer.31 This case-
note will suggest that the Supreme Court should have decided that Douglas
was entitled to all of the procedural safeguards provided by Mempa, Morris-
sey, and Gagnon.
Although the Supreme Court failed to impose the Morrissey require-
ment of a preliminary hearing, it did require the existence of at least some
evidence to support a factual determination that an actual violation had
occurred. 32 A requirement of a separate factual determination of a violation
-similar to that required at the final hearing in the Morrissey procedure-
is appropriate even at a single hearing. It would have focused attention on
29. 485 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. En Bane), rev'd, 412 U.S. 430 (1978). Even the
dissenting opinion reviewed Douglas from a substantive due process perspective,
contending that the evidence was insufficient to show that Douglas had in fact
violated a condition of probation and that this violated a substantive due process
requirement set forth in Morrissey. Id. at 611.
30. Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S. 480 (1973). The Supreme Court held that
the hearing judge's finding that Douglas had failed to report "all arrests" was
considered "so totally devoid of evidentiary support" as to amount to punishment
without evidence of guilt. Id. at 432. This devoid-of-evidence theory differs from
a sufficiency-of-evidence theory. Only one element of a criminal charge need be
devoid of evidentiary support to make a conviction a denial of due process. This
seldom used theory is based on a failure to overcome the presumption of inno-
ence. See Annot., 15 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1966); Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 1362 (1961).
For a case attacking a conviction obtained without evidentiary support on thir-
teenth amendment "involuntary servitude" grounds, see United States ex rel.
Caminito v. Murphy, 222 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 896(1955).
31. Id. Under this theory, a specific statute unforeseeably construed is even
more violative of a "sense of fair warning" than a "vague" statute, which at least
arouses suspicion. When a statute is broadened retroactively by court interpreta-
tion, it is similar to the ex post facto laws prohibited by the United States Con-
stitution article I, § 10, and may violate due process. See Bouie v. City of
Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 362 (1964). In Douglas, the defendant argued that prior
statutory definitions of "arrest" required actual restraint or- taking into custody,
§ 554.180, RSMo 1969, and therefore he had no fair warning that he was
required to immediately report the citation to his probation officer. See Douglas
v. Buder, 412 U.S. 430, 431-32 (1973); State ex rel. Douglas v. Buder, 485
S.W.2d 609, 611-12 (1972).
32. 412 U.S. at 432.
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the crucial issue of whether a traffic citation constituted an arrest which had
to be reported as a condition of probation. But even had the Missouri courts
specifically found that a traffic citation constituted an arrest, the Supreme
Court's second ground for reversal-an unforeseeable state court con-
struction of a criminal statute without fair warning-would still have
been applicable.33
One way to explain the Court's silence in Douglas regarding the pre-
liminary hearing requirement is to interpret Morrissey as requiring a pre-
liminary hearing only when there is an immediate loss of conditional liberty
-when the parolee has been arrested. This approach views the Morrissey
decision as aimed at preventing the incarceration of a parolee prior to a
determination of the existence of probable cause. 34 Under this theory, since
Douglas was not arrested pending the revocation decision, a preliminary
hearing was not required.35
Another possible explanation for the court's failure to impose the
Morrissey due process requirements is that the court may have considered
that the Mempa requirements-including notice, hearing and an evidentiary
.record-provided adequate due process protection. Mempa is applicable to
Douglas because Douglas also faced sentencing upon the revocation of his
probation. This approach avoids unnecessarily expanding the use of Morris-
sey's two-step hearing process but maintains the distinction between the due
process requirements of a revocation hearing and those of a criminal pro-
ceeding, particularly regarding the right to counsel.3 6 It also meets the
objection that imposing the Morrissey requirement in a situation involving
38. Id.
34. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). "Such a determination would
be sufficient to warrant the parolee's continued detention and return to the state
correctional institution pending the final decision." Id. at 487.
35. An analogy to the preliminary hearing in an actual criminal trial gives
strong support for this view. A preliminary hearing in a criminal trial is not a
general constitutional right; in the absence of a state statute or state constitution,
it is not required. Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586 (1913); State ex rel. Ward
v. Jeffries, 210 Mo. 802, 109 S.W. 614 (1908). The primary purpose of the pre-
liminary hearing is to ascertain whether there is reasonable ground to believe that
a crime has been committed and whether there is just cause to believe the defen-
dant committed it. State v. Solomon, 158 Wis. 146, 147 N.W. 640, reh. den., 158
Wis. 152, 148 N.W. 1095. Since a preliminary hearing is usually not necessary to
the filing of an information for a misdemeanor, it is not generally required in cases
where there is no arrest. For a recent case suggesting that a preliminary hearing
may be a constitutional requirement, see Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778 (1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1062 (1974).
36. While Mempa afforded an indigent probationer an absolute right to
counsel when sentencing and revocation occurred at the same hearing, Morrissey
did not require counsel. Gagnon, however, stipulated that counsel would be
required for indigents during a revocation decision on a case-by-case basis under
certain situations demonstrating the need for counsel. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778, 790 (1973). The Court in Gagnon clearly distinguished this case-by-
case need for counsel from the absolute right to counsel where sentencing, a
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sentencing infringes upon the judge's traditional discretion in that area.37
As a third possibility, the Court may have simply reached a result-oriented
decision-not intended to suggest broader inferences-by adopting the
Missouri Supreme Court's dissenting opinion that the finding of a proba-
tion violation was unsupported by evidence.3 8
The rights attendant to a criminal proceeding and required by Mempa
where sentencing occurs at a revocation hearing does not include a pre-
liminary hearing or a separate factual determination that a probation
violation occurred. Mempa, however, did not consider the extent it was
necessary to determine that the defendant had violated the terms of his
parole. Morrissey, on the other hand, did face that question and required
a separate factual determination of a violation prior to parole revocation and
a preliminary hearing where there has been an arrest pending the hearing.
The Morrissey requirements should be extended to a probation revocation
hearing involving sentencing regardless of whether the probationer is ar-
rested prior to the hearing.39 Traditionally, due process has depended in
part on whether original liberty, as in the sentencing stage of a criminal
proceeding, or only conditional liberty is at stake. Unlike either Morrissey or
Gagnon, Douglas was both a sentencing decision (oirginal liberty) and a
revocation decision (conditional liberty). On this basis, the preliminary
hearing requirement of Morrissey seems even more appropriate in Douglas.
Both the Mempa rights and the Morrissey requirements should apply to
Douglas-type situations.
A preliminary hearing provides the accused with notice of alleged vio-
lations and discovery of the government's case.40 Not only may the pre-
37. However, the fact-finding and statement of decision required by
Morrissey were designed as a limitation on the revocation decision, not on sen-
tencing. For a wide-ranging discussion of potential questions facing the courts,
see Cohen, Sentencing, Probation, and the Rehabilitative Ideal: The View From
Mempa v. Rhay, 47 TExAs L. REv. 1, 42-47 (1968).
38. For an example of cases in which the narrow grounds cited in the
Supreme Court opinion have been viewed in a procedural due process context,
see Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 1372-73 (1961).
39. Justice Douglas, in his dissent in Morrissey, and Judge Skelly Wright, in
his dissent in Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 261 (D.C. Cir., 1963), both suggest
that a parolee be given a hearing even before he is taken into custody. This view
has been criticized on the ground that it fails to maintain the distinction between
absolute liberty and conditional liberty. It is argued that a normal citizen can be
arrested on probable cause without a preliminary hearing and that a parolee should
not have greater rights. See 11 DuQurEsNr L. REv. 693, 699-700 (1973). This
criticism fails to recognize the distinction between probable cause of commission
of a crime and probable cause of violation of a condition of parole. Parole condi-
tions often include continued employment, non-association with criminals, and
other requiremets that serve rehabilitation goals but do not involve obeying or
disobeying the law. Where the alleged parole violation does not endanger society,
incarceration without a hearing may be unjustified. See 11 DUQUrmsN L. REv.
693, 699-700 (1973).
40. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 497 (1972). While the preliminary
hearing is more frequently used in state procedure, normal federal procedure
involves indictment by grand jury. The only purpose of a preliminary examina-
tion in federal procedure is to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to
warrant holding an accused for action by a grand jury. If an accused chooses to
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liminary hearing result in a dismissal for lack of probable cause, thus saving
the probationer the time and cost of counsel involved in a final hearing,41
it also involves more participants in the hearing process thus diminishing the
possible effect of a single biased decision-maker. 42 Furthermore, a prelim-
inary hearing conducted by an independent hearing officer near the scene
of the alleged violation affords the probationer an opportunity to challenge
the revocation before the probation officer is compelled to play an adversary
role, possibly preserving the counseling relationship.4 3 Fundamental fairness
also requires separate factual and discretionary determinations at the final
hearing. A separate factual determination of a violation prevents ajudge intent on revocation from ignoring the need to first establish an
actual violation.
Because Douglas involved both revocation and sentencing, the Supreme
Court had available at least two landmark decisions upon which to justify
the imposition of due process requirements, Mempa and Morrissey. In
Douglas, however, the Supreme Court avoided deciding whether the Morris-
sey requirements apply where the probationer or parolee is not arrested
pending the hearing. Because it provides notice and discovery, guards
against the bias of a single decision-maker, and may avoid an adversary role
for the probation or parole officer, the Morrissey preliminary hearing re-
quirement should apply even in the absence of an arrest pending a hearing.
The Supreme Court recognized due process requirements where sentencing
was involved 44 five years prior to recognition of due process requirements in
other revocation cases. Since Douglas involved sentencing as well as revoca-
tion, the argument for requiring a preliminary hearing and a separate, factual
finding of a violation is even stronger than in the Morrissey and Gagnon
factual situations.
LARY W. Morm
procced by information to expedite matters, he waives preliminary examination
and makes a grand jury indictment useless. See 21 Am. JuR. 2d Criminal Law
§ 444 (1965).
The grand jury serves many of the same functions-in addition to a probable
cause determination-as a preliminary hearing. A grand jury indictment provides
notice of charges and avoids a single biased decision-maker. It has been held,however, that Federal Rule 16 of Criminal Procedure does not permit discovery
and inspection of evidence, (other than the accused's own testimony) presented
to a grand jury or of names and addresses of witnesses who testified. See U.S.
v. Mesarosh, 13 F.R.D. 180 (W.D. Pa., 1952).
41. Although Douglas was on probation from a Missouri court, his accident
occurred on an Arkansas highway. 485 S.W.2d 609, 610 (Mo. En Bane); revd,412 U.S. 430 (1973). The loss of a work day-and the risk of dismissal absentee-
ism entails-to travel to a final hearing in Missouri might have been avoided ordiminished by a prompt preliminary hearing near the scene of the accident.
42. In this respect, the two-step hearing procedure attempts to avoid the need
for a case-by-case review on substantive due process grounds. PRESmENTS CoM-
ISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: THE COURTS 56, n.28 (1967).
43. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 (1978).
44. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
45. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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RIGHT OF PRIVACY-AVAILABILITY OF INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF FOR INVASIONS OF PRIVACY
Galella v. Onassis'
Ron Galella is a free-lance photographer, a self-proclaimed "papa-
razzo,"2 specializing in the making and sale of photographs of well-known
persons. Frequent objects of his pursuits have been Mrs, Jacqueline Onassis
and her two children, John and Caroline, widow and children of the late
President Kennedy. On other occasions prior to the incidence of this action,
Galella had interrupted Caroline at tennis, invaded the children's private
schools, swerved dangerously close in a power boat to Mrs. Onassis swim-
ming, followed her and the children too closely in an automobile, inten-
tionally touched them during attempts to photograph them, and made
himself obtrusively present at numerous social affairs attended by Mrs.
Onassis and the children 3
The incident of greatest concern in the case occurred when Galella
was taking pictures of John Kennedy riding his bicycle in Central Park
near his home. Galella jumped into Johns path, causing him to swerve
dangerously as he left the park and was about to enter Fifth Avenue. At
that point three Secret Service agents charged with the protection of the
Kennedy children4 apprehended Galella and took him to a police station
for questioning; while there they filed state charges against him for inter-
ference with them in the discharge of their duties.5
After his acquittal in the state courts, Galella filed suit against the
agents and Mrs. Onasis for false arrest and malicious prosecution, claiming
unlawful interference with his trade. Mrs. Onassis answered denying any
role in the arrest, and counter-claimed for damages and injunctive relief,
charging, inter alia, that Galella had invaded her privacy and engaged in
a campaign of harassment. The United States intervened, requesting injunc-
tive relief against obstruction by Galella of the agents' protective duties.
The district court dismissed the complaint against the Secret Service
agents in a summary judgment, and after a six-week trial, dismissed the
complaint against Mrs. Onasis; the court also granted injunctive relief as
requested by Mrs. Onassis and the intervening United States.7 The Court
1. 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
2. Paparazzi are an infamous breed of photographers who "make them-
selves as visible to the public and obnoxious to their photographic subjects as
possible to aid in the advertisement and wide sale of their works." Id. at 992.
3. Id. at 992, 994.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 3056 (1970).
5. 487 F.2d at 992-93.
6. The damage claim was later dropped and a claim added for violation
of N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1948). The action was originally
brought in state court, but was later removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1970)
to federal court. 487 F.2d at 992.
7. Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The permanent
injunction, which was basically the same as the temporary injunction granted
earlier against Galella, enjoined him from (1) keeping the defendant and her
children under surveillance or following any of them; (2) approaching within
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of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed on those points, though modi-
fying the terms of the injunction imposed against Galella as to the territorial
limitations imposed upon his approaching the family members." The court
accepted the findings of the district court that Galella was guilty of tortious
100 yards of the home of defendant or her children, or within 100 yards of either
child's school, or within 75 yards of either child or 50 yards of defendant; (8)
using the name, portrait or picture of defendant or her children for advertising;
(4) attempting to communicate with defendant or her children except through
her attorney. 853 F. Supp. at 241.
8. The court rejected Galella's contention that the first amendment gives
newsmen an immunity from liability for their conduct while gathering news.
"Crimes and torts committed in news gathering are not protected." 487 F.2d at
995. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), and Dietemann v. Time,
Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971). Several procedural claims raised by Galella
on appeal were also dismissed, as either correctly treated below or as harmless
error. 487 F.2d at 996. The court did agree, however, that Galella should be
taxed for the costs of only those daily transcripts shown to be necessary; multiple
copies of the transcript allowed Mrs. Onassis were not justified. The judgment
was modified accordingly. 487 F.2d at 999.
The injunction imposed by the district court was held to be broader than is
required to protect Mrs. Onassis from the "paparazzi" attack which distinguishes
Galella's behavior from that of other photographers entitled to cover her news-
worthy activities. The court modified the order to prohibit only (1) an approach
within 25 feet of defendant or any touching of her person; (2) any blocking of
her movement in public places and thoroughfares; (3) any act foreseeably or
reasonably calculated to place the life and safety of defendant in jeopardy; and
(4) any conduct which would reasonably be foreseen to harass, alarm or frighten
the defendant. Similarly the injunction granted the government agaist inter-
ference with protective duties of the Secret Service was modified to enjoin
Galella from (1) entering the childrens schools or play areas; (2) engaging in
action calculated or reasonably foreseen to place the childrens safety or well
being in jeopardy, or which would threaten or create physical injury; (3) taking
any action which could reasonably be foreseen to harass, alarm or frighten the
children; and (4) from approaching within 30 feet of the children. 487 F.2d at
998-99.
Judge Timbers filed a persuasive dissenting opinion (though apparently
not persuasive to a majority of the court) in which he outlined a number of
factors mitigatin against modification of the injunction by the appellate court.
The substance of his objections may be summarized as follows: The majority set
aside the lengthy findings of the district court without holding them clearly
erroneous, as prescribed by FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). The court offered no explana-
tion for its drastic reduction in the distances Galella is required to maintain from
Mrs. Onassis and the children. In phrasing its modified injunction in terms of
conduct "foreseeably or reasonably calculated" to endanger or harass, alarm or
frighten Mrs. Onassis or the children, the majority runs afoul of FED. R. Crv. P.
65(d), which provides that "[e]very order granting an injunction . . . shall be
specific in terms.. . ." The language used seems to invite disputes over compli-
ance with the order; the likelihood of such disputes is reinforced by Galellas
past willful violations of restraining orders couched in similar terms. Since Galella
raised his objections to the distance requirements for the first time on appeal, the
district court never had an opportunity to pass on the question. The district court,
possessed of all the relevant information, should be allowed to make such determi-
nations after a hearing, before the court of appeals reaches the matter on appeal.
And finally, the net effect of distinguishing between injunctive relief afforded
Mrs. Onassis and that given the government is to "strip the children of any pro-
tection under the injunction after they reach age 16 when their protection by
the Secret Service ceases." 487 F.2d at 1003.
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conduct, but suggested that because of peculiarities of New York law, the
particular conduct might be actionable as harassment rather than as an
invasion of privacyY
The purpose of this note will be to survey some common patterns of
conduct which have been held to be impermissible invasions of the right of
privacy, noting where injunctive relief has and has not been previously
made available; and to suggest that in the, great majority of such invasions,
with certain specific exceptions, equitable relief should be granted upon
the same considerations 0 as for other enforceable rights deserving of
protection.
The touchstone for the right of privacy has been a law review article 1
by Warren and Brandeis which appeared in 1890, arguing for judicial rec-
ognition of an enforceable "right to be let alone." The New York court, in
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.,12 considered the arguments ad-
vanced, but refused to adopt a general right of privacy. Adverse public
reaction to the decision caused the New York legislature the next year to
adopt a limited right of privacy statute' 3 proscribing commercial use of a
person's name or likeness. In 1905 the Georgia Supreme Court rejected the
reasoning in Roberson and recognized a right of privacy derived from
natural law.14 In the ensuing years a majority of the states have recognized
a protectable right of privacy.' 5
It is useful to think of the tort of invasion of the right of privacy in
terms of the manner in which the injury is produced. Dean Prosser's four-
part classification system' 6 has enjoyed wide-spread use among courts and
commentators. The system sets apart the following patterns of injury: (1)
Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private af-
fairs; 17 (2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the
9. Although Galella's behavior would be actionable in most jurisdictions
as an intrusive invasion of privacy, New York has not yet recognized a common
law right of privacy as such. The New York privacy statute, Civm RiGHTS LAw
§ 51 (McKinney 1948), protects a much narrower interest. An actionable inva-
sion of privacy must involve the use of a person's name, portrait or picture for
advertising or trade purposes without his consent. Thus, a person may callously
intrude into another s sphere of privacy without incurring liability under New
York's privacy law, so long as he avoids an advertising or trade purpose for his
acts. See Chaplin v. National Broadcasting Co., 15 F.R.D. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
New York courts have softened the rule in many cases, however, by recog-
nizing and liberally applying freedom from emotional distress as a protectable
interest. See Long v. Beneficial Fin. Co. 39 A.D.2d 11, 330 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1972);
Halio v. Lurie, 15 A.D.2d 62, 222 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1962).
10. I.e., inadequacy of legal remedy, threat of irreparable injury, impossi-
bility of assessing damage, practicality of enforcement, social policy. See D. DOBBS,
HAMNBOOK oN THE LAw OF REMEDIES, §§ 2.5, 2.10 (1973).
11. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Hsaiv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
12. 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
13. N.Y. Civm Rcrrs LAw §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1948). See note 9 supra.
14. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(a), comment a (Tent. Draft
No. 13, 1967).
16. W. PROSSER, TnE LAw OF TORTS § 117 (4th ed. 1971).
17. See, e.g., Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964);
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plaintiff;' 8 (3) publicity placing the plaintiff in a false light in the public
eye; 19 and (4) appropriation for the defendant's advantage of the plaintiffs
name or likeness.20 As will be seen, whether injunctive relief against con-
tinuing invasions of privacy is available is often dependent, in part, upon
how a particular invasion may be categorized.
It must be remembered that before reaching the special problems
which the right of privacy presents for the grant of injunctive relief in a
given case, the threshold requirements21 for equitable jurisdiction must first
be met. One must overcome the hesitancy of courts to enjoin the commis-
sion of torts22 through a showing of inadequacy of the legal remedy, threat
of irreparable injury, and the likelihood of continued tortious conduct. In
the past, courts have frequently referred to the maxim that equity will
protect only property, not personal, rights, as a ground for refusing relief
for invasion of privacy.23 Today, however, that rule is not an absolute, and
courts commonly will give equitable relief to enforce personal rights.2 4
A plaintiff is more readily accorded injunctive relief if his complaint
fits within Prosser's first or fourth categories. The fourth category, appro-
priation of plaintiff's name or likeness for defendant's advantage, was. his-
torically the first to be recognized as an actionable invasion of plaintiffs
rights, even before the term "right of privacy" came into use. In Gee v.
Pritchard,25 a Chancellor advanced the idea that equity protects only prop-
erty rights, but enjoined the publication of a letter expressing private senti-
ments on the theory that there was a property right in the contents of the
letter. Many of the early decisions recognizing a general right of privacy
involved some unauthorized use of a plaintiffs name or picture in the fur-
therance of defendant's interests.26 It was standard practice for the courts
to find a property right in the plaintiff's name or picture, in compliance with
equity's requirements of the time. It has since become well established that
such invasions through appropriation of name or likeness can be enjoined.27
18. See, e.g., Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
19. See, e.g., Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942).
20. See, e.g., Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 124, 233 N.E.2d 840,
286 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 1046 (1969). Spahn
arose under the New York privacy law, CnL RIGHTs LAiW §§ 50, 51 (MeKinney
1948), which protects basically the same interest as Prosser's fourth category.
21. See note 10 supra.
22. 27 Am. Jutn. 2D Equity § 65 (1966).
23. See Chappell v. Stewart, 82 Md. 323, 33 A. 542 (Ct. App. 1896), error
dismissed, 169 U.S. 733 (1898).
24. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Kenyon v. City of Chicopee, 320
Mass. 528, 70 N.E.2d 241 (1946). See 62 Am. JuR. 2D Privacy § 62 (1972);
DE FuNLAx, HANDBOOic OF MODE N EQUITY § 56 (1956). The rule is not dead,
however; in certain sensitive areas, courts are still more willing to grant injunc-
tions under the guise of protecting property. See notes 62-65 and accompanying
text infa.
25. 2 Swanst. 402, 19 Eng. Rep. 87 (Ch. 1818).
26. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68
(1905), and Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (K.C. Ct. Ap.
1911) (both involving photographs of plaintiffs in defendants advertisements).
27. See McCreery v. Miller's Grocerteria, 99 Colo. 499, 64 P.2d 803 (1936);
Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (K.C. Ct. App. 1911);
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This is still the general rule today, although the existence of a property
right is no longer the decisive factor it once was.28
It is probable that the injury caused by actual intrusions upon one's
seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs, most nearly approaches the
layman's concept of an invasion of privacy, a denial of the "right to be let
alone." This type of invasion is often the easiest of the four to identify and
the hardest to justify, particularly when the physical presence of the de-
fendant is an element of the offense.29 An actionable intrusion can take
place in any number of ways, including, but not limited to, the following:
actual invasion and take-over of plaintiffs home;30 harassment on the
streets and in the home (including use of telephones and the mail) ;31
objectionable news gathering methods;32 stealing papers and records from
a place reasonably expected to be private;m improper surveillance and
Palmer v. Schonhorn Enter., Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (1967); Edison
v. Edison Polyform Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67 A. 392 (Chan. 1907); Spahn v.
Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 124, 233 N.E.2d 840, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1967),
appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 1046 (1969); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212
N.C. 980, 195 S.E. 55 (1938).
It has been held that under the New York privacy law, once a proposed use
of a person's name or image for trade purposes without his consent is established,
the right to enjoin such use is absolute. Durgom v. Columbia Broadcasting System
Inc., 29 Misc.2d 394, 214 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1961). See also Doe v. Roe, 42 A.D.2d
559, 345 N.Y.S.2d 560 (App. Div. 1973); and Thompson v. G.P. Putnams Sons,
40 Misc. 2d 608, 243 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1963).
28. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
29. But actual physical presence of the defendant is not a requirement of
this kind of invasion. See cases cited in notes 34 and 35 infra.
30. Welsh v. Pritchard, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952).
81. See Webber v. Gray, 228 Ark. 289, 307 S.W.2d 80 (1957); Hunt v.
Hudgins, 168 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943); Hawks v. Yancey, 265 S.W. 233
(Tex. Civ. App. 1924) (harassment after unsatisfactory love affairs); Biederman's
of Springfield, Inc. v. Wright, 322 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1959) (public harassment
over past-due debt); and Flamm v. Nierop, 56 Misc. 2d 1059, 291 N.Y.S.2d 189(1968); Halio v. Lurie, 15 A.D.2d 62, 222 N.Y.S.2d 759 (App. Div. 1961) (in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress, based on public harassment).
82. Dieteman v. Time, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 925 (C.D. Cal. 1968), a!fd,
449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971). See also note 8 supra.
33. Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
947 (1969). In Pearson the court distinguished between the tort of intrusion
and the tort of improper publication; it found no liability for publication of
material in the public interest, even though those who procured it may be liable
for an intrusion into owner's privacy.
Although the issue was not raised in Pearson or in any other known decision
of record, the case does suggest a problem that must be eventually resolved by
the courts: Should an injunction issue against the publication of material ad-
mittedly in the public interest when the material was, and could only have been,
acquired by the tortious invasion of an individual's privacy by the person who
then seeks to publish it? In such a situation it is probable that the most damaging
intrusion into the individual's privacy and dignity results from the publication,
rather than from the initial acquisition. If any meaningful remedy is to be given
the victim of such tactics, it should be available at the stage where the most harm
is done. The difficulty lies in resolving the individual's right to be free from
physcal intrusions into his personal domain and the consequences of such intru-
sions, and the public interest in a free press and the unfettered dispersal of in-
formation. For a more complete discussion of the judicial recognition of the
public interest, see notes 44-71 and accompanying text infra.
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shadowing;34 eavesdropping;35 and wiretapping. 36 The general consensus
is that any of these intrusive invasions can be enjoined, after a showing of
inadequacy of legal remedy, if continued and threatened in the future.3 7
Ron Galella's conduct-public harassment and constant surveillance-fits
into this category; since it was his manifest intent to continue it into the
future, the court had no difficulty at all in finding injunctive relief to be
proper in this case.38
The two remaining types of privacy invasions, public disclosure of
embarrassing private facts and publicity placing the plaintiff in a false
light in the public eye, share the basic set of characteristics that dominate
courts' decisions on whether to grant or withhold injunctive relief. Cases
arising in this area must involve a publication, in the generic sense, of facts
or implications to the public.39 Both in that respect, and in the nature of
the resulting injury, these two categories of invasions bear more than a
passing resemblance to the tort of defamation. It is that resemblance which
is responsible for much of the confusion and occasional injustice that mar
the protection of this aspect of the right of privacy.
The general rule of equity in such cases is easily stated: There is a
heavy presumption against any enjoining of speech or writing.40 The rea-
sons normally given for denial of injunctions against invasions of privacy
by publication are (1) adequacy of legal remedy, (2) equity's limitation
to the protection of property rights, and (3) fear of violating constitutional
34. See Tucker v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 171 So. 2d 487 (Fla. App.
1965); Pinkerton Nat'l Det. Agency, Inc. v. Stevens, 108 Ga. App. 159, 132
S.E.2d 119 (1963); Souder v. Pendleton Det., Inc., 88 So. 2d 716 (La. App.
1956); Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765, 307
N.Y.S.2d 647 (1970); and Schultz v. Frankfort Marine Accident & Plate Glass Ins.
Co., 151 Wis. 537, 139 N.W. 886 (1913). But see ACLU v. Westmoreland, 323
F. Supp. 1153 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (no invasion of constitutional rights in Army's
civil surveillance program, injunction denied).
But note that reasonable and inobtrusive shadowing on the streets is not an
invasion of privacy. See Tucker v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 171 So.2d 437
(Fla. App. 1965); Chappell v. Stewart, 82 Md. 323, 33 A. 542 (Ct. App. 1896),
error dismissed, 169 U.S. 733 (1898); Forster v. Manchester, 410 Pa. 192, 189
A.2d 147 (1963).
35. See McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Coca Bot. Co., 60 Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E.2d
810 (1939); Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964)(recording device placed under plaintiffs' bed by landlord); and Roach v. Harper,
143 W. Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564 (1968).
36. See Fowler v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 343 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.
1965); Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973).
87. See 62 AM. JT. 2D Privacy § 49 (1972); D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAw OF REMEDIES 536 (1973); Note, Invasion of Privacy-Unreasonable Intru-
sion-A Weapon Against Intrusions Upon Our Shrinking Right of Privacy, 47
NoTnE DAME LAw. 1067 (1972); Sedler, Injunctive Relief and Personal In-
tegrity, 9 ST. L, L.J. 147 (1964). Sedler, supra, at 171, suggests that the degree
of harassment and interference should determine the need for injunctive relief.
38. 487 F.2d at 998.
39. See Zimmerman v. Associates Dis. Corp., 444 S.W.2d 396 (Mo. En
Bane 1969) (no invasion of privacy where no one but plaintiff heard what was
said); Biederman's of Springfield, Inc. v. Wright, 322 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1959).
40. See e.g., Konigsberg v. Time, Inc., 288 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
D. DoBns, HANDBOOK ON Tr= LAw OF RtElmDms 120-21, 536-39 (1973).
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rights of freedom of speech and the press and the right to jury trial.41 It
would seem that in most situations the adequacy of a legal remedy is a fact
question, with no prescribed resolution;42 and the property right-personal
right distinction no longer carries the weight in courts of equity that it once
did.43 Accordingly, the substantive issue is whether there are constitutional
barriers to enjoining publications which interfere with privacy rights.
Two principal constitutional arguments are typically raised in opposi-
tion to the use of injunctions as a remedy for invasions of privacy by publi-
cation: the traditional prior restraint doctrine, as delineated in Near v.
Minnesota;44 and the special privilege accorded publications about public
officials and persons involved in newsworthy events, as developed in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan4 5 and its progeny. As a strict rule of law, the
greater obstacle to the imposition of equitable relief would appear to be
presented by the Near decision, in which the Supreme Court held imper-
missible an attempt to prohibit future publications by the defendants in a
particular vein on the basis of past publications of allegedly defamatory
material. There was no explicit language in the opinion which purported
to limit its applicability to the protection of only newsworthy or political
items. Consequently, Near is frequently cited as an absolute bar to enjoin-
ing any publication, regardless of content or purpose.
Alternatively, there is no clear statement of intent to apply the Near
doctrine to every situation involving a publication of some sort. It is arguable
that the doctrine of prior restraint should be a relevant consideration in the
general first amendment area only when there is a threat of a system of
governmentally sanctioned censorship, whereby all future communicative
publications of a given type are sought to be prohibited or restricted. The
Near decision itself grew out of such a factual setting; it was the state's
restrictive policy which the Court found constitutionally objectionable. 46
No such danger of suppression of ideas is present when a private effort is
made to enjoin future publications of personal or embarassing material not
in the public interest. In the private sphere injunctive actions are concerned
with specific acts or statements which have been made in the past and which
alone would be prevented in the future. Broad censorship of a general type
of statement or publication need not be involved.47
41. See Bertelsman, Injunctions Against Speech and Writing: A Re-evalua-
tion, 59 Ky. L.J. 319 (1971); cf. Annot., 47 A.L.R.2d 715 (1956).
42. See Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Cal. 1947). See generally
McClintock, Adequacy of Ineffective Remedy at Law, 16 MiNN. L. REV. 233(1932).
It is questionable whether there can ever be an adequate legal remedy to
some injuries to privacy. See State ex rel. Reed v. Harris, 348 Mo. 426, 153
S.W.2d 834, 837 (1941).
43. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
44. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
45. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See notes 50-55 and accompanying text infra.
46. Cf. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). In
the Pentagon Papers case, the Supreme Court held the issuance of an injunction
against publication, as sought by the federal government, to be an invalid prior
restraint.
47. See generally Berteisman, note 41 supra, at 331-32.
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There has yet been no Supreme Court ruling which conclusively re-
jects such an argument. In Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe,48 the
Court held unconstitutional an injunction against "passing out pamphlets,
leaflets or literature of any kind, and from picketing" by the defendant com-
munity organization, which sought to expose and discourage the plaintiff
realtor's "blockbusting" tactics. The plantiff asserted that past distributions
of leaflets had invaded his right of privacy; but the Court emphasized that
defendant's leaflets were informational in nature, concerned with a matter
of legitimate public interest. "Respondent thus carries a heavy burden of
showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint. He has not met
that burden."40 The Court did not suggest, however, that the burden would
be impossible to meet. In a separate context the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that "the right of every person 'to be let alone' must be placed in the
scales with the right of others to communicate." 50 The mere incantation of
the ritual words "prior restraint" should not force an immediate denial of
injunctive relief in true privacy cases without a realistic appraisal of the
probable results in each case.
The second line of cases which limit the availability of injunctive relief
in the privacy area begins with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.1 The
Supreme Court in New York Times held that a public official could not
recover for defamation absent a showing that the defendant made the
statement with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
its truth or falseness. Subsequent decisions52 extended basically the same
test to "public figures." A further extension was made, in Time, Inc. v.
Hill,5 3 an action brought under the New York right of privacy statute, 4 by
the application of the "actual malice" test to private individuals tempo-
rarily elevated to the status of public figures through their involvement in
a newsworthy event of legitimate interest to the public. The Court's policy
decision in these cases was based on the social need, underlying the consti-
tutional right to free speech and a free press, for open, unencumbered
exchange of ideas and criticism, free from the "chilling effect" of the fear
of possible liability for inadvertent mistakes. The Court in effect applied a
balancing test, and found the social interest in maintaining an open forum
for speech to outweigh the individual's interest in always being able to
have a cause of action for defamation, where the subject matter of the
defamation was in the public eye.
The argument for that approach is less pleasing when it is applied
across the board to a privacy action. A factor in the decision to balance
48. 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
49. 402 U.S. at 419.
50. Rowan v. United States P.O. Dep't., 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970).
51. 876 U.S. 254 (1964).
52. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
53. 885 U.S. 874 (1967). Although ostensibly a privacy action, alleging
that plaintiffs were placed in a false light in the public eye, the same issue was
involved as in the pure defamation cases: the liability for false statements made
in the context of an event or person within the public interest.
54. N.Y. Cmv. RIGHTS LAw § 51 (McKinney 1948).
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against the interests of the defamed person is the idea that the injury to
reputation caused by defamatory speech can be cured by more speech; a
person's reputation can be restored, in theory, by the opportunity to make
a convincing reply to his attacker. But the right of privacy is meant to pro-
tect the interest in keeping certain private facts out of the public eye, a
completely separate concept from the preservation of reputation. No amount
of extra speech can ever restore the solitude and privacy of a person after
being exposed as a reformed prostitute 5 or having a detailed account of
his private life spread across the pages of a national magazine.56 But in
spite of this "misapplication of first amendment theory to the law of pri-
vacy,"5 7 it has emerged as the backbone of the general rule prohibiting
injunctive relief for invasions of privacy by publication.
This is not to say, however, that the rule is an absolute bar to injunc-
tions. There are very real situations in which an individual may be held up
to a false light in the public eye, without legitimate reason to be so placed
before the public; yet no element of exchange of ideas in the public forum
is present. Without the requisite use of speech to pass pertinent information
into the public sphere, the doctrine of New York Times should not attach.
Given such a situation, once a plaintiff establishes a definite injury to his
interest in privacy and the inability of legal remedies to restore him to his
former position, courts should, and usually will, grant an injunction to pro-
tect his privacy. A common example of a non-constitutionally protected
publication which places a person in a false light is the presence of the
person's picture in a "rogue's gallery" after his arrest did not terminate in
conviction. There is an increasing willingness among courts to enjoin the
continued exhibition of pictures of innocent persons to the public,58 or even
to compel the return of photographs or fingerprints if no conviction has
resulted. 9 But courts will still commonly refuse an injunction as unneces-
sary if the public won't in fact see the photographs.60
55. Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285,297 P. 91 (1981).
56. Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 118 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 811 U.S.
711 (1940).
57. Nimmer, The Right To Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment
Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAIw. L. REv. 935,
958-61 (1968).
58. See Menard v. Mitchell, 480 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United States
v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967); T.N.G. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d
767, 484 P.2d 981, 94 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1971); State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall,
224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d 755 (1946); Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 117 La. 708, 42
So. 228 (1906); Downs v. Swann, 111 Md. 58, 78 A. 658 (1909); State ex rel.
Reed v. Harris, 848 Mo. 426, 153 S.W.2d 834 (1941); McGovern v. Van Ripper,
137 N.J. Eq. 24, 43 A.2d 514 (1945).
59. See Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334, 487 P.2d 211 (1971) (finding
constitutional right of privacy; police must show compelling reason for retention
of fingerprints); cf. Henry v. Looney, 65 Misc. 2d 759, 817 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1971).
See McCutcheon, Constitutional Law-Right of Privacy-A Constitutional Right
to Return of Fingerprints and Photographs on Acquittal, 37 Mo. L. REv. 709(1972).
60. See Kolb v. O'Connor, 14 Ill. App. 2d 81, 142 N.E.2d 818 (1957);
Miller v. Gillespie, 196 Mich. 423, 168 N.W. 22 (1917) (arrest records); Hans-
son v. Harris, 252 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
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Where there actually is a communicative purpose behind a publica-
tion which denies a person his previously-enjoyed privacy, the rogue's
gallery cases are of little help. The similarity to claims for libel and slander
may be fatal to a plaintiff seeking to enjoin the acts which give him un-
wanted publicity.,' Again, however, courts have found or made exceptions
to the law of defamation. It has not been particularly uncommon for courts
to enjoin a continuing trade libel, injurious to a business, trade or profes-
sion, where the statements were merely part of a larger tortious scheme to
destroy business,0 2 or where accompanied by criminal or tortious elements
of conspiracy, intimidation or coercion.63 At least one court has gone so
far as to hold that, even absent those outside factors, a pure continuing
trade libel may be enjoined. 64 Several other courts, in denying injunctions
for personal libel, have suggested that a different result might have been
reached had plaintiffs property interests been threatened. 5
If invasions of privacy by publication were to be accorded the same
treatment, with the presence or absence of a property interest to be the
decisive factor in granting an injunction, there would indeed be a "triumph
of materialism over humanity."0 Fortunately, that result is not mandated
by current judicial policy. The Supreme Court in Time, Inc. v. Hill" ex-
pressly did not extend the actual malice test to "[r]evelations . . . so
unwarranted in view of the victim's position as to outrage the community's
notions of decency."60 Furthermore, that element of Time which extends
61. For typical cases denying injunctions against defamation, see Willis v.
O'Connell, 231 F. 1004 (S.D. Ala. 1916) (freedom of speech and press); Mont-
gomery Ward & Co. v. United Retail, Who. & Dep't Store Employees, 400 ll. 38,
79 N.E.2d 46 (1948) (right to jury trial); Greenberg v. De Salvo, 254 La. 1019,
229 So. 2d 88 (1969), cert. denied, 897 U.S. 1075 (1970) (speech and press);
Ryan v. City of Warrensburg, 342 Mo. 761, 117 S.W.2d 303 (1938) (jury trial).
62. Downey v. United Weatherproofing, Inc., 863 Mo. 852, 253 S.W.2d 976
(1953); Wolf v. Gold, 9 A.D.2d 257, 183 N.Y.S.2d 36 (1959).
63. See Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 224 F. Supp. 978 (D. Ore. 1963);
Carter v. Knapp Motor Co., 243 Ala. 600, 11 So. 2d 883 (1943); Pratt Food
Co. v. Bird, 148 Mich. 631, 112 N.W. 701, 118 Am. St. Rep. 601 (1907); Rus-
sell v. Russell, 127 N.J. Eq. 555, 14 A.2d 540 (1940); cf. (denying relief where
those elements were not present) Robert C. Hicks Corp. v. National Salesmens
Training Ass'n, 19 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1927); Fashion Two Twenty, Inc. v.
Steinberg, 339 F. Supp. 836 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); American Malting Co. v. Keitel,
217 F. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1914); Schmoldt v. Oakley, 390 P.2d 882 (Okla. 1964).
But see Krebiozen Research Found. v. Beacon Press, Inc., 834 Mass. 86, 134
N.E.2d 1 (1956) (injunction denied because of public need to hear comments on
merits of important scientific issue).
64. Black & Yates, Inc. v. Mahogany Ass'n, 129 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1941).
65. See McFarlan v. Manget, 179 Ga. 17, 174 S.E. 712 (1934); Montgomery
Ward & Co. v. United Retail, Who. & Dep 't Store Employees, 400 Ill. 38, 79
N.E.2d 46 (1948). But see Birnbaum v. Wilcox-Gay Corp., 17 F.R.D. 133 (N.D.
III. 1958) (proerty rights not decisive).
66. Bertelsman, note 41 supra, at 326. As the author observes, "[an injunc-
tion to protect business interests is no more or less a prior restraint on speech
than an injunction to protect interests of personality."
67. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
68. 385 U.S. at 388 n.7, quoting from Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806,
809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940).
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the actual malice test of New York Times to privacy actions by otherwise
private individuals involved in newsworthy events may be questionable as
an accurate statement of current judicial policy. In Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.,69 the Supreme Court ruled that a private individual may recover
compensatory damages for a defamatory publication without meeting the
stricter New York Times standard of proof, even though the statement may
have been made in the context of a news item of legitimate interest to the
public. The Court observed that for one to become a public figure, to whom
the stricter standard would apply, a voluntary effort must ordinarily be
exerted to thrust the person to the forefront of particular controversies.70
Since truly private individuals have not voluntarily given up any expecta-
tion of freedom from mistreatment at the hands of the press, they "are not
only more vulnerable to injury than public officials and public figures;
they are also more deserving of recovery."71
The same reasoning should apply with equal force to actions by private
individuals for invasions of privacy. Just as Gertz provides in the context of
defamation actions, the states should be free to define the appropriate
standard of liability for invasions of privacy of private individuals, subject
to the limitation in Gertz that no liability be imposed without fault.7 2 Where
the constitutional considerations implicit in New York Times are not pres-
ent, there is no reason to impose the actual malice test. The argument fol-
lows that when those same constitutional considerations are not present,
publications which expose an individual to glaring and undeserving atten-
tion should be subject to injunction, in the same manner that unwarranted
physical intrusions may be enjoined.7 3 Courts have, on occasion, enjoined
some of the more outrageous excursions into plaintiffs' private lives, on the
theory that there can be no legitimate public need to know of such mat-
ters.74 There is nothing in the Time and Gertz decisions to preclude a simi-
lar finding today.75
69. U.S. - , 94 S. Ct. 2997 (1974).
70. U.S. at , 94 S. Ct. at 3009.
71. U.S. at - , 94 S. Ct. at 8010.
72. Id.
73. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
74. See Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930)
(parents of malformed child stated cause of action to enjoin hospital from dis-
tributing pictures of the child); Clayman v. Bernstein, 38 Pa. D. & C. 543 (Phila.
Co. 1939).
75. In Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 356 Mass. 251, 249 N.E.2d 610 (1969),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970), the court enjoined the showing to general
audiences of a film depicting conditions at a state mental institution, on the
ground that the privacy of several inmates was invaded by showing them in highly
personal and embarrassing situations. It is arguable that the wrong result was
reached in this case, since there was a legitimate public interest in the condition
of inmates' lives at the institution, and the purpose of the film was to arouse public
indignation over those conditions. See Note, Privacy of Mental Inmates Will Be
Protected by an Injunction, 83 HA.v. L. REv. 1722, 1730-31 (1970).
RECENT CASES1974]
67
et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
The conclusion, simply stated, that must be drawn is that invasions of
the right of privacy, in whatever manner inflicted, should be subject to
injunction. Where real and substantial injury is likely, no public issue is
involved, and the injunction is narrowly drawn so not to restrict legitimate
activity, there are no sound' policy reasons against enjoining publications
which place an individual in a false light in the public eye or reveal em-
barrassing personal facts about him.76 A judicial system dedicated to the
preservation of basic human rights should offer no less.
DmNNIS B wncs
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT-
CONTROL OF INTERCITY HIGH VOLTAGE TRANSMISSION LINES
Union Electric Co. v. City of Crestwood1
In 1958 the City of Crestwood passed an ordinance granting Union
Electric Company a twenty year franchise.2 Since that time Union Electric
has supplied electric power within the city. The utility also served the city
of St. Louis and numerous St. Louis municipalities, maintaining generating
plants interconnected by a grid of high voltage transmission lines.
Pursuant to its long-range expansion plan, Union Electric proposed to
construct a new high voltage transmission line on the right-of-way of the
Missouri Pacific Railroad. The proposed line would serve several areas and
would span seven miles, 1.8 miles of which would be within the city of
Crestwood. With minor exceptions, all previous transmission lines within
Crestwood had been installed above ground. The Crestwood city council,
however, attempted to persuade Union Electric to install this line under-
ground, After the utility rejected the idea as too costly, the council passed
Ordinance No. 1119 which prohibited any further aboveground construc-
tion and made violation of the ordinance a misdemeanor. Union Electric
then sought a declaratory judgment against the ordinance,3 but the trial
76. See Bertelsman, note 41 supra, at 349-50.
1. 499 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. 1973).
2. Id. at 481. The 1958 franchise permitted Union Electric to construct
"poles, towers, wires, conduits .. .in, along, across, over and under the streets,
roads, alleys, sidewalks... and other public places in the City of Crestwood [for
the purpose of] transmitting, furnishing and distributing electricity."
3. Against the ordinance, Union Electric Co. contended that:(1) the ordinance is ultra vires in that it exceeds the authority of the
city and invades the field of regulation of utility companies which the
state has vested in and reserved to the Public Service Commission;(2) the additional cost of placing these lines underground would be so
much greater that it would prevent UE from performing its statutory
duty to render adequate and safe service at a reasonable cost;(3) the ordinance exceeds the police power of the city in that it does
not reasonably relate to the health, safety and welfare of the public;
and (4) the ordinance results in a partial taking of UE's vested property
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court upheld its validity.4 The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the
lower court, holding that the ordinance was. invalid because it "invaded"
the area of regulation vested in the Public Service Commission by the
General Assembly.5
The controversy in Union Electric arose as a result of the overlapping
regulatory powers of the Missouri Public Service Commission and the city
of Crestwood. Municipalities in Missouri which do not have a constitutional
charter have only those powers granted by statute5a These include expressly
granted powers, powers implied from or incident to express powers and
those powers essential to the declared objects and purposes of the municipal
corporation.6 One express grant of power used to control utilities is the fran-
chise statute.7 This statute purports to confer an absolute power to grant or
withhold municipal consent to a utility's use of public streets, sidewalks and
other public ways." The awarding of a franchise has been held a condition
precedent to the granting of a certificate of convenience and necessity9 by
4. The trial court relied on three statutes. §§ 71.520, 79.410 and 393.010,
RSMo 1969. Section 71.520 provides:
Any city, town or village in this state may by ordinance, authorize any
person, or any company organized for the purpose of supplying light
... to set and maintain its poles ... and necessary equipment... and
to maintain and operate the same along, across or under any of the
public roads, streets, alleys, or public places within such city, town,
or village, for a period of twenty years or less, subject to such rules,
regulations and conditions as shall be expressed in such ordinance.
Section 79.410 provides: "The board of aldermen may prohibit and prevent
all encroachments into and upon sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys and other
public places of the city .. . [and] they may also regulate the . .. erecting
of... electric light poles ....
Section 393.010 states:
Any corporation formed under or subject to chapter 351, RSMo 1949
or heretofore organized under the laws of Missouri for the purpose of
supplying any town, city or village with gas, electricity... shall have
the power to lay conductors for conveying gas, electricity or water
through the streets, alleys and squares of any city, town or village with
the consent of the municipal authorities thereof under such reasonable
regulations as such authorities may prescribe, and such companies are
authorized to set theirpoles ... along, across or under any of the
public roads, streets and waters of this state in such manner as not to
incommode the public in the use of such roads, streets and waters.
5. 499 S.W.2d 480, 483-84 (Mo. 1973).
5a. Ex parte Williams, 139 S.W.2d 485 (Mo. 1940).
6. Id.
7. § 71.520, RSMo 1969, quoted note 4 supra.
8. Holland Realty & Power Co. v. City of St. Louis, 282 Mo. 180, 221 S.W.
51 (1920).
9. § 393.170, RSMo 1969 states:
3. The commission shall have the power to grant the permission and
approval herein specified whenever it shall after due hearing determine
that such construction or such exercise of the right, privilege or fran-
chise is necessary or convenient for the public service. The commission
may by its order impose such condition or conditions as it may deem
reasonable and necessary ....
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the Public Service Commission."° The area included in the certificate granted
cannot exceed the franchise granted."1
Another source of power for Missouri municipalities is the police power
-the power to legislate to promote the public health, safety and welfare.12
This police power has been held to support some municipal utility regula-
tion. In State ex rel. Chaney v. West Missouri Power Co.,13 the court stated
that under its police power a city could require a franchised utility to bring
a high tension transmission line into the city "in such manner and under
such safeguards as will effectually protect the citizens from the appre-
hended dangers." 14
The Missouri Public Service Commission is a statutory agency 5 which
can only exercise expressly conferred powers 6 and those implied powers
necessary and proper to carry out its delegated duties.17 Its jurisdiction is
generally defined in section 386.250;1s specific authority is granted in sub-
sequent sections.19 The enabling statutes, based on the state's police power,2 0
10. State ex rel. Pub. Water Supply Dist. of Jackson City v. Burton, 879
S.W.2d 598 (Mo. 1964); State v. Missouri Util. Co., 831 Mo. 837, 53 S.W.2d
894 (En Bane 1982). For a similar holding by the Missouri Public Service Com-
mission see Southwest Water Co., 25 Mo. P.S.C. 637 (1941).
11. State ex rel. Pub. Water Supply Dist. of Jackson City v. Burton, 879
S.W.2d 598 (Mo. 1964); State ex rel. Doniphan Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
377 S.W.2d 469 (K.C. Mo. App. 1964).
12. Graff v. Priest, 856 Mo. 401, 201 S.W.2d 945 (1947).
18. 813 Mo. 283, 281 S.W. 709 (1926).
14. Id. at 801, 281 S.W. at 714 (1926).
15. The Missouri Public Service Commission was created by a statute, Mo.
Laws 1918, at 556-661, S.B.I., now contained in Chapter 886, RSMo 1969.
16. State ex rel. Kansas City Transit, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 406
S.W.2d 5 (Mo. En Banc 1966); State ex rel. Kansas City Power & Light Co. v.
Buzard, 850 Mo. 768, 168 S.W.2d 1044 (En Banc 1948); State ex rel. Public
Serv. Comm'n v. Padberg, 846 Mo. 1183, 145 S.W.2d 150 (En Bane 1940);
State ex rel. Haline v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 848 S.W.2d 177 (K.C. Mo. App.
1960).
17. See statute quoted note 18 infra; cases cited note 16 supra.
18. § 386.250, RSMo 1969.
The jurisdiction, supervision, powers and duties of the public service
commission herein created and established shall extend under this
chapter .
(5) To the manner, sales or distribution of... electricity for light, heat
and power, within the state, and to persons or corporations owning,
leasing, operating or controlling the same; and to gas and electric plants,
and to persons or corporations owning, leasing, and operating or con-
trolling the same ....
(10) To all public utility corporations and persons whatsoever subject
to the provisions of this chapter as herein defined; and
(11) To such other and further extent, and to all such other and addi-
tional matters and things, and in such further respects as may herein
appear, either expressly or impliedly.
19. See §§ 893.140, .150, .180, .190, .200, .280, .270, RSMo 1969.
20. State ex rel. Chicago, R.I. & P. RR. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 812 S.W.2d
791 (Mo. En Bane 1958). See also cases note 21 infra.
[Vol. 39
70
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [1974], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss4/6
RECENT CASES
have been held remedial and therefore are to be liberally construed.21 The
courts have also held that the Public Service Commission Law was not
intended to repeal existing law but rather to supplement it unless in
direct conflict.22
Earlier cases have resolved overlaps of regulatory power in certain
specific areas. For example, under the franchise statute, municipalities may
impose reasonable conditions upon the grant of their franchise.23 The Com-
mission, however, has power to set and change rates even where those rates
were conditions upon the grant of the franchise.24 Likewise, where a munic-
ipal franchise required a railroad to maintain a shop for repairs in the
municipality, the Commission was empowered to rule such condition unnec-
essary and excuse the railroad from continued compliance.2 5 If the utility
is municipally owned, on the other hand, the Public Service Commission
has no power over it.26
In Union Electric, the court resolved the conflict between the Public
Service Commission and the municipality through the doctrine of preemp-
tion, a doctrine which flows from the concept of intergovernmental suprem-
acy.27 Obviously, a state statute will control over a conflicting municipal
ordinance.28 Where there has been a conflict between a local ordinance and
21. State ex rel. City of Sedalia v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 275 Mo. 201, 204
S.W. 497 (1918); State ex rel. Kansas City v. Kansas City Gas Co., 254 Mo. 515,
163 S.W. 854 (1913).
22. Clark v. Mississippi River & B.T.Ry., 324 Mo. 406, 23 S.W.2d 174(1929); Patterson v. Thompson, 277 S.W.2d 314 (Spr. Mo. App. 1955).
23. State ex rel. City of Lebanon v. Missouri Standard Tel. Co., 337 Mo.
642, 85 S.W.2d 613 (En Banc 1935). See Holland Realty & Power Co. v. City
of St. Louis, 282 Mo. 180, 221 S.W. 51 (1920). There the court held that, where
the terms of the franchise required municipal consent for the laying of utility lines,
the city could cut lines previously laid without the city's consent under a public
road even though the utility bad permission of the owners of the fee. See also§ 393.010, RSMo 1969, quoted note 4 supra; Union Elec. v. City of Crestwood,
499 S.W.2d 480, 485 (Mo. 1973); City of Cape Girardeau v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry.,
305 Mo. 590, 267 S.W. 601 (En Banc 1924).
24. State ex rel. City of Sedalia v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 275 Mo. 201, 204
S.W. 497 (1918). The constitutional provision forbidding impairment of con-
tracts (Mo. CONST. art. II, § 15) is inapplicable because a state or an agency of
the state may not contract away its police power. See Mo. CONST. art. XI, § 3;
State ex rel. City of Kirkwood v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 330 Mo. 507, 50 S.W.2d
114 (1932); City of Cape Girardeau v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 305 Mo. 590, 267
S.W. 601 (En Banc 1924); State ex rel. City of Sedalia v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
275 Mo. 201, 204 S.W. 497 (1918). Rate setting has specifically been found to
be part of the state police power.
25. City of Cape Girardeau v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 305 Mo. 590, 267 S.W.
601 (En Banc 1924).
26. Lightfoot v. City of Springfield, 361 Mo. 659, 236 S.W.2d 348 (1951);
State ex rel. City of Sikeston v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 336 Mo. 985, 82 S.W.2d
105 (1935).
27. Cf. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
28. Jennings v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 140 Conn. 650, 663, 103
A.2d 535 (1954) (dictum); State ex rel. Knese v. Kinsex, 314 Mo. 80, 282 S.W.
437 (En Banc 1926). In Shartel v. Missouri Util. Co., 53 S.W.2d 894, 398 (Mo. En
Banc 1932), the court stated: "It is unnecessary for us to determine in this case
the effect of possible conflict between the franchise requirements imposed by a
municipality and conditions imposed by a Public Service Commission in granting
a certificate of convenience and necessity, because no such situation is presented."
1974]
71
et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
the Public Service Commission, Missouri courts have not hesitated to sus-
tain the Public Service Commission.29 The court in Union Electric did not,
however, find a conflict of purpose between the local ordinance and any
regulation by the Public Service Commission.30 Yet even absent such a
direct conflict, the municipality must nevertheless bow to its creating
government unit if the court finds that the area of activity has been
preempted by the superior governmental unit or its agencies.31
Courts have found preemption in three situations: (1) express statutory
preemption where the legislature states that control will remain in the
legislature or a designated agency and municipalities may no longer control;
(2) implied preemption from a broad grant of power to a state agency
making it appear that the legislature did not intend any other political
division to have authority in the area; 32 and (3) occupation of the field
where either the legislature or a designated state agency has made so many
regulations in a certain area that it seems unlikely that any regulation by
another governmental group was to be allowed 3 3 Some authorities suggest
that preemption is a preferred ground of judicial decision because it allows
the court to avoid the onus of invalidating local government action by
throwing the blame to the legislature or agency.3 4
Decisions from other states indicate that a grant of broad power to a
public service commission by a state legislature precludes regulation by a
municipality 6 unless regulatory power has specifically been reserved to the
municipality by statute.38 The same rule has been held applicable even
29. 499 S.W.2d 480, 485 (Mo. 1973).
00. In fact, the court took judicial notice of a study being conducted by
the Public Service Commission on the feasibility of underground electric lines for
the state, 499 S.W.2d at 483n.3, which had resulted in a recent Commission
order requiring all electric lines in new subdivisions to be placed underground.
While at some later date the Public Service Commission might rule that under-
ground placement of intercity transmission lines like those involved in Union
Electric was infeasible, Crestwood's desire for underground lines currently appears
more in harmony than in conflict with the Public Service Commission.
31. See Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. San Francisco, 51 Cal.2d 766, 336 P.2d
514 (1959); 36 S. CAL. L. Ruv. 430 (1963). For a discussion of preemption in
Missouri home rule see Sterehi, State-Local Conflicts Under the New Home Rule
Amendment, 37 Mo. L. PaEv. 677 (1972).
32. In re Lane, 57 Cal. App. 103, 367 P.2d 673, 18 Cal. Rptr. 33, aff'd on
rehearing, 58 Cal.2d 99, 372 P.2d 897, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1962).
33. Whitney v. Municipal Ct., 58 Cal.2d 907, 377 P.2d 80, 27 Cal. Rptr. 16(1962); In re Moss, 58 Cal.2d 117, 373 P.2d 425, 23 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1962).
34. See Comment, Preemption as a Preferred Ground: A New Canon of
Construction, 12 STA. L. REv. 208 (1959).
35. Jennings v. Connecticut Light & Power Co. 140 Conn. 650, 103 A.2d
535 (1954); (building of steam plant held properly submitted to local zoning
commission subject, however, to an appeal to the Public Utilities Commission);
In re Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358, 173 A.2d 233 (1961); Geneseo v.
Illinois Northern Util. Co., 363 Ill. 89, 1 N.E.2d 392 (1936) (utility's franchise
had expired; held, city's only power was to control original installation or con-
struction; thereafter power in the commission); 64 Am. Jur. 2d Public Utilities
§ 233, at 742 (1972).
36. See Benzinger v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 293 Ky. 747, 170
S.W.2d 38 (1943) (state constitution specifically reserved to the city the power
to force power lines to be buried).
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where broad home rule powers are involved.87 In deciding that regulatory
power rests solely in the state agency, the courts have spoken in terms of
and limited their decisions to matters requiring state-wide uniformity. s
Where wires are to cross public streets and to carry high voltage, however,
at least one case has held it a reasonable exercise of the municipal police
power to require wires to be put underground.39
In Union Electric, the court found that the grant of power to the Com-
mission was "sweeping,"40 then cited a New Jersey case41 which ruled that
statutes relative to that state's public service commission were legislative
recognition that utility regulation transcends municipal boundaries and that
the subject requires uniform state regulation. Even though the court did not
completely foreclose the possibility of future municipal regulation of utilities,
the court did fail to provide any guidelines as to the boundaries of the area
of permissible municipal activity. The problem thus becomes identification
of those areas of regulatory authority reserved to each governmental unit. On
this issue, the language of the opinion is less than precise.
Earlier cases upheld ordinances requiring all cables to be placed under-
ground where such was a condition in the original franchise accepted by the
utility. 4 2 Union Electric distinguished these cases noting that Crestvood had
The same rule has been applied even where broad municipal home rule
powers were involved. See People ex rel. Public Util. Comm'n v. Mountain States
Tel. & Tel. Co., 125 Colo. 167, 248 P.2d 397 (1952) (nature of activity and
impact on areas beyond the municipality are factors in determining proper scope
of municipal concern); Cleveland Elec. Ilium. Co. v. Painesville, 15 Ohio St. 2d
125, 289 N.E.2d 75 (1968).
87. See Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. San Francisco, 51 Cal.2d 766, 886 P.2d
514 (1959); 86 S. CAL. L. REv. 480 (1968).
88. Cases cited note 82 supra; In re Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 85 N.J.
858, 178 A.2d 288 (1961). For a decision limiting the municipal control to
original installation or construction on streets and not to supervision, regulation or
control after installation, see Geneseo v. Illinois North. Util. Co., 868 Ill. 89,
1 N.E.2d 892 (1936). In Jennings v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 140 Conn.
650, 108 A.2d 585 (1954), local authorities were allowed to make regulatory
decisions subject to an appeal to the Public Service Commission.
89. State ex rel. Cleveland Elec. Ilium. Co. v. City of Euclid, 169 Ohio St.
476, 159 N.E.2d 756 (1959) (even absent reservation of power in franchise,
police power would support burying ordinance).
40. 499 S.W.2d 480, 482 (Mo. 1978).
41. In re Public Serv. Elee. & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 858, 178 A.2d 238 (1961).
A New Jersey borough attempted to force the utility company to run underground
a high voltage cable on the private right-of-way of the Staten Island Railroad.
The borough first tried a zoning ordinance requiring a permit but the Public
Service Board held the permit unnecessary. The borough then enacted an ordi-
nance exercising its police power. The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that
the ordinance exceeded the police power of the borough and that the Public
Service Board's finding granting relief from the zoning ordinance was not subject
to attack. The municipalitys control was limited to public streets used by
local residents.
42. State ex rel. McAllister v. Cupples Station Light, Heat & Power Co., 288
Mo. 115, 228 S.W. 75 (En Bane 1920); Missouri Valley Realty Co. v. Cupples
Station Light, Heat & Power Co., 199 S.W. 151 (Mo. 1917); Frolichstein v.
Cupples Station Light, Heat & Power Co., 201 Mo. App. 162, 210 S.W. 90 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1919). These cases dealt with the Keyes ordinance in St. Louis which
provided for underground wires in a special district.
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sought to eliminate rights granted in a franchise previously given.4 3 Thus, it
appears still permissible for a municipality to require underground trans-
mission lines as a condition to a grant of an original franchise, but impermis-
sible to make such a requirement subsequent to the original franchise. This
distinction, however, is inconsistent with the rationale of state-wide unifor-
mity; the need for uniformity remains the same before and after the franchise
has been given.44
The court also distinguished as "inapplicable" 45 section 393.010, RSMo
1969,40 which gives a municipal corporation the power to regulate utility
conductors laid through streets, alleys and squares. The court failed, how-
ever, to expressly state why the section was inapplicable or give guidelines
as to what power was reserved to the municipality under the section.
Presumably by a literal reading of this section and section 79.410,47 which
permits municipal regulation of the erection of electric light poles, the
court limited them to public ways rather than the private right-of-way
which Union Electric planned to use. The court, however, did not indicate
that a limitation of the ordinance to public ways would have given a
different result.
Union Electric indicates that Missouri municipalities are preempted
from a substantial area of utility regulation by implication from the "sweep-
ing" powers granted to the Public Service Commission. Apparently, the
Public Service Commission has sole authority to regulate where an intercity
transmission line is being placed on a private right-of-way under a previously
granted franchise. Beyond the facts of Union Electric, however, it is diffi-
cult to precisely know the extent public utility regulation has been pre-
empted by the Public Service Commission. It appears that the municipality
will be able to impose reasonable conditions in the original franchise. How-
ever, due to the "sweeping" control by the Public Service Commission, it
may no longer be reasonable to allow each municipality to control whether
cables within its boundaries are above or below ground. This result would
be consistent with the need for uniformity. Union Electric thus requires
that municipal regulatory statutes be carefully drawn to be sustained. The
vagueness of the holding, however, makes drafting standards unclear.
PATRmciA L. WsoN
43. 499 S.W.2d 480, 484 (Mo. 1973).
44. The court also failed to mention the intriguing problem of whether,
upon the expiration (or termination) of an existing franchise which did not con-
tain a requirement that lines be buried, a renewal could include such a condition.
45. 499 S.W.2d 480, 484 (Mo. 1973).
46. See statute quoted note 4 supra.
47. § 79.410, RSMo 1969, quoted note 4 supra.
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WRONGFUL DEATH-RECOVERY FOR DEATH
OF A VIABLE UNBORN CHILD
Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg1
I. CHIMSAFOGEORGIS
On September 1, 1966, Mrs. Chrisafogeorgis was struck by an auto-
mobile while crossing a Chicago street. After emergency surgery it was
determined that her unborn son had died from injuries received in the
accident. Her husband, the administrator of the estate, filed suit against the
driver of the automobile and its owner for wrongful death of the child.
Defendants moved for summary judgment on grounds that there could be
no cause of action unless the fetus was born alive. The Cook County circuit
court granted the motion for dismissal.2 The appellate court affirmed.3 The
Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded, 4 holding that the Illinois
Wrongful Death Act5 allowed recovery for wrongful death of a viable6
fetus. Thus, Illinois became the most recent state to allow such recovery.
The Illinois decision raises a question that remains unanswered in Mis-
souri. Will Missouri allow recovery in a similar case?
II. Missomti LAw
Missouri's Wrongful Death Act is Sections 537.080-.100, RSMo 1969.
Based on Lord Campbell's Act 7 it has been construed as creating a
new cause of action distinct from any previous action for injuries by
the decedent.8 Two Missouri decisions have a direct bearing on the ques-
tion of recovery.
In Steggall v. Morris,9 on May 2, 1952, a viable infant en ventre sa
mere"0 was injured in an automobile accident. He was born alive but died
as a result of his injuries approximately two weeks later. The trial court
dismissed plaintiffs petition for wrongful death damages of $15,000, finding
that no cause of action was stated. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed
and remanded, stating that a viable child, born alive, could maintain an
action for injuries suffered while en ventre sa mere and holding that a
1. 55 Ill.2d 368, 804 N.E.2d 88 (1973).
2. Id. at 869, 304 N.E.2d at 89.
3. Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 3 Ill. App. 3d 422, 279 N.E.2d 440
(1972).
4. 55 Ill. 2d at 375, 304 N.E.2d at 92.
5. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 1, 2 (1969).
6. Sufficiently developed for survival outside the mother's womb. Normally
a fetus of seven months or older. T. SEmDAN, MEDIcAL DICTIONAuY 1234 (16th
ed. 1946).
7. 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93 (1846).
8. State ex rel. Thomas v. Daues, 314 Mo. 13, 29-30, 283 S.W. 51, 56
(1926).
9. 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577 (En Banc 1953).
10. In its mother's womb. BLAck's LAw DIC-nONARY 619 (4th ed. 1968).
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wrongful death action would lie as a result of death, after birth, from said
injuries. 1 The court in Steggall stated "[ilt is not in accordance with the
truth to say the law indulges in a fiction when it attributes a legal person-
ality to an unborn child."12
Acton v. Shields 3 was an action under the wrongful death statute for
the death of a child en ventre sa mere. The Missouri Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's dismissal for failure to state a cause of action. The
court based its ruling upon the lack of pecuniary loss suffered by the
plaintiffs (deceased's collateral beneficiaries).14 The court specifically re-
served judgment upon the sufficiency of an action brought by the decedents
father, however. 10
III. REcovEY-Po AND CON
The statute refers to the death "of a person"'1 by a wrongful act such
that if death had not ensued would have entitled the injured party to main-
tain an action and recover damages.'1 Recovery, then, is conditioned upon
(1) the existence of a person who (2) could have maintained an injury
had he lived.'
A. Is A Viable Child A Person?
The characterization of a viable fetus as a person has sometimes been
called the biological approach.' 9 Thirteen jurisdictions have expressly held
that a viable child is a person.20 These states take the approach that a
11. Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 1233, 258 S.W.2d 577, 581 (En Banc
1953).
12. Id. at 1229, 258 S.W.2d at 579.
13. 886 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. 1965).
14. See text accompanying note 67 infra.
15. 386 S.W.2d at 367. Acton is also distinguishable because the fetus was
not alleged to be viable. For a thorough analysis of Missouri law prior to both
Steggall and Acton see Cason & Collins, May Parents Maintain An Action For
The Wrongful Death Of An Unborn Child In Missouri?, 15 Mo. L. REv. 211(1950).
16. Section 537.080, RSMo 1969, provides:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful act,
neglect or default of another, and the act, neglect or default is such as
would, if death bad not ensued, have entitled the party injured to main-
tain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then . . . the
person who . .. would have been liable if death had not ensued shall
be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the
person injured ....
17. Id.
18. Hawkins v. Smith, 242 Mo. 688, 703, 147 S.W. 1042, 1046 (En Banc
1912).
19. Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901, 905 (Ky. 1955).
20. Simmons v. Howard Univ., 323 F. Supp. 529, 529 (D.D.C. 1971); Porter
v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 716, 87 S.E.2d 100, 102 (1955) (a "child");
Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 874-75, 304 N.E.2d 88, 92(1973); Britt v. Sears, 277 N.E.2d 20, 27 (Ind. 1971) (a "child"); Orange v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 443 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969); State
ex rel. Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 183, 198 A.2d 71, 73 (Ct. App. 1964);
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viable child must be considered a separate entity from its mother because
by definition it is fully capable of an independent existence apart from her.21
"Biologically speaking, such a person is, in fact, a presently existing person, a
living human being."2 2
Other courts have rejected viability as a standard for establishing the
existence of a person.2 Viability is much more difficult to determine than
live birth.24 Any dividing line makes arbitrary distinctions, but a live birth
test is better suited to judicial determination 25 because regardless of medi-
cal definitions, a child is a physical part of its mother until birth. The
viability standard has been rejected in most suits that have considered the
matter for purposes of prenatal personal injuries.2 6
At common law, a viable unborn child was recognized as a separate
entity entitled to the recognition and protection of the courts for many
purposes.2 7 For example, property law has long treated unborn children as
persons in some instances.28 These property rights, however, are contingent
upon the child's being born alive.29 A stillborn fetus is considered as never
having been born or conceived.30 Furthermore, an unborn child is normally
considered en esse only for purposes to his benefit, and a wrongful death
recovery does not benefit the deceased infant.3' Property law also does not
support the viability distinction as in some instances property law doesn't
even require conception.32
O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 138, 188 N.W.2d 785, 788 (1971); Ilainey v.
Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 283, 72 So. 2d 434, 439-40 (1954); White v. Yup, 85 Nev.
527, 584, 538, 458 P.2d 617, 621, 623 (1969); Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio
App. 431, 433, 167 N.E.2d 106, 107-08 (1959); Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C.
608, 613, 138 S.E.2d 42, 44 (1964); Baldwin v. Butcher, W. Va.
o , 184 S.E.2d 428, 432 (1971); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut.
Auto Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 22, 148 N.W.2d 107, 112 (1967).
21. Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901, 905 (Ky. 1955). "Modem medicine
is replete with cases of living children being taken from dead mothers." Bonbrest
v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 140 (D.D.C. 1946).
22. Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901, 905 (Ky. 1955).
23. E.g., Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 20, 50 N.W.2d 229, 232(1951).
24. Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 486, 248 N.E.2d 901, 905, 301
N.Y.S.2d 65, 70-71 (1969).
25. "The law cannot always be scientific or technically correct. It must often
content itself with being merely practical." Lipps v. Milwaukee E.R.&L. Co., 164
Wis. 272, 276, 159 N.W. 916, 917 (1916).
26. E.g., Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 448-49, 225
N.E.2d 926, 927 (1967).
27. Stemmer v. Kline, 19 N.J. Misc. 15, 17, 17 A.2d 58, 59 (Middlesex
County Cir. Ct. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d 489 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1942). In contemplation of law life commences at the moment of
quickening ... State v. Cooper, 22 N.J.L. 52, 54 (1849).28. Aubuchon v. Bender, 44 Mo. 5 568 (1869).
29. Stokes v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 695, 700 (Fla. 1968).30. Marsellis v. Thalhimer, 2 Paige Ch. 35 (N.Y. 1830).
31. Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 437-38, 167 N.E.2d 106, 110
(1959) (Wiseman, P.J., dissenting).32. Folk v. Hughes, 100 S.C. 220, 84 S.E. 713 (1915) (beneficiary of afuture interest unborn at time of devise).
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Similarly, courts allowing recovery have noted that the criminal law
recognizes the rights of the unborn.3 3 Under Missouri law, the willful kill-
ing of an unborn child is manslaughter.34 If the law recognizes the separate
existence of the child sufficiently to make its killing a crime why should it
not also recognize it as a tort?35 On the other hand it can be argued that
whatever criminal penalties are associated with the killing of a fetus (gen-
erally abortion or manslaughter) are due solely to society's interest in the
potential life involved. Criminal statutes do not treat the viable fetus
exactly like a living person; no state has a law which makes the killing of
an unborn child murder.a6
Even if an unborn viable child is deemed a person in 1974, it can be
argued that no such result was intended by the legislature at the time of
passage of the Wrongful Death Act (1855) .Y Section 537.080, RSMo 1969,
must be interpreted with due regard for legislative intent. Statutes in
derogation of the common law are ordinarily strictly construed.3 8 Wrongful
death statutes, however, are remedial in nature and thus should be liberally
construed.30 As the United States Supreme Court stated:
Death statutes have their roots in dissatisfaction with the archaisms
of the law .... It would be a misfortune if a narrow or grudging
process of construction were to exemplify and perpetuate the very
evils to ,be remedied.40
It can be argued that abortions were much freer at the time of passage
of the original act and the legislature likely could not have intended "per-
sons" to include the unborn.41 However it is doubtful that the legislature
intended to provide an action only for persons as the law existed in 1855.42
In all probability, the legislature never really thought about the question.4 3
Other statutes show the legislature's present concern for the life of the
unborn. The abortion statute enacted by the Missouri legislature prohibits
abortion unless necessary to preserve the life of the mother "or that of an
unborn child.""4
38. The killing of an unborn child was manslaughter or homicide at common
law. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARsS 70 (Gavit's ed. 1941). When a pregnant
woman was condemned to death, at common law, a stay of execution was granted
until she delivered.
34. § 559.090, RSMo 1969.
35. Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, 4 D.L.R. 337, 344 (1933).
36. Note, The Keeler Case: Feticide as Murder, 19 CATH. U.L. REv. 372, 375
(1970).
37. See, e.g., Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 377, 804
N.E.2d 88, 98-94 (1973) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
88, Bates v. Sylvester, 205 Mo. 493, 502, 506, 104 S.W. 73, 75, 77 (1907).
39. Crohn v. Kansas City Home Tel. Co., 131 Mo. App. 313, 320, 109 S.W.
1068, 1070 (K.C. Ct. App. 1908) (dictum that the Wrongful Death Act is
purely remedial); Cray v. Goodson, 61 Wash. 2d 319, 324, 378 P.2d 413, 415
(1963).
40. Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342, 350 (1937).
41. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
42. Hawkins v. Smith, 242 Mo. 688, 704-05, 147 S.W. 1042, 1047 (En Banc
1912). See also O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 180, 134, 188 N.W.2d 785, 786
(1971).
48. Britt v. Sears, 277 N.E.2d 20, 24-25 (Ind. 1971).
44. § 559.100, RSMo 1969.
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Nor does the recent Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade45 neces-
sarily bar recovery for the wrongful death of a viable unborn child. Roe
held that the unborn were not "persons" for purposes of the fourteenth
amendment.46 The word "person" can have different meanings in different
statutes. There would be nothing invalid with an interpretation of the
Wrongful Death Act to include the viable unborn, even if for due process
purposes they are not persons."47 In his opinion, Justice Blackmum specifi-
cally stated that wrongful death recoveries for stillborn fetuses vindicate the
parents' rights, not the infant's, and could still be allowed consistently with
Roe.48 The decision expressly approved of the viability distinction by assert-
ing that in the last trimester (viable stage) the state could even proscribe
abortion, except when necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.49
B. Could the Viable Child Have
Maintained An Injury Action Had He Lived?
Assuming that the viable unborn infant is a person for purposes of the
Wrongful Death Act, does he meet the second requirement of the act, that
he could have been able to maintain an injury action had he survived the
injury? Immediately after the injury, there is no independent life able to
institute such a suit.50 The statute conditions recovery upon the existence
of a cause of action for injuries.51 The infant could not have brought suit
while en ventre sa mere52 and had he died of natural causes before birth, he
would never have had the cause of action for injuries required by the
statute.5 3 Barring subsequent death due to other causes, however, Steggall v.
Morris54 would allow the infant to sue for its injuries suffered while en
ventre sa mere.55 Whether a cause of action for injuries contingent on live
birth is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 537.080, TISMo 1969,
has not been determined. It would appear that the statutory language could
be reasonably interpreted in either manner.
45. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
46. Id. at 158.
47. Although the same reason that convinced the Supreme Court that an
unborn child is not a "person" could probably be applied here.
48. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
49. Id. at 163-64. Abortion at this stage could raise questions if stillborn
infants are included within the Wrongful Death Act. Would a non-consenting
father have a cause of action against his wife or the physician? See generally
Touriel v. Beneveniste, 30 U.S.L.W. 2203 (Super. Ct., L.A., Cal. 1961). Could
the mother's consent to abort waive any right of action for wrongful death?
Comment, Wrongful Death and the Unborn: An Examination of Recovery After
Roe v. Wade, 13 J. F~m. L. 99, 105 (1978).
50. Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 48, 202 A.2d 9, 11 (1964).
51. See note 16 supra.
52. State ex rel. Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 186, 198 A.2d 71, 74 (Ct.
App. 1964) (Gray, J., dissenting).53. Baldwin v. Butcher, W. Va. , 184 S.E.2d
428, 438 (1971) (Calhoun, J., dissenting).
54. 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577 (En Bane 1953).
55. Id. at 1283, 258 S.W.2d at 581.
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C. Possible Bars to Recovery
1. Proof of Causation
Some courts have denied recovery due to the difficulty in proof of
causation. At one time this may have been a serious problem, but physicians
today have advanced in their knowledge of causation and the difficulty has
diminished considerably. In any event, "[t]he difficulty of obtaining proof
of the wrong should prompt greater leniency in affording the remedy, rather
than a denial of plain justice."5 6 Fears of fraudulent claims have also been
voiced. Fraud, however, is not new to our judicial system and can be dealt
with just as in other cases.5 7
2. Proof of Damages
A possible bar to recovery in Missouri is the pecuniary damage rule.
Pecuniary damages generally are computed by subtracting the parents'
expense of support and maintenance for the child from the value of his
services to the parents.5 Some courts have held that pecuniary damages for
the death of a stillborn child are too speculative to be awarded.5 9 Awarding
damages in such a case is thought to be punitive rather than compensatory.60
Thus a few courts have rejected recovery on the basis of their pecuniary
damage rules.01
The Missouri Supreme Court in Acton v. Shields62 denied recovery to
the decedents collateral heirs due to the lack of pecuniary damage, but
expressly left the question open with regard to parents.63 In Acton the court
referred 4 to Graf v. Taggert"5 which denied parents of a fetus killed en
ventre sa mere recovery on a pecuniary damage basis. The New Jersey
Supreme Court in Graf stated:
On the death of a very young child ... at least'some facts can be
shown to aid in estimating damages as, for example, its mental and
physical condition.
But not even these scant proofs can be offered when the child
is stillborn.06
The validity of Acton is open to question, however, in light of the 1973
amendment to section 537.090, RSMo 1969. As amended, the section reads:
[T]he trier of the facts may give to the party or parties entitled
56. Scott v. McPheeters, 83 Cal. App. 2d 629, 637, 92 P.2d 678, 682 (1939).
57. Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 79 A.2d 550, 559 (Md. 1951).
58. Marx v. Parks, 39 S.W.2d 570, 575 (St. L. Mo. App. 1931).
59. See, e.g., Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964).
60. Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 894, 400, 146 S.E.2d 425, 480 (1966).
61. Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 311, 204 A.2d 140, 144 (1964); Gay v.
Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 400, 146 S.E.2d 425, 429 (1966). For a thorough
brea':down of the various jurisdictions and statutes see Comment, Wrongful Death
and ihe Unborn: An Examination of Recovery After Roe v. Wade, 13 J. FAM. L.
99 111-14 (1973).
62. 386 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. 1965).
63. Id. at 367.
64. Id. at 367 n.1.
65. 48 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964).
66. Id. at 310, 204 A.2d at 144.
[Vol. 39
80
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [1974], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss4/6
RECENT CASES
thereto such damages as will fairly and justly compensate such
party or parties for any damages he or they have sustained and are
reasonably certain to sustain in the future as a direct result of
such death.67
This amendment may supersede Missouri's court-made pecuniary damage
restriction on wrongful death recovery. If so, plaintiffs could recover non-
pecuniary damages that have previously been barred, e.g. parental mental
distress. To date, however, the question has not been resolved.
Many courts have recognized the inequities present in allowing recovery
for prenatal injuries but denying it for wrongful death. Of the jurisdictions
which have ruled on the issue, a majority now allow recovery whereas as
recently as 1949, none did.68 A large minority, however, remain unconvinced
by the arguments in favor of recovery.6 9 Two unique policy arguments have
been made in an attempt to justify denial of wrongful death recovery while
allowing recovery for injuries. If the fetus is born alive, but injured, it has
become a "person" with at least the theoretical possibility of enduring the
consequences of its injury throughout life. A stillborn child incurs no such
risk.70 Secondly, where the child is born alive "[t]he responsibility of the
parents is immeasurably extended and broadened, or the child may neces-
saily become a charge upon the community,"71
Others have maintained that denial of an action creates serious injus-
tices. If no recovery is allowed, a wrong is inflicted without a remedy.72 The
child's mother cannot recover for the loss in her own action for personal
injuries.73 In the case of an intentional tort, a tortfeasor could foreclose his
67. Emphasis added.
68. In addition to the jurisdictions cited in note 20 supra, the following have
allowed recovery (for a total of nineteen): Gorke v. Le Clerc, 23 Conn. Sup. 256,
181 A.2d 448 (1962); Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, 11 Terry 258, 128 A.2d 557(Del. 1956); Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Valence v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 So. 2d 847 (La. Ct. App. 1951); Verkennes v.
Corr ea, 229 Minn. 365, 88 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101
N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957).
69. At the time of writing, twelve states deny recovery. Seven have expressly
held that unborn viable fetuses are not persons: Bayer v. Suttle, 23 Cal. App. 3d
361, 364-65, 100 Cal. Rptr. 212, 215 (1972); Stokes v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
213 So. 2d 695, 700 (Fla. 1968) (not a "minor child"); McKillip v. Zimmerman,
191 N.W.2d 706, 709 (Iowa 1971); Leccese v. McDonough, - Mass.
,279 N.E.2d 339, 341 (1972),; Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155
Neb. 17, 22, 50 N.W.2d 229, 232 (1951) (based, however, on lack of precedent);
Howell v. Rushing, 261 P.2d 217, 218 (Okla. 1953); Hogan v. McDaniel, 204
Tenn. 235, 243, 319 S.W.2d 221, 224 (1958). Five others have denied recovery
on other grounds: Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964); Endresz v.
Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969); Gay v.
Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966); Marko v. Philadelphia Transp.
Co., 420 Pa. 124, 216 A.2d 502 (1966); Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 210 Va.
138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969).
, 70. Leccese v. McDonough, Mass. , ,279 N.E.2d
339, 341 (1972).
71. Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 49, 202 A.2d 9, 11 (1964).
72. Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 2d 14, 20, 148
N.W.2d 107, 110 (1967).
73. Vitale v. Biando, 52 S.W.2d 24, 28 (St. L. Mo. App. 1932),appeal
quashed sub nom., State ex rel. Biando v. Haid, 60 S.W.2d 38 (Mo. 1933).
1974]
81
et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
own liability by killing the child rather than merely injuring it74 in a
manner which would allow live birth. It also seems anomalous to deny
recovery for injuries serious enough to cause death before birth, while
permitting recovery for less serious injuries that cause death after birth.75
Most cases arise out of automobile accidents and these type accidents seldom
injure the infant without killing it.76 Recovery advocates ask why an arbi-
trary line should be drawn between a live birth surviving only a few
seconds and the unborn.77
There would appear to be no valid reason to recognize a cause of action
for infants who survive birth but a few days78 while denying it to
infants who may have come within hours of birth before their injuries
brought about death. The damages are no more speculative in the stillbirth
cases and problems of proof are similar. There may be a presumption of
pecuniary loss to the parents,79 or nominal damages might be appropriate.8 0
In any case the difficulty in proving damages should not bar the cause
of action."'
D. Common Law Recovery
Recovery could possibly be based on the common law, rather than
statute. Although most courts have followed the rule of Baker v. Boltons2
that there is no common law action, 3 Massachusetts84 and Hawaii8 5 cur-
rently recognize a common law right of recovery for wrongful death. Mari-
time law also recognizes the cause of action.86 Civil actions were available
in colonial times.87 In at least one case prior to the passage of the Wrongful
Death Act, the Missouri Supreme Court allowed recovery for loss of services
74. Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 841 F.2d 75,77 (4th Cir. 1964).
75. Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 434, 167 N.E.2d 106, 108(1959).
76. Gross mechanical injury rarely leads to malformation. If the force is
strong enough to penetrate to the child, abortion will usually occur. Gruenwald,
Mechanisms of Abnormal Development, 44 ARcH. PATH. 398, 415 (1947).
77. Gorke v. Le Clerc, 23 Conn. Sup. 256, 261-62, 181 A.2d 448, 451(1962).
78. E.g., Steggall v. Morris, 863 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577 (En Banc 1953)
(death occurred 18 days after birth).
79. Rice v. Rizk, 458 S.W.2d 732, 735 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970); Degan v.
Jewell, 293 Mo. 80, 88, 239 S.W. 66, 68 (1922). But see Oliver v. Morgan, 73
S.W.2d 993, 997 (Mo. 1934).
80. Higgins v. Gosney, 435 S.W.2d 653, 660 (Mo. 1968).
81. Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 372, 304 N.E.2d 88,
90-91 (1973).
82. 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808).
83. Knorp v. Thompson, 352 Mo. 44, 175 S.W.2d 889 (1943). "A cause of
action for wrongful death was not generally cognizable at common law." Id. at
53, 175 S.W.2d at 895.
84. Gaudette v. Webb, - Mass. - , 284 N.E.2d 222 (1972).
85. United States v. Hayashi, 282 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1960).
86. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
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of a deceased child.88 The common law cause of action would, however,
have to be expanded to include viable unborns.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is logical support for both sides of the controversy. Several com-
mentators have expressed belief that Missouri would allow recovery for the
wrongful death of a viable unborn child.8 9 This author agrees. In light of
Steggall, why should recovery be allowed if the infant dies soon after birth,
but denied in the case of a more serious injury that causes death immedi-
ately before birth? Justice should not turn on such items of chance. The
result in Chrisafogeorgis should be followed in Missouri.
1RcHAR D. WooDs
88. James v. Christy, 18 Mo. 162 (1853).
89. E.g., S. Speiser, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 4 at 31 n.16 (1966);
Stubbs, Wrongful Death Action for Injury to an Unborn Child, 19 Mo. L. REv.
81, 82-83 (1954). These views were expressed prior to the recent amendment to
§ 537.090, RSMo 1969.
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